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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Burns Concrete, Burns Holdings, LLC
vs.
Teton Count

Supreme Court Case No. 46827-2019

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
in and for the County of Teton

HONORABLE DANE H. WATKINS, JR

Billie Siddoway

Robert B. Burns

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

Boise, Idaho

Boise, Idaho
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Burns Concrete, Burns Holdings, LLC
vs.
Teton County

§

§
§
§
§

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number:

Teton County District Court
Watkins, Dane H., Jr
05/21/2013
43527

CASE LlliFORMATION

Bonds
Cash Bond
4/10/2019
Counts: 1

Case Type: AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and Hl)

$100.00
Posted Cash

Case 02/28/2019 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

Cash Bond #CV-2013-165 $98.25
10/16/2015
Posted
10/16/2015
Converted
Counts: 1
Cash Bond #CV-2013-165 $200.00
10/16/2015
Converted
8/24/2015
Posted
Counts: 1

DATE

CASE ASSIGNJ\1-ENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2013-165
Teton County District Court
06/21/2013
Watkins, Dane H., Jr

PARTY INFORM.A TION

Lead Attorneys
Burns, Robert Brett
Retained
208-562-4900(W)

Burns Concrete

Plaintiff

Burns, Robert Brett
Retained
208-562-4900(W)

Burns Holdings, LLC

Defendant

Teton County

Siddoway, Billie Jean
Retained
208-354-2990(W)

Counter Claimant

Teton County

Siddoway, Billie Jean
Retained
208-354-2990(W)

DA TE

05/21/2013

EVENTS

&

ORDERS OF THE C0t:RT

("IDEX

ffl New Case Filed Other Claims (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
New Case Filed - Other Claims

65/21/2013

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H, or the other A
listings below Paid by: Moffatt Thomas Receipt number: 0053795 Dated: 5/21/2013 Amount:
$96.00 (Check) For: Burns Concrete (plaintiff)

05/21/2013

Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Plaintiff: Burns Concrete Attorney Retained Robert B Burns
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
05/21/2013

Summons Issued (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Summons Issued

06/03/2013

1) Summons Returned (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Summons Returned

06/03/2013

'\I Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Affidavit OfService

06/03/2013

'I] Motion (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Motion for Disqualification Without Cause

06/04/2013

1) Order (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory)
Order for Disqualification without Cause

06/11/2013

Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Defendant: Teton County, Attorney Retained Kathy Spitzer

06/11/2013

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by:
Spitzer, Kathy (attorney for Teton County,) Receipt number: 0053996 Dated: 6/1112013
Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: Teton County, (defendant)

06/11/2013

ffl Answer (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Answer & Counterclaim

06/21/2013

I) Order (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Order ofAssignment

06/26/2013

'1ft Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order ofAssignment Corrected Copy

07/05/2013

'1ft Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Reply to Counterclaim

08/01/2013

'II Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice OfService of Discovery (Plaintiffs' First Set ofDiscovery Requests to Defendant)

08/20/2013

'1ft Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendants Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Discovery Requests to
Defendant

10/11/2013

ffl Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Service ofDiscovery

05/19/2014

ffl ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice of Proposed Dismissal

06/02/2014

ffl Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Aifi--•JMiull~~ .

0i/22/2014

ffl Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 08/21/2014 08:30 AM)

08/11/2014

"IJ Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Pkiintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
08/11/2014

'ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

08/11/2014

IJ Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Affidavit ofKimberly D Evans Ross

08/11/2014

'11 Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion to File Amended Reply to Counterclaim

08/11/2014

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Support ofMotion to File Amended Reply to Counterclaim

08/21/2014

ffl Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 8/21/2014
Time: 8:38 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Kimberly EVans Ross, Plaintiffs Counsel
Kathy Spitzer, Defendants Counsel

08/21/2014

08/21/2014

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 08/2112014 08: 30 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

'ffl Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 11120/2014 10:00 AM) for Summary Judgment

08/21/2014

Status Conference (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 08/21/2014 08: 30 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

08/22/2014

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 8/21/2014
Time: 8: 26 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:

08/28/2014

ffl Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice of Change ofAddress

08/29/2014

'ffl Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Change OfAddress

-09/18/20 I 4

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion For Summary Judgment

09/18/2014

ffl Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
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Printed on 05/03/2019 at 4:35 PM

Page 4

TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Affidavit Of Kathy Spitzer
09/18/2014

II Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Support ofSummary Judgment

09/19/2014

II Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice OfHearing Re: Motion To File Amended Reply To Counterclaim

10/21/2014

11 Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum In Reply To Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

11/05/2014

11 Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Affidavit ofKirk Burns

11/05/2014

"II Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Opposition to Teton County's Motion/or Summary Judgment

11/12/2014

I) Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Reply In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

11/12/2014

I) Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Errata

11/20/2014

I} Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 11/20/2014
Time: 10:05 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Plaintiffs Attorney Emily Evans Ross
Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer

11/20/2014

Case Taken Under Advisement (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 11/20/2014 10:00 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement for Summary Judgment

11/20/2014

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 11120/2014 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at: for Summary Judgment Less than
200

11/20/2014

Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
for Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 11/20/2014 10:00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

12/02/2014

I} Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Granting Plailntiffs' Motion to File Amended Pleading

12/19/2014

I} Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum Dec is on and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment

12/29/2014

I) Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Amended Reply to Counterclaim
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
12/31/2014

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Claim/or Attorney Fees

01/20/2015

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration ofMemorandum Decision and Order RE: Motions for
Summary Judgment

01/20/2015

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Reconsideration

03/18/2015

'IJ Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
. Order Setting Costs ($22,348.00)

05/04/2015

11 Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice ofHearing RE: Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Decision and Order RE:
Motions for Summary Judgment

05/04/2015

111 Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion/or Leave to Appear Telephonically

05/04/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 06/04/2015 01: 30 PM)

05/19/2015

'ti Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration

05/28/2015

'Ii Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Granting Motion/or Leave to Appear Telephonically

06/01/2015

'IJ Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Reply in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration

06/02/2015

'II Certificate of Mailing (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr).
Certificate of Service ofOrder Granitng Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically

06/04/2015

m

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 6/4/2015
Time: 1:38 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Plaintiffs Attorney Kimberly Evans Ross
Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer

06/04/2015

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 06/04/2015 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated at:

06/04/2015

Case Taken Under Advisement (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Case Taken Under Advisement

06/04/2015

Motion Hearing (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 06/0412015 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

06/24/2015

II Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion/or Reconsideration

06/30/2015

'II Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendant's Memorandum Of Costs And Claim For Attorney Fees

07/09/2015

I) Substitution of Counsel (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice ofSubstitution Of Counsel

07/13/2015

'II Judgment (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Final Judgment

07/13/2015

Civil Disposition Entered (Judicial Officer: Watkiris, Dane H., Jr)
Civil Disposition entered/or: Teton County,, Defendant; Burns Concrete, Plaintiff; Burns
Holdings, LLC, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/13/2015

07/13/2015

Case Status Closed But Pending (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Case Status Closed But Pending: Closed

07/13/2015

Dismissed With Prejudice
Party (Bums Holdings, LLC)
Party (Bums Concrete)
Party (Teton County)

08/21/2015

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid by: Parsons Behle
Receipt number: 0060576 Dated: 8/2112015 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Burns Concrete
(plaintiff) and Burns Holdings, LLC (plaintiff)

08/21/2015

'II Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice ofAppeal

08/21/2015

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies O/Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by:
Parson, Behle Receipt number: 0060577 Dated: 8/21/2015 Amount: $200.00 (Check)

08/24/2015

Voided Receipt (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Receipt Voided (Receipt# 605 77 dated 8/2112015)

08/24/2015

Bond Posted - Cash (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 60584 Dated 8124/2015 for 200.00)

08/24/2015

Condition of Bond (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Condition ofBond: payment for Clerk's record

10/16/2015

Bond Posted - Cash (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 60992 Dated 10/16/2015 for 98.25)

10/16/2015

Condition of Bond (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Condition ofBond: for final payment of Clerk's Record

10/16/2015

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Bond converted - other party (Transaction number 17953 dated 10/16/2015 amount 200.00)

10/16/2015

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Bond converted- other party (Transaction number 17954 dated 10/16/2015 amount 98.25)

08/15/2016

ffl Judgment (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Final Judgment
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
11/23/2016

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
2016 Opinion No. 110

12/12/2016

1#3 Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Remittitur

12/22/2016

ffl Substitution of Counsel (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Substitution Of Counsel

12/30/2016

11 Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs Renewed Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

12/30/2016

11 Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Renewed Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

01/09/2017

01/12/2017

Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendant: Teton County, Attorney Retained Billie Jean Siddoway

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion/or Leave to Appear Telephonically for the Hearing RE: Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment

01/12/2017

ffl Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

01/12/2017

'ffl Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Granting Motion/or Leave to Appear Telephonically

01/20/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 04/1012017 02: 30 AM)

03/27/2017

~ Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion/or Partial Summary
Judgment

03/30/2017

ffl Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Second Affidavit ofKirk Burns

04/04/2017

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Reply in Support ofPlaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

04/10/2017

ffl Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 4/10/2017
Time: 2:44 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Amy Bland
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Plaintiffs Attorney Robert Burns
Defendant's Attorney Billie Siddoway

04/10/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 04/10/2017 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at: less than 200
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
04/10/2017

04/21/2017

Motion Hearing (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 04/10/2017 02:30 PM· District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at: less than 200

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Order

04/21/2017

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Response to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Order

05/02/2017

"I; Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

07/17/2017

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Request For Trial Setting

08/01/2017

11 Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 08/03/2017 02:00 PM)

08/03/2017

11 Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 8/3/2017
Time: 3:01 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Plaintiff's Attorney Robert Burns
Defendant's Attorney Billie Siddoway

08/03/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 08/03/2017 02:00 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

08/03/2017

Scheduling Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 08/03/2017 02:00 PM· District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

08/07/2017

ffl Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Setting Trial And Pretrial Conference

08/24/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 01/17/2018 01:30 PM)

08/24/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/07/2018 10:30 AM)

to/06/2017

'ffl:Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiff's Disclosure ofExpert Witnesses

I 0/20/2017

ffl Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Service Of Discovery Request

10/26/2017

'f; Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
PAGES OF 17
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Notice OfService
11/09/2017

'II Certificate of Mailing (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Certificate Of Service

11/17/2017

'II Certificate of Mailing (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Certificate Of Service

11/20/2017

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's Joint Motion/or Protective Order and to Quash
Subpoena

11/20/2017

ffl Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Third Affidavit ofKirk Burns

11/20/2017

'ffl Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Second Affidavit of Robert B. Burns

11/20/2017

'fl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion to Shorten Time RE: Plaintiffs' Joint Motion/or Protective Order and to Quash
Subpoena

11/20/2017

'ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion/or Leave to Appeaer Telephonically for the Hearing RE: Plaintiffs' Joint Motion/or
Protective Order and to Quash Subpoena

11/20/2017

11/27/2017

"IIMotion
Plaintiffs' Joint Motoinfor Protective Order and to Quash Subpoena

tJJ Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Hearing
Hearingdate: 11/27/2017
Time: 3:37 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Bob Burns, Plaintiff's Attorney
Billie Siddoway, Defense Attorney

11/27/2017

11 Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Protective Order and to Qaush Subpoena

11/27/2017

Motion Hearing (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
to quash,for protective order Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 11/27/2017 03:30 PM·
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated at:

11/28/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 11/27/2017 03:30 PM) to quash,for protective order

11/28/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 11/27/2017 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated at: to quash,for protective order less
than 200

11/28/2017
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165

II Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Staying Bank ofIdaho's Production Pursuant to Subpoena
11/28/2017

11 Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Staying BAnk ofIdaho's Production Pursuant to Subpoena

11/30/2017

11 Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Objection to Proposed Protective Order

11/30/2017

II Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Hearing

11/30/2017

Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02107/2018 10: 30 AM: Hearing Vacated

11/30/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 02/22/2018 01:30 PM)

11/30/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 03/07/2018 01:30 PM)

12/07/2017

11 Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Certificate Of Service

12/08/2017

11 Stipulation (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Stipulated Protection Order

12/18/2017

11 Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Production Of Documents

12/18/2017

ffl Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Third Affidavit Of Robert B. Burns

12/18/2017

'fl Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice O/Service

12/18/2017

11 Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel Discovery

12/18/2017

°II Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion To Leave To Appear Telephically For The Hearing Re: Plaintiffs' Motion To Compel
Production Of Documents

12/29/2017

11 Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Compel Production Of Documents

12/29/2017

ffl Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Service

01/03/2018

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion in Limine RE: Measure ofDamages

01/03/2018

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion to Reconsider Protective Order and Motion for Limited Discovery Without
Interference
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
01/03/2018

'fl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Summary Judgment

01/03/2018

I) Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Reconsider Order Granting Summary Judgment

01/03/2018

11 Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Reconsider Protective Order and Motion for Limited Discovery Without Interference

01/03/2018

11 Memorandum In Support of Motion
in Limine RE: Measures of Damages

01/08/2018

01/08/2018

IJNotice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Hearing

11 Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically

01/10/2018

01/10/2018

Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice of Withdrawal ofPortion ofExhibit to Motion in Limine RE Measures ofDamages

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Measure of Damages

01/10/2018

01/10/2018

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Fourth Affidait ofKirk Burns

'fl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel

01/10/2018

I) Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Fourth Affidavit ofRobert B. Burns

01/10/2018

11 Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiff's Objection to Hearing of Defendant's Motions at January 17, 2018 Hearing

01/10/2018

I) Memorandum
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Measure ofDamages

01/12/2018

I) Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production ofDocuments

01/17/2018

'fl Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Pre-Trial Conference
Hearing date: 1/17/2018
Time: 1:03 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Plaintiff's Attorney

01/17/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Pre-Triatconference scheduled on 01/17/2018 01:30 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated at: Motion to Compel
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Motion to Reconsider less than 200
01/17/2018

Case Taken Under Advisement (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 01/17/2018 01:30 PM· Case Taken
Under Advisement Motion to Compel
Motion to Reconsider

01/17/2018

Pre-trial Conference (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion to Compel
Motion to Reconsider Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on O1IJ712018 OJ: 30
PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number a/Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

01/26/2018

ffl Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order

01/30/2018

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion For Leave To Appear Telephonically For The Pre-Trial Conference

02/02/2018

Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Request For Telephone Conference Re: Discovery issue

02/07/2018

CANCELED Jury Trial (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Vacated
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/0712018 10: 30 AM: Hearing Vacated

02/12/2018

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Motion in Limine

02/15/2018

ffl Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order Granting Motion/or Leave to Appear Telephonically

02/21/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs' Witness List

02/21/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendant's Pre-Trial Disclosures

02/21/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs' Trial Brief

02/21/2018

ffl ROA - Converted Event
Plaintiff's Statement RE: Liability and Settlement

02/21/2018

ffl Miscellaneous
Plaintiffs' Exhibit List

02/22/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Defendant's BriefOf Legal Authority

02/22/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 02/22/2018 01:30 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

02/22/2018

Pre-trial Conference (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 02/22/2018 01:30 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:

02/22/2018

'fl Minute Entry
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Pre-Trial Conference
Hearing date: 2/22/2018
Time: 1:31 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Gabriela Hermosillo
Tape Number:

02/23/2018

"fll Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Intent To Serve Trial Subpoena Duces Tecum

02/23/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Trial Subpoena Duces
Tecum

02/23/2018

ffl Notice (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Intent To Serve Trial Subpoena Duces Tecum

02/23/2018

02/28/2018

Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Trial Subpoena Duces Tecum

ffl Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice OfService

02/28/2018

'fl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plantiffs Motion In Limine #1 Re: Limiting Testimony Of Defendant's Expert Rick S. Hoffman

02/28/2018

'ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum In Support Of Plaitiffs Motion In Limine # 1 Re: Limiting Testimony Of
Defendat's Expert Rick S. Hoffman

02/28/2018

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
'Plaintiffs' Motion In llmine #2 Re: <imiting Trial Testimony OfJames Walters

02/28/2018

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine #2 Re: Limiting trial Testimony Of
James Walters

02/28/2018

'fl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine #3 Re: Introduction Of Confidential Financial Statements Subject
To Protective Order And Motion To Seal The Same

02/28/2018

ffl Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Memorandum In Support Of Plaitiffs' Motion In Limine #3 Re: Introduction Of Corifidential
Financial Statements Subject To Protective Order And Motion To Seal The Same

02/28/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plamtiffs' Am~hlllltU.

03/05/2018

ffl Notice of Service (.fndicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Service

03/07/2018

fiil Minu.te Entry (Judicial Officer: Walker, Jason D.)
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 3/7/2018
Time: 11:06 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Tape Number:
Plaintiffs Attorney Robert Burns
Defendant's Attorney Lindsey Blake

03/07/2018

03/07/2018

Court Trial Started (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Court Trial scheduled on 03/07/2018 01:30 PM: Court Trial Started

Iii DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Court Trial scheduled on 03/07/2018 01:30 PM· District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated at:

03/07/2018

Court Trial (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
03/07/2018-03/09/2018

Hearing result/or Court Trial scheduled on 03/07/2018 01:30 PM· Court Trial Started

03/16/2018

'11 Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 05/1112018 09:00 AM)

05/01/2018

Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Notice Of Service

05/11/2018

Court Trial Started (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Court Trial scheduled on 05/11/2018 09:00 AM: Court Trial Started

05/11/2018

Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Hearing result/or Court Trial scheduled on 05/11/2018 09:00 AM: Court Trial Started

08/24/2018

I} Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
[Defendant's Proposed} Findings Of Facts And Conclusion OfLaw

08/24/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusion Of Law

08/30/2018

ffl Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Motion/or Extension a/Time to Respond

08/30/2018

ffl Order (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Order on Defendant's Motion/or Extension

08/31/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Rebuttal of Defendant's Proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw and Supplemental
Proposed Conclusions ofLaw

09/04/2018

'(I Motion (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., k)
Motion to Clarify or, in the Alternative to Reopen the Trial to Accept Additional Evidence

09/041~18

qJ Response to Request for Discovery (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Response To Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions oflaw

09/17/2018

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Plainitffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Clarify or, in the alternative, to Reopen the
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
Trial to Accept Additional Evidence

10/04/2018

'ti Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

10/25/2018

'II Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs Motion/or Amended and Additional Findings of Fact

10/25/2018

11Motion
Plaintiffs Motion/or Amended and Additional Findings ofFact

10/31/2018

ffl Notice of Hearing
Notice ofHearing RE-Motion/or Amended and Additional Findings ofFact

11/05/2018

fflMotion
Motion/or Leave to Appear Telephonfcally

12/12/2018

'II Memorandum
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion/or Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

12/17/2018

'II Reply
Reply Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion/or Amended and Additional Findings of
Fact and Conclusions ofLaw

12/19/2018

'ffl Motion Hearing - Civil (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)

12/19/2018

'II Court Minutes

01/18/2019

'ffl Memorandum
Decision and Order Re: Motion for Amended and Additional Findings ofFact and
Conclusions of Law

02/06/2019

02/14/2019

'IINotice
Notice of Opposition

'II Request
for Immediate Entry ofJudgment

02/14/2019

'II objection
to Proposed Judgment

02/14/2019

ffl Motion to Dismiss

02/14/2019

'II Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Dismiss

02/14/2019

fflRequest
Second Request for Immediate Entry ofJudgment

02/15/2019

·R~t
Third Request for Immediate Entry ofJudgement

02/15/2019

fflAmended
Amended Third Request for Immediate Entry ofJudgement
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
02/28/2019

1i1udgment

02/28/2019

Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Watkins, Dane H., Jr)
Comment()
Party (Burns Holdings, LLC; Burns Concrete; Teton County)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Burns Holdings, LLC; Burns Concrete
Against: Teton County
Entered Date: 02/28/2019
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 02/28/2019
Monetary Award:
Amount: $1,049,250.90

02/28/2019

Civil Disposition Entered

02/28/2019

ffl Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
Notice ofAppeal

03/07/2019

1iorder
Augmenting Appeal

03/11/2019

"II Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Memorandum ofAttorney Fees and Costs

03/11/2019

'I} Declaration
Declaration ofKirk Burns

03/11/2019

1§ Declaration
Declaration of Robert B. Burns

03/25/2019

1iobjection
Objection to Plaintiffs' Memorandum for Attorney's Fees and Costs

03/28/2019

111 Appeal Cover/Title Page

03/28/2019

"t; Clerk's Certificate of Service

03/28/2019

111 Case Summary

03/28/2019

03/29/2019

'11Motion
for Extension of Time

'ti order
Granting Extension of Time for Clerk's Record

04/01/2019

04/09/2019

mReply
Reply to Defendant's Objection to Memo ofAttorney Fees and Costs

ffl Appeal Filed in SuJIIWile Court
Notice of Cross-Appeal

04/10/2019
04/19/2019

Bond Posted - Cash

ffl Transcript Lodged
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TETON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2013-165
04/19/2019

11 Transcript Lodged

04/22/2019

'llArnended
Amended Notice ofAppeal

04/30/2019

'11 Exhibit List/Log

05/03/2019

11 Clerk's Certificate of Service

05/03/2019

'ti Certificate of Service
FL"IA,.._CL<\L INFORMATION

DATE

Defendant Teton County·
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/3/2019

0.00
0.00
0.00

Plaintiff Bums Concrete
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/3/2019

354.00
354.00
0.00

Plaintiff Bums Holdings, LLC
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/3/2019

0.00
0.00
0.00

Plaintiff Bums Concrete
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/3/2019

0.00

Plaintiff Bums Concrete
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/3/2019

0.00

Plaintiff Bums Concrete
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/3/2019

100.00
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsRespondents,

Order Augmenting Appeal

Docket No. 46827-2019
V.

Teton County District Court
CV-2013-165

TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-A

ellant.

WHEREAS, a Clerk's Record having been filed with this Court in prior appeal No.
43527-2015, Bums Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County(Teton County No. CV-2013-165); therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk's Record in this appeal shall be augmented to
include the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 43527-2015, Bums Concrete, Inc. v. Teton
County (Teton County No. CV-2013-165).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a Limited
Clerk's Record with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in this Notice of
Appeal together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included in the
Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 43527-2015. The due date for filing the Clerk's Record
with this Court shall remain set for May 9, 2019.
DATED this __
?t_h___ day of March, 2019.
For the Supreme Court

for

? > f e : ~ ~...~
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
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.}
FILED
20l3HAY2 J PH J:55
TETON COUN
DISTRICT

ltuWf Ha

Robert B. Bums, ISB No. 3744
Kimberly D. Evans Ross, ISB No. 6900
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

900 Pier View Drive Suite 206
Post Office Box 51505
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone (208) 522-6700
Facsimile (208) 522-5111
rbb@moffatt.com
kde@moffatt.com
19449.0005
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company
Plaintiffs,
VS.

TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Idaho,

CaseNo.

GV/3-/(p,S

VERIFIED COMPLAIN T FOR:
(i) DECLARAT ORY JUDGMENT ,
(ii) BREACH OF CONTRACT AND
RESCISSIO N, (iii) UNJUST
ENRICHME NT
Fee Category: A
Fee: $96.00

Defendant.
Plaintiffs Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings, LLC (jointly, "Bums" or
"Developer"), as their complaint in this action against Defendant Teton County, allege as
follows:

VERIFIED COMPLAIN T - 1

Client: 2726239.4
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•
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

Bums holds all rights of the defined "Developer" under that certain

Developer's Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC, made by and between Bums Holdings, LLC
and Teton County and recorded September 5, 2007 by Teton County as Instrument #191250 (the
"Agreement").
2.

A true and correct copy of the recorded Agreement is attached hereto as

Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Bums now seeks (a) a decree that Teton County is estopped from rezoning

the property described in the Agreement and that the time for constructing the "Permanent
Facility" defined in the Agreement has been tolled since November 15, 2007, when the Teton
County Board of County Commissioners first voted to deny issuance of the land use approvals
required for construction of the Permanent Facility; (b) a decree establishing Teton County's
anticipatory repudiation and material breach and Bums' rescission of the Agreement, together
with judgment against Teton County for all damages incurred by Bums related to or arising out
of the Agreement; and (c) in the event the Agreement should be held to be void or voidable by
Teton County, judgment against Teton County for restitution damages in an amount equal to the
benefits by which Teton County was unjustly enriched as a result of the public improvements
constructed by Bums pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.

PARTIES
4.

Bums Concrete, Inc. is an Idaho corporation engaged in the manufacture

and sale of concrete, and Bums Holdings, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company engaged in
the holding of real property, with the two companies being under common ownership and

together holding all rights of the defined Developer under the Agreement.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 2
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•
5.

Teton County is a political subdivision of the State ofldaho.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6.

Jurisdiction exists in this court under Idaho Code § 5-514.

7.

Venue exists in Teton County under Idaho Code§ 5-403 .
RELEVANTTERMSOF THEAGREEMENT

8.

The real property subjected to the Agreement is located within the Area of

Impact of the City of Driggs, Teton County, Idaho and described in Exhibit "A" to the
Agreement (the "Property").
9.

Pursuant to Paragraph 1 (titled, Zoning Ordinance Amendment) of the

Agreement, Teton County agreed to "adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Area of Impact
Zoning Map to rezone the property to Ml." The Property was thereafter rezoned by Teton
County to Ml (Light Industrial).
10.

Pursuant to Paragraph 2 (titled, Conditions on Development) of the

Agreement:
The sole use allowed and restrictions pursuant to this
conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows:

a.
The property shall be used exclusively for the
operation of a ready-mix concrete manufacturing plant.
b.
. . . . This development and operation shall be
subject to the following terms and conditions, in addition to the
other terms hereof:
(i)
Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete
Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property.
(ii)
All operations on the property shall comply with all
applicable and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances and laws
relating to dust, noise, water quality and air quality.

(iii)

Attached as Exhibit "B" - Site Plan, and

Exhibit "C" - Building Elevations, and by this reference

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 3
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•
incorporated herein are plans for construction ofDeveloper's
intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility").

(iv)
Immediately upon execution of this Agreement,
Developer shall order and commence construction of the
Permanent Facility. The installation of the Permanent Facility
shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of
this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or
any other act offorce majeure or action beyond Developer's
control.
(v)
In order to facilitate and support the construction of
the Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite
commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and operate a
temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in Exhibit "B" Site Plan and Exhibit "D".
(vi)
In the event that the Permanent Facility is not
completed within the time allowed herein, the County shall have
the right to revoke the authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
The grant of authority of the Temporary Facility is to allow
Developer to operate Developer's business until the Permanent
Facility is constructed. The authority to operate the Temporary
Facility shall terminate upon completion of the Permanent Facility
even if sooner than the described eighteen (18) month time period.
(Bolding in original; italics added.)
11.

Pursuant to Paragraph 5 (titled, Zoning Reversion Consent) of the

Agreement:
The execution of this Agreement shall be deemed written
consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions
imposed by this Agreement. No reversion shall take place until
after a hearing on this matter pursuant to Idaho Code §67-651 lA.
Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this Agreement and in
Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached
Exhibit "A " is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends
or is abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may, upon
receiving a recommendation from the City's governing board,
order that the property will revert to the zoning designation (and

land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing immediately
prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to the
C3, Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation.
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(Italics added.)
12.

Pursuant to Paragraph 8 (titled, Default and Remedies) of the Agreement:

In the event of a default or breach of this Agreement or of
any of its terms or conditions, the party alleging default shall give
the breaching party not less than thirty (30) days Notice of Default,
in writing, unless an emergency exists threatening the health and
safety of the public. If such an emergency exists, written notice
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the
circumstances of the breach. The time of the giving of the notice
shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of Default.
The Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default
and, where appropriate, the manner and period of time during
which said default may be satisfactorily cured. During any period
of curing, the party charged shall not be considered in default for
the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the institution
of legal proceedings. If the default is cured, then no default shall
exist and the charging party shall take no further action.
(Italics added.)
13.

Finally, pursuant to Paragraph 12.b of the Agreement, the Agreement runs

with the land, binds the Property in perpetuity, and inures to the benefit of and is enforceable by
Developer and its assigns.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

14.

Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibit C of the Agreement expressly provide for

and depict Bums' construction of its desired 75-foot "Permanent Facility."
15 .

In accordance with Teton County's requirements, the City of Driggs'

Planning and Zoning Commission heard on July 11, 2007 and unanimously recommended for
approval by Teton County both the Agreement and the issuance of a conditional use permit
allowing the 75-foot height of the Permanent Facility (the "CUP").
16.

Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2007 Teton County and Bums entered

into the Agreement and Teton County caused the Agreement to be recorded.
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•

17.

Following the execution of the Agreement, Bums expended many

hundreds of thousands of dollars constructing and implementing the commitments imposed
under the Agreement, including without limitation (a) erecting and operating the existing
concrete batch plant (the "Temporary Facility") required under Paragraph 2.b(v) of the
Agreement, which required Bums to incur substantial expense for site demolition, remediating
the site for prior waste disposal, clearing and grubbing the site, extending utilities to the site, and
transporting to and erecting on the site the Temporary Facility; (b) constructing the road and
highway improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement, which required
Bums to incur substantial expense for barrier fencing with concrete foundations, new tum lanes,
landscaping, and performance bonds; and (c) applying for and taking all actions necessary to
obtain the CUP and variance required to construct the Permanent Facility.
18.

After Bums had incurred the substantial costs required by the Agreement,

and notwithstanding the unanimous recommendation for approval by the City of Driggs'
Planning and Zoning Commission and the determination of Teton County's attorney that the
Agreement was a valid and binding contract, the Teton County Board of County Commissioners
voted to deny the CUP on November 15, 2007.
19.

Bums confirmed with Teton County's director of planning and zoning,

Kurt Hibbert, on November 20, 2007 that Teton County would not issue a building permit for the
construction of the Permanent Facility specified in the Agreement.
20.

Bums has undertaken every act reasonably possible to obtain the CUP and

variance required by Teton County for Bums to construct the Permanent Facility, which CUP
and variance Teton County has refused to issue.
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•

•
21.

Bums cannot now construct the Permanent Facility without an amendment

to the ordinances of Teton County, over which amendment Bums has no control.
COUNT!
(Declaratory Relief)

22.

Bums hereby incorporates above paragraphs 1 through 21.

23.

When considering whether to expand its business operations into Teton

County, Bums met with representatives of both Teton County and the City of Driggs to
determine whether and where to construct a concrete batch plant in the area. All such
representatives encouraged Bums to construct such a plant, with both Teton County and the City
of Driggs designating the Property as the specific site where Bums should construct it.
24.

Bums purchased the Property based on the representations made by Teton

County and the City of Driggs and with the reasonable expectancy of entering into the
Agreement with the County, after having first filed for a change of zoning for the Property to
allow for the construction and operation of the proposed Permanent Facility.
25.

Bums has operated and continues to operate the Temporary Facility in

accordance with the terms of the Agreement. However, Bums cannot now and has not ever been
able to construct the Permanent Facility by reason of actions and inaction by Teton County over
which Bums has no control.
26.

Nevertheless, by letter dated October 23, 2012 from the Teton County

Prosecuting Attorney, Teton County resubmitted to the City of Driggs a previously withdrawn
application for a recommendation by the city that the zoning of the Property should revert to C3
(Service and Highway Commercial). Although a final decision on the application was tabled by
the City of Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission until June 12, 2013, Teton County's
proposal to rezone the Property remains pending.
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27.

•

•

By reason of (a) the change in Teton County's position with respect to

Bums' construction of the Permanent Facility from the time the Agreement was executed, (b) the
benefits obtained by Teton County under the Agreement from Bums and the costs incurred by
Bums under the Agreement, as referenced in above paragraph 17, and (c) Teton County's
conduct in inducing Bums to provide the benefits and incur the costs referenced in above
paragraph 17, it would be unconscionable to permit Teton County to rezone the Property to C3
and Teton County should thus be estopped from doing so,
28.

Additionally, by letter dated November 5, 2012 from the Teton County

Prosecuting Attorney to Bums' counsel, Teton County asserted that the clause in Paragraph
2.b(iv) of the Agreement extending the 18-month period to construct the Permanent Facility "is
inapplicable to the present situation" and threatened to file suit to force Bums' removal of the
Temporary Facility from the Property.
29.

By reason of Teton County's efforts to rezone the Property and its threat

to file suit to force removal of the Temporary Facility, an actual and existing controversy
between Bums and Teton County exists with respect to whether (a) Teton County should be
estopped from rezoning the Property for so long as Bums is not in material breach of the
Agreement and (b) whether the time for constructing the Permanent Facility has been tolled since
November 15, 2007, when the Teton County Board of County Commissioners first voted to deny
issuance of the CUP required for the construction of the Permanent Facility, or such other date as
the Court may determine to be applicable.
30.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 10-1201 and 10-1203, a determination of the

respective rights and obligations of Bums and Teton County with respect to the rezoning the
Property and the Agreement is subject to declaratory relief. Bums is therefore entitled to
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declaratory judgment against Teton County, establishing (a) that Teton County is estopped and
enjoined from rezoning the Property for so long as Bums is not in material breach of the
Agreement and (b) that the 18-month period specified in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement to
construct the Permanent Facility has been and will remain tolled until Teton County has taken all
such action within its control that is necessary for it to permit the construction of the Permanent
Facility.

COUNT II
(Breach of Contract and Rescission)
31.

Bums hereby incorporates above paragraphs 1 through 30.

32.

By letter dated October 4, 2012 from its Board of County Commissioners,

Teton County revoked Bums' authority to operate its temporary facility and demanded its
immediate removal from the Property.
33.

In response to Teton County's revocation and demand, counsel for Bums

provided Teton County written notice by letter dated October 15, 2012 that Teton County's
action constituted a breach of the Agreement and demanded the following:
(i)
If the County contends the Developer has breached or is in
default of the Agreement, that the County provide the Developer
with "not less than thirty (30) days Notice of Default, in writing
... [and] specify the nature of the alleged default and, where
appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said
default may be satisfactorily cured" - in accordance with the
requirements imposed under Paragraph 8 of the Agreement;
(ii)
That the County take no further action adverse to the
Developer's rights under the Agreement without first providing a
written Notice of Default and opportunity to cure the alleged
default- as is expressly required by Paragraph 8 of the Agreement;
and
(iii)

That the County provide the Developer with a written

retraction of its notice of revocation dated October 4, 2012, within
30 days of the County's receipt of this letter - which demand is
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hereby made subject to the Developer's reservation of rights to
treat any further action by the County that is adverse to the
Developer's rights under the Agreement or the County's failure to
retract its notice of revocation within said 30 days as a repudiation
of the County's obligations under the Agreement.
34.

Teton County responded to Bums' foregoing notice and demand, (a) by

acting to rezone the Property, as further alleged in above paragraph 26, and (b) by letter dated
November 5, 2012 from the Teton County Prosecuting Attorney to Bums' counsel, rejecting all
of the demands made by Bums and threatening to file suit to compel Bums' removal of the
Temporary Faci,lity from the Property.
35.

By undertaking the action alleged in above paragraph 34, Teton County

has repudiated its obligations under and materially breached the Agreement.
36.

Bums therefore seeks judgment rescinding the Agreement and awarding

Bums the damages it incurred as a result of its reasonable expectations of entering into the
Agreement and reliance on and performance under the Agreement, in the amount to be proved at
trial.
COUNTIII
(Unjust Enrichment)

37.

Bums hereby incorporates above paragraphs 1 through 36.

38.

Bums' construction of the road and highway improvements alleged in

above paragraph 17 conferred a benefit upon Teton County that would be inequitable for it to
retain without payment.
39.

Accordingly, in the event the Agreement should be held to be void or

voidable by Teton County, Bums seeks judgment awarding it restitution damages, in the amount
to be proved at trial.
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40.

ATTORNEY FEES

•

Bums has brought this civil action under and pursuant to the Agreement

and is therefore entitled under Paragraph 12.e thereof to be awarded its reasonable attorney fees
and costs.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Bums prays for judgment as follows:
1.

for a decree enjoining Teton County from rezoning the Property for so

long as Bums is not in material breach of the Agreement;
2.

for a decree establishing that the 18-month period to construct the

Permanent Facility specified in the Agreement has been and remains tolled;
3.

for a decree establishing Teton County's material breach and Bums'

rescission of the Agreement, together with an award for all damages Bums has incurred;
4.

in the event the Agreement should be held to be unenforceable, for an

award of restitution damages;
5.

for an award of all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees,

incurred by Bums; and
6.

for such other and additional relief as may be just and proper.

DATED this / 7~day of May 2013.
MOFFA TI, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

•

)
) ss.
)

KIRK BURNS, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
He is the PRESIDENT of BURNS CONCRETE, INC., the corporation named
in the above-entitled proceeding, and the MANAGER of BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, the
limited liability company named in the above-entitled proceeding, and is authorized to make this
verification in their behalf.
He has read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT, knows the contents
thereof, and the same are true to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

_jQ_ day of May, 2013.

Residing
My Commission Ex
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Index lo. AGREEMENT

DEVELO PER'S AGREEMENT for BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC
:,-f

On the .3 /--day of -A . . . ~
, 2007, Teton County, Idaho (hereinafter
referred to as "County"), and Btn;Hold ings, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company
(hereinafter referred to as "Developer"), the owner of the real property described in the
attached Exhibit "A" enter into the following agreement:
WHEREA S, the Developer has applied for a zone change from C3, Service and
Highway Commercial to M 1, Light Industrial, for certain real property described in
Exhibit "A", attached hereto and located in the City of Driggs Area of Impact, Teton
County Idaho, and hereinafter referred to as "the property"; and
WHEREAS, the Developer has requested the zone change for the purpose of
developing a concrete batch plant facility on the property; and
WHEREAS, the County, pursuant to Section 67-6511A, Idaho Code, has the
authority to conditionally rezone the property and to enter into a development agreement for
the purpose of allowing, by agreement, a specific development to proceed in a specific area
and for a specific purpose or use which is appropriate in the area, but for which all allowed
uses for the requested zoning may not be appropriate pursuant to the Idaho Code and the
City of Driggs Zoning Ordinance, adopted by the County as the official zoning ordinance
for the Driggs Area of Impact; and
WHEREAS, the County and the Developer desire to formalize and clarify the
respective obligations of the parties, it is agreed as follows:
1.
Zoning Ordinance Amendment: The City of Driggs (hereinafter referred to as
"City") has recommended approval of, and the County hereby grants, the zone change to M
1, Light Industrial, for the property, and will adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Area
of Impact Zoning Map to rezone the property to M 1.
2.
Conditions on Development: The sole use allowed and restrictions pursuant to
this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows:
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a.
The property shall be used exclusively for the operation of a ready-mix
concrete manufac turing facility.
b.
At the current time the property has been re-zoned to M 1, Light
Industrial as described in paragrap h 1. above. Part of such approval and recomme ndation
was based upon execution of this developm ent agreemen t to identify responsibilities and
obligations pertainin g to certain matters relating to the improvem ent and operation of the
property. This developm ent and operation shall be subject to the following terms and
conditions, in addition to the other terms hereof:
(i)
Develope r intends to operate
Manufac turing Facility (a "Facility ") on the property .

a

Ready-M ix

Concrete

(ii)
All operation s on the property shall comply with all applicable
and governing local, state or U .S. ordinanc es and laws relating to dust, noise, water quality
and air quality.
(iii)
Attached as Exhibit "B" - Site Plan, and Exhibit "C" Building Elevations, and by this reference incorporated herein are plans for construction of
Develop er's intended permane nt facility ("Perman ent Facility" ).
(iv)
Immedia tely upon execution of this Agreement, Develope r shall
order and commen ce construc tion of the Permane nt Facility. The installation of the
Permane nt Facility shall be complete d within eighteen (18) months of executio n of this
Agreeme nt by the County, subject to delays resulting from weather, strikes, shortage of
steel or manufact uring equipme nt or any other act of force majeure or action beyond
Develop er's control.
(v)
In order to facilitate and support the construct ion of the
Permane nt Facility and to allow the Develope r to expedite commerc ial operation s, the
Develope r shall erect and operate a temporar y concrete batch plant on site as shown in

Exhibit "B" - Site Plan and Exhibit "D".

(vi)
In the event that the Permane nt Facility is not complete d within
the time allowed herein, the County shall have the right to revoke the authority to operate
the Tempora ry Facility. The grant
authority of the Tempora ry Facility is to allow

of

Developer to operate Developer's business until the Permanent Facility is constructed. The
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authority to operate the Temporary Facility shall terminate upon completion of the
Permanent Facility even if sooner than the described eighteen (18) month ti.me period.
c.
The access to the property from State Highway 33 shall be via Casper
Lane, which shall be improved to City. of Driggs Public Works Standards and
Specifications, as shown in the construction drawings submitted by Developer and held by
the City of Driggs, prior to operation of the Temporary Facility.
d.
To assure compatibility with other surrounding uses the following
additional matters have been addressed and agreed upon for the Permanent Facility as
follows:
(i)
Noise related issues will be addressed by construction of
decorative concrete block walls of eight and three-quarters feet (8.75') in height along the
boundaries of the property, as shown in Exhibit B - Site Plan and enclosure of the Batch
~lant Equipment within a building, as shown in Exhibit C - Building Elevations .
(ii)
Dust will be controlled through paving of the area around the
Facility, the enclosure of the Batch Plant Equipment within a building, a truck wash for
trucks utilized by the Facility and a dust collection system on the Batch Plant. In addition;
the Facility will have an air quality permit from the Idaho Department of Environmental
Quality and comply with the requirements of that agency.

(iii) Hours of operation shall not be restricted as this is consistent
with the provisions for M 1 and C3 zoning. The property is surrounded by property zoned
M 1 and C3 . The construction business activities of the Facility sometimes require varying
hours of operation due to the nature of the construction industry.
(iv) Traffic issues shall be mitigated by construction of
improvements on Casper Drive as described herein and the implementation of
improvements on Highway 33 as required by the Idaho Department of Transportation.
(v)
Landscaping on the North and West side will consist of a block
wall with planter areas that will include trees or vegetation. The east boundary of the
property shall have a fifteen ( 15) foot wide area reserved for future landscaping that will be
3 - Ciry of Driggs Development Agreement: Burns Holdings L.L.C. Zone Change [Draft l]
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•
addressed if the future road planned for the area is developed. See Exhibits "B"-Sit e
Plan
and "E" - Block Wall Planter Detail.
(vi)
Lighting issues shall be mitigated by using cut-off fixtures that
direct the light downwa rd rather than flood lighting.
3.
Indemnity: Develop er agrees to, and does hereby, defend, hold harmles s and
indemnify the City and County , all associated elected and appointed officials, officers
,
employ ees, agents, represen tatives, and attorney s, from any and all claims that may, at
any
time, be asserted against any such parties in connect ion with:
a.
the City's or County 's review and approval of any plans or
improve ments, or the issuance of any approva ls, permits , certificates, or accepta
nces
relating to the use and/or develop ment of the property ;
b.

the develop ment, constru ction, and maintenance of the propert y;

c.
the perform ance by the County of its obligations under this Agreem ent
and all related ordinan ces, resoluti ons, or other agreeme nts; and
d.
Notwithstanding the foregoin g, the indemnification terms of this
paragra ph 3 shall not extend or apply to the failure of the County to follow, in good
faith,
governing law or ordinan ces.
4.
Agreem ent Modification: This Agreem ent may be modified only by a written
docume nt, signed by the parties, or their success ors in interest, after comply ing with
the
notice and hearing procedu res of Idaho Code §67-650 9 and of the Driggs Zoning
Ordinan ce.
5.
Zoning Reversion Consen t: The executio n of this Agreem ent shall be deemed
written consent by Develop er to change the zoning of the subject property to its
prior
designation upon failure to comply with the conditio ns imposed by this Agreem ent.
No
reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter pursuan t to Idaho Code
§6765 l lA. Upon notice and hearing , as provide d in this Agreem ent and in Idaho Code
§676509, if the property describe d in attached Exhibit A is not used as approve d, or
if the
approved use ends or is abandon ed, the Board of County Commi ssioners may,
upon
II

II
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receiving a recommendation from the City's governing board, order that the property will
revert to the zoning designation (and land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing
immediately prior to the rezone action, i.e . , the property shall revert back to the C3,
Service and Highway Commer cial zoning designation.
6.
Annual Review: The County may, while this Agreeme nt is in effect, annually
review the extent of good faith substantial compliance with the terms of this Agreeme nt.
Develope r shalt have the duty to demonstrate Develop er ' s good faith compliance with the
terms of this Agreeme nt during such review.
7.
Performance: Develope r shall comply with all commitments set out in this
Agreement. Develope r shall timely and satisfactorily carry out all required performa nce to
appropriately maintain, in the discretion of the County, all commitments set forth in this
Agreement.
8.
Default and Remedies: In the event of a default or breach of this Agreeme nt
or of any of its terms or conditions, the party alleging default shall give the breachin g party
not less than thirty (30) days Notice of Default, in writing, unless an emergen cy exists
threatening the health and safety of the public. If such an emergen cy exists, written notice
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach.
The time of the giving of the notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of
Default. The Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default and, where
appropria te, the manner and period of time during which said default may be satisfactorily
cured. During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be considere d in default for
the purposes of termination or zoning reversion , or the institution of legal proceedi ngs. If
the default is cured, then no default shall exist and the charging party shall take no further
action.
9.
Termination: This Agreement may be terminated in accordance with the notice
and hearing procedures of Idaho Code §67-6509, and the zoning designation upon which the
use is based reversed, upon failure of Develope r, a subsequent owner, or other person
acquiring an interest in the property described in attached Exhibit "A" to comply with the
terms of this Agreement.
10.

Compliance with Laws: Develope r agrees to comply with

all federal, state,

county and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject property.
5 - City of Driggs Development Agreement: Burns Holdings L.L.C . Zone Change [Draft l]

Page 36

Develo per's failure to comply with the above laws or the terms of this Agreem
ent will
subject Develo per to an enforcement action by the County in a court
of compe tent
jurisdi ction.
11.
Chang es in Law: Any reference to laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or
resolutions shall include such laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or resolut
ions as have
been, to the date of this agreement, or as they may then be in force in
the future with
respect to propos ed amendments to this Agreem ent in the future.
12.

Miscel laneou s Provisions:

a.
The parties agree that the relationship created by the agreem ent is
solely that of a private Develo per and the City . Nothing in this agreement
shall create the
Develo per or City as an agent, employ er, employ ee, legal representative
, partne r or
subsidiary of the other.
b.
The parties agree that this Agreem ent shall run with the land and bind
the proper ty in perpetu ity, and shall inure to the benefit of and be enforce
able by the
parties, and any of their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors,
and assigns.
c.
All notice must be in writing, mailed in the U.S. Mail via certified mail
to the addresses indicated on this agreement.
d.
This agreem ent shall be construed and enforc ed pursuant to the laws of
the State of Idaho.
e.
If any party shall bring suit against the other party to enforce this
agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees
and costs.

f.
If any term of this agreement is declared invalid, illegal or
unenforceable, the remain der of this agreem ent shall remain operative and
bindin g.
g.
The Develo per hereby guarantees the promp t and satisfactory
correct ion of all defects or deficiencies in the improvements that occur or
becom e eviden t
during the one-ye ar period following [final constru ction of the improvements
. If the defect

or deficiency occurs or becomes evident, then the Developer shall commence correction of
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the defect of deficiency within ten days after written notice from the City. The Develope r
shall proceed with reasonable diligence to correct the defect or deficiency. The guaranty
shall be extended one full year from the date of repair or replacem ent of any improvem ent
made pursuant to this paragrap h.
h.
This agreement shall be signed in duplicate originals. Each party shall
receive one original of this agreement.

i.
The County shall have this agreemen t recorded in the office of the
Teton County Clerk.
AGREED :
Teton County, Idaho
By:

l- ~ ~ ~ - -

County Comm issi~
P.O. Box
Driggs, Idaho 83422

o=-::::

Develope r:
BURNS HOLDIN GS, LLC

~

By:----~
Kirk Bums, Manager
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EXHIBIT "A"

FRO:NI ll~STRUNIENT NO. 183802
TRA CT 1: FEE ESTA TE
LOT lB-W , TET ON PEAKS VIEW SUBDIVISION, TETO
N COUNTY, IDAHO, PART
OF THE Wl/2 .NEl /4, SECTION 23, TOWNSHIP 5 NOR
TH, RAN GE 45 EAS T, BOISE
MERIDIAN, TET ON COU NTY , IDAHO, BEING FUR
THE R DESCRJBED AS: FROM
THE Nl/4 COR NER OF SAID SECTION 23, SOU TH 975.6
3 FEET AND EAS T, 627.41
FEET TO THE POIN T OF BEGINNING; THE NCE SOU
TH 510.00 FEET TO A POINT;
THE NCE WEST 274.41 FEE T TO A POINT; THE NCE
NOR TH 510.0 0 FEET TO A
POINT; THE NCE EAST 274.41 FEE T TO THE POIN
T OF BEGINNING.
TRA CT 2: EAS EME NT ESTA TE
TOG ETH ER WITH A 60 FOOT WID E ROAD AND
UTILITY EAS EME NT ALONG
THE SOU TH SIDE OF THE . REM AIND ER LOT lA,
AS SHOWN ON THE REC ORD
OF SURVEY REC ORD ED FEBRUARY 24, 1999 AS
INST RUM ENT NO. 133115,
RECORDS OF TET ON COU NTY , IDAHO.
FROl'vl INSTRUNIENT NO. 183803

LOT lB-E , TET ON PEAKS VIEW SUBDIVISION, TETO
N COUNTY, IDAHO, BEING
FUR THE R DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: PART OF
THE Wl/2 NE1 /4 SEC TION 23,
TOW NSH IP 5 NORTH, RAN GE 45 EAST, BOISE MER
IDIA N, TET ON COU NTY ,
IDAH O, BEING FUR THE R DESCRIBED AS: FRO M
THE Nl/4 COR NER OF SAID
SECTION 23, SOU TH 975.63 FEET AND EAST 627.4
1 FEET TO THE POIN T OF
BEGINNING. THE NCE EAST 274.60 FEET TO A POIN
T; THE NCE SOU TH 510.0 0
FEET TO A POINT; THE NCE WEST 274.60 FEE T TO
A POIN T; THE NCE NOR TH
510.0 0 FEET TO THE POIN T OF BEGINNING.
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Exhibit B
Burns Holdings Driggs Site Plan

Version 9.5
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EXHIBIT "C"

EAST ELEVATION

SOUTH ELEVATION

NORTH ELEVATION

WEST ELEVATION

BUILDING ELEVATIONS
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Exhibit D Temporary Batch Plant
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Kathy Spitzer, Esq. [ISB No. 6053]
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
89 N. Main Street, Suite 5
Driggs, Idaho 83455
208-354-2990
kspitzer@co.teton.id.us
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Attorney for Defendant Teton County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., AN IDAHO
CORPORATION, AND BURNS HOLDINGS,
LLC, AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

CV-13-165

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

V.

TETON COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

Answer
By and through counsel of record, Defendant Teton County, Idaho submits the
following as an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint"). In answering
this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set forth below,
all defenses provided for or authorized by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and all
other defenses provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that their investigation of

this matter is continuing and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may
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change in the future in light of additional or newly discovered information. Defendant
denies any and all allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint not expressly admitted.
Answers to Preliminary Statement

1.

Paragraph 1 contains conclusions of law and not factual allegations to

which an answer is required. To the extent an answer is required, Defendant admits that
a document entitled "Developer's Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC" was recorded as
Instrument #191250 on September 5, 2007 in Teton County at the request of Burns
Concrete.
2.

Admitted.

3.

Paragraph 3 does not contain factual allegations to which an answer is

required. In so far as there are any factual allegations in Paragraph 3, Defendant denies
the same.
Answers to Parties

4.

Defendant admits that Burns Concrete, Inc. is an Idaho Corporation and

Burns Holdings, LLC is an Idaho Limited Liability Company. Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the relationship between the
two companies.
5.

Defendant admits that it is a political subdivision of the State ofldaho.
Answers to Jurisdiction and Venue

6.

Admitted.

7.

Admitted.
Answers to Relevant Terms of the Agreement

8.

Admitted.
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9.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required. Admitted that the Property was rezoned by Teton
County to M-1 (Light Industrial).
10.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required.
11.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required.
12.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required.
13.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required.
Answers to General Allegations

14.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required.
15.

Admitted.

16.

Admitted that the Agreement was entered into and it is recorded in the

office of the Teton County Clerk.
17.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the allegations in this Paragraph and therefore denies the allegations in this
Paragraph.
18.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to what costs were incurred by Burns. Defendant admits that the Teton County Board

of Commissioners voted to deny the CUP on November 15, 2007 notwithstanding the
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recommendation for approval by the City of Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission
and the statement by the current County Attorney at the public hearing that he thought the
Agreement was valid in so far as the zone change was concerned.

Denied that the

County Attorney rendered any formal legal opinion as to the general validity of the
Agreement, and denied that he rendered any opinion at all as to the validity or
enforceability of the Agreement in relation to the conditional use permit which was the
subject of the November 15, 2007 hearing.
19.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the allegations in this Paragraph and therefore denies the allegations in this
Paragraph.
20.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to whether Burns has undertaken "every act reasonably possible to obtain the CUP and
variance," and therefore denies this allegation. Defendant admits that Burns was denied
their application for a CUP in 2007 and their application for a variance several years
later.
21.

Admitted that Burns cannot construct a 75 foot tall building in the M-1

zone located in the Driggs' Area of Impact without an amendment to the ordinances of
Teton County. Denied that Burns has no control over such amendment.
Answers to Count I

22.

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1-

21 of the Complaint herein, as if set forth in full.
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23.

The allegations in this Paragraph are vague and ambiguous as to what

representatives were met with and when and what exactly was said. Defendant therefore
denies each and every allegation in this Paragraph for want of knowledge or information.
24.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the allegations in this Paragraph and therefore denies the allegations in this
Paragraph.
25.

The statements in paragraph 25 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same.
26.

Admitted.

27.

The statements in paragraph 27 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 27, Defendant denies the same.
28.

Admitted.

29.

The statements in paragraph 29 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same.
30.

The statements in paragraph 30 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 30, Defendant denies the same.
Answers to Count II

31.

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1-

30 of the Complaint herein, as if set forth in full.
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32.

Admitted.

33.

Admitted.

34.

Admitted.

35.

The statements in paragraph 35 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same.
36.

The statements in paragraph 36 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 36, Defendant denies the same.
Answers to Count III

37.

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1-

36 of the Complaint herein, as if set forth in full.
38.

The statements in paragraph 38 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 38, Defendant denies the same.
39.

The statements in paragraph 39 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 39, Defendant denies the same.
Answer to Attorney Fees

40.

The statements in paragraph 40 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 40, Defendant denies the same.
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that the Complaint and
each and every alleged cause of action contained therein, fails to allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action against Defendant.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that by the filing of this action Complainant is pursuing a
frivolous claim that is totally and wholly without merit or justification and by reason
thereof, Defendant is entitled to its attorney fees and an award of sanctions against
Complainant and his attorney.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs failed to bring this cause of action within five (5) years after the claim
arose or reasonable should have been discovered as required by Idaho Code § 5-216.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing this action
in the District Court.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages, if any.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or part, by the doctrine of !aches.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Teton County prays that the Court enter judgment in
its favor and that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and that the Court
grant Defendant its reasonable costs and fees incurred herein and such other relief as is

appropriate.
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COUNTERCLAIM

COMES NOW Counterclaim Plaintiff, Teton County, Idaho, by and through its
attorney, and for its causes of action against Counterclaim Defendants, Burns Concrete,
Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC, states and alleges as follows:
Count I
Breach of Contract

1.

Counterclaim Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every

allegation and answer contained in the above paragraphs.
2.

Counterclaim Defendant owns approximately 6.5 acres of property m

Teton County, Idaho located at 175 N and 185N on State highway 33 (the "Property").
3.

On February 26, 2007 Teton County granted Counterclaim Defendants

application for a conditional zone change, altering the zoning designation on the Property
from the C-3 to M-1.
4.

The rezone application submitted by Burns was made for the purpose of

constructing a concrete batch plant on Burns' property located North of the City of
Driggs.
5.

As a condition of the rezoning the County required Defendant to make a

written commitment (the "Agreement") concerning the use or development of the
Property.
6.

The terms of the Agreement were negotiated by and between the

Developer and the County and City planning administrators.
7.

In order to "facilitate and support the construction of the Permanent

Facility and to allow Developer to expedite commercial operations," Paragraph 2(b)(v) of
the Agreement allowed for the construction of a Temporary Facility.

Answer and Counterclaim - Page 8
Page 51

•
8.

•

Paragraph 2(b)(vi) of the Agreement states:
In the event that the Permanent Facility is not completed within the time
allowed herein, the County shall have the right to revoke the authority to
operate the Temporary Facility. The grant of authority of the Temporary
Facility is to allow Developer to operate Developer's business until the
Permanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate the Temporary
Facility shall terminate upon completion of the Permanent Facility even if
sooner than the described eighteen (18) month time period.
(I tali cs added.)

9.

The Permanent Facility has never been constructed and the Temporary

Facility has been in existence for over five (5) years.
10.

On April 9, 2012 Teton County provided Bums written notice of

revocation of Bums Holding's authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
11.

On October 4, 2012 Teton County again provided Bums written notice of

revocation of Bums Holding's authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
12.

Burns has refused to comply with Teton County's revocation of authority

for the Temporary Facility.
13.

According to Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement, it was agreed that the

concrete plant, the "Permanent Facility" was to be complete within eighteen (18) months
from the date of execution of the Agreement, August 31, 2007.
14.

According to Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement, the only matters which

could delay the eighteen ( 18) month completion period were those "resulting from
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act of force
majeure or actions beyond the Developer's control."
15.

Weather, strikes, shortage of steel, or manufacturing equipment or any

other act of force majeure or actions beyond the Developer's control did not cause a
delay in the construction of the Permanent Facility.
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The only delay in the construction of the Permanent Facility was the

height of the Permanent Facility exceeding the height allowed outright by law by 30 feet.
17.

Counterclaim Defendants applied to the County for a permit to exceed the

height limitation and construct a 75-foot tall building; the County heard and denied the
application November 15, 2007.
18.

Counterclaim Defendants have failed to comply with the condition of the

Agreement that required it to construct the Permanent Facility within eighteen (18)
months.
19.

Counterclaim Defendants were aware of the height limitation of 45 feet in

the M-1 zone when they attached Exhibit "C" - Building Elevations - to the Agreement.
20.

When they attached Exhibit "C" - Building Elevations - to the

Agreement, Counterclaim Defendants were aware that in order to build a structure in
excess of the allowed 45 foot height an application was required and approval had to be
obtained via statutory notice and public hearings procedures.
21.

When they attached Exhibit "C" - Building Elevations - to the

Agreement, Counterclaim Defendants were aware that a quasi-judicial officer must
confine his or her decision to the record produced at the public hearing.
22.

The Agreement was made for the purpose of placing conditions on the

zone change and the Agreement did not address the 45 foot height limitation.
23.

Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, "Zoning Reversion Consent," gives the

County the prior written consent of Counterclaim Defendant to rezone the property upon
failure of any condition of the Agreement. This reversion ability is only limited by the

notice and hearing provisions ofldaho Code§ 67-6509.
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Teton County initiated a rezone application following the notice and

hearing procedures set for the in Idaho Code§ 67-6509 in the Spring of 2012 and Burns
was given notice of that application.
25.

Burns contested the application by letter dated April 11, 2012 to the City

of Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission and by letter dated April 17, 2012 to the
Teton County Board of Commissioners. Kirk Burns also spoke in opposition to the
rezone application at the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission public hearing on
April 11, 2012.
26.

In the minutes of the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission public

hearing on April 11, 2012 Kirk Burns is documented as stating that he knew there would
be a height issue from the beginning, but he wasn't sure of the extent until plans were
developed.
27.

Teton County resubmitted its request for the City of Driggs to make a

recommendation to rezone the Property and that application was heard on December 12,
2012. The Driggs Commission tabled the decision until June 12, 2013.
28.

By letter dated June 4, 2013, Counsel for Burns requested that no action

be taken on the rezone application until the court rules on the present lawsuit.
29.

Counterclaim Plaintiff, Teton County, performed all terms and conditions

required to be performed by it under the Agreement.
30.

Counterclaim Defendants breached the Agreement by failing to: (a)

comply with the County's revocation of authority for the Temporary Facility (Paragraph
2(b)(vi) of the Agreement), (b) consent to be rezoned (Paragraph 5 of the Agreement), (c)

comply with all commitments set forth in the Agreement (Paragraph 7 of the Agreement);
and (d) comply with laws (Paragraph 10 of the Agreement).
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31.

As a result of Counterclaim Defendants breach, Counterclaim Plaintiff has

been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
Count II
Declaratory Judgment

32.

Counterclaim Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every

allegation and answer contained in the above paragraphs as well as Paragraphs 1 - 31 of
this Counterclaim as though set forth at length.
33.

Counterclaim Plaintiff Teton County, Idaho is a political and corporate

body of the State ofldaho and is entitled to seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 10-1213.
34.

By letter dated April 17, 2012 to the Teton County Commissioners, and in

response to an April 9, 2012 letter from the Teton County Commissioners, Counterclaim
Defendant asserted that" ... Burns' obligation to commence and complete
construction of the Permanent Facility within eighteen ( 18) months of execution was
excused by the force majeure clause."
35.

A force majeure is a contract clause that protects parties if an obligation

cannot be performed due to causes that are outside the control of the parties, causes that
could not be avoided through the exercise of due care.
36.

At the zone change hearing on February 26, 2007, the Teton County

Commissioners expressed concern that the Permanent Facility would be 45 feet high, and
they were told that it would look similar in size, or substantially smaller than, the hangars
at the airport and that the high part of the structure would be approximately 40 feet tall.
37.

In entering the Agreement, Counterclaim Defendants were aware that

permission to exceed the height limitation could only be granted through a statutorily
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mandated public process and that the County could not validly restrict or limit its future
use of the police power.
38.

A contract made under the hope that a permit will be granted is made

knowing the risk that it may not be granted.
39.

Idaho Code § 67-651 l(d) also allows a governing board to rezone

property:
If a governing board adopts a zoning classification pursuant to a request by a
property owner based upon a valid, existing comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinance, the governing board shall not subsequently reverse its action or
otherwise change the zoning classification of said property without the
consent in writing of the current property owner for a period of four (4) years
from the date the governing board adopted said individual property owner's
request for a zoning classification change. If the governing body does reverse
its action or otherwise change the zoning classification of said property
during the above four (4) year period without the current property owner's
consent in writing, the current property owner shall have standing in a court
of competent jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this section.

40.

The Temporary Facility that has been in place on the subject property for

over five (5) years is in excess of the height permitted in the M-1 zone.
41.

In accordance with Paragraph 2(b)(v) of the Developer's Agreement, the

purpose of the Temporary Facility was to "facilitate and support the construction of the
Permanent Facility."
42.

Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, "Zoning Reversion Consent," states that

the County may rezone the property, and provides that Counterclaim Defendants consent
to a rezoning of their property, if Counterclaim Defendants fail to comply with any of the
conditions of the Agreement.
43.

Counterclaim Plaintiff is entitled to obtain a declaration against

Counterclaim Defendant establishing: (a) that the force majeure clause of the Agreement
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does not apply to protect Counterclaim Defendant from complying with the Agreement,
(b) that the force majeure clause does not prevent Teton County from rezoning the
subject property or from enforcing its laws, (c) that the (18) eighteen month period
specified in the Agreement has long since run, (d) that Teton County's revocation of the
Temporary Facility is effective and therefore it must be removed; and (e) that the
Temporary Facility has been in violation of the Teton County zoning laws since March 1,
2009.
Attorney Fees

44.

If Teton County is the prevailing party it is entitled under Paragraph 12(e)

of the Agreement to be awarded its attorneys fees and costs.
45.

Teton County is also entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-117,

120 and 121.
Prayer

WHEREFORE, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows :
1.

For a decree stating that Burns is in material breach of the Agreement;

2.

For a decree establishing that the 18 month period to construct the

Permanent Facility has not been tolled and that the 18 month period has expired;
3.

For a decree stating that the Agreement has not been breached by Teton

County and that Burns' has no right to rescission;
4.

For a decree stating that if the Agreement is rescinded than the zone

change from C-3 to M-1 would also be rescinded;
5.

For a decree stating that Teton County has the right, by agreement and by

law, to rezone the subject property;
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For a decree stating that the Temporary Facility has been in violation of

the Teton County zoning laws since March 1, 2009;
7.

For an award of all costs and expenses, including Teton County's

attorneys fees; and

6.

For such other and additional relief as is just and proper.

DATED this

-,h

_J_ day of June, 2013.

Teton County Prosecuting Attorney

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF TETON

)
) ss.
)

I, Kathy Spitzer, Teton County Prosecutor, being first duly sworn, says that she
has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof and the ame are true to the best of
her knowledge, information and belief.

·

~

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this~ day of June, 2013. Witness
my hand and official seal.

Jin\~ B
Notary Public
My commission expires: \ \- \ q -

JAN CLEMO~S

NotaTY pub\lC

State of \dano
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \\~ay of June, 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim, by causing a copy thereof to be
hand-delivered or by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed to:

Robert B. Burns
Kimberly D. Evans
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[ X] U.S. Mail [ ] Hand [ ] Fax

~
\ Q_gkYI.Qr)5
an Clemoni;-f'.egal Assistant
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BURNS CONCRETE, INC.,
anidahocorporarion,and
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No.

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

CV-13-165

FINAL JUDGMENT

v.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Court hereby enters judgment in favor of Defendant/Counterclaimant Teton
County, Idaho, and against Plaintiffs/Counterdefendant Bums Concrete, Inc. and Burns
Holding, LLC, granting relief pursuant to the terms of this Court's Memorandum Decision
and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment entered on December 19, 2014. The
Complaint in the above entitled action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. This shall be
deemed as a Final Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a).
IT IS SO ORDERED this

Final Judgment
Page 1 of 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

of the foregoing document
I hereby certify that I serve a true and correct copy
, 2015.
to the following on this UQ_day of ::ta ,~
Kimberly D. Evan Ross
1120 East 1275 North
Shelley, Idaho 83274
Kathy Spitzer
Courthouse Box
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation, )
and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited )
)
liability company,
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the ~
State of Idaho,
)
Defendant-Respondent.
TO:

.

REMITTITUR

Supreme Court Docket No. 43527
Teton County Court# CV-2013165

)
)

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF TETON.

The Court having announced its Opinion in this

c:1.jl November

I, 2016, and

having denied Respondent's Petition for Rehearing on Decemberfi!._, 2016; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required, and;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellants' costs on appeal in the amount of
$895.25 be, and hereby are, allo.r,r1.
DATED this

.J.l!_ day of December, 2016.
Clerk o
STATE OF IDAHO

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge
Publisher(s)
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------------Robert B. Burns, ISB #3744
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
rbums@parsonsbehle .com
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This motion is based on (i) the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion on Bums' appeal of the
Final Judgment earlier entered in this action, (ii) Bums' memorandum in support of this renewed
motion for partial summary judgment being filed concurrently herewith, (iii) Bums' Verified
Complaint, (iv) Teton County's verified Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013, and (v)
the supporting affidavits of Kimberly D. Evans Ross, filed August 11, 2014, and Kirk Bums,
filed November 5, 2014.
DATED thisj.f1'$. day of December 2016.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
21813 .00l \4840-9043-8975 vi
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;l~da y of December 2016, I caused
FOR PARTIAL
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION
addressed to the
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below and
following:
Kathy Spitzer
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Facsimile (208) 354-2994

(x)
( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

By_ _ _ _ _ _- - + - , ~ - - - - - - Robert B. Bums

MENT - 3
PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDG
21813 .001 \4840-9043-8975 vi

Page 65

04/20/2017

..

-

19:45 Teton County Prosecutor

(f AX)208 354 2994

-

P.005/007

Billie J. Siddoway, ISB # 6628
Lindse y A. Blake, ISB # 7920
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNTY
PROSE CUTIN G ATTORNEY

230 North Main, Suite 125
Driggs, ID 83442
Tel: 208·364·2990
Fax: 208·354·2994

Counsel for Defendant Teton County
IN THE SEVE NTH JUDIC IAL DISTR ICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TETO N COUNTY
BURN S CONCRETE, INC. et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. cv-2013·165
ORDE R GRANTING PLAIN TIFFS '
RENE WED MOTI ON FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDG MENT

TETO N COUNTY,

Defen dant.
Plainti ffs' Renew ed Motion for Partia l Summ ary Judgm ent, filed Decem ber
iffs"),
30, 2016 by Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC Gointlym ''Plaint
t B.
came on for hearin g by the Court pursu ant to notice on April 10, 2017. Rober
ffs,
Burns of Parson s Behle & Latim er appea red teleph onical ly on behalf of Plainti
on behalf
and Billie J. Siddoway, the Teton Count y Prosec uting Attorn ey, appea red
s,
of Defen dant Teton County. Based on the motion, memo randa of the partie
forth in
affidavits on file, and oral argum ent at the hearin g, and for the reason s set
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED
PAOEl

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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19:45 Teton County Prosecutor

P.006/007

s of law deliv ered
the Cour t's oral state ment of its findings of fact and conclusion
durin g the heari ng, it is hereb y ORDERED as follows:
ent on the liabil ity
1. The Cour t GRANTS Plain tiffs parti al summ ary judgm
filed May 21,
comp onen t only of Coun t II of Plain tiffs' Verified Comp laint,
's Agre emen t
2013, for breac h of contr act and rescis sion of the Developer
attac hed as Exhi bit 1 to the Verified Comp laint.
rator y judgm ent,
2. No order is enter ed on Coun t I of the Com plain t for decla
ent on said
Plain tiffs havin g withd rawn their reque st for summ ary judgm
count.

PAGE 2

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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19:45 Teton County Prosecutor

P.007/007

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the date set forth below a true and correct
copy of the foregoing was caused to be sent to the following:
Robert B. Burns
Parsons Behle & Latimer
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208·562-4901

D Facsimile
-WU,S. Mail
□ Courthouse Mailbox

Billie Siddoway
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N Main St #125
Driggs, ID 83422
Fax: 208·364·2994

D Facsimile
~U.S.Mail
D Courthouse Mailbox

\J_ __
;:;...._.___._
~ _.1,
Date:____;;._

PAOE3

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Robert B. Bums, ISB #3744
PARS ONS BEHL E & LA TIME R
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
rburns@parsonsbehle .com

ALEO IN CHAMBERS
at Idaho Falls
,
Bonneville County
Honorable Judge
Date \ \-2$.\J

Wod:¥1 a~

Time 2: Pf?pM
Deputy Clerk

C,t- AC ,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC
ICT OF THE
IN THE DISTR ICT COUR T OF THE SEVE NTH JUDICIAL DISTR
STA TE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUN TY OF TETO N
BURNS CONC RETE , INC ., an Idaho corporation,
and BURN S HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability compa ny,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

Case No. CV-2013-165

ORDE R STAYING BANK OF
IDAHO'S PRODUCTION
PURSUANT TO SUBP OENA

VS.

TETO N COUN TY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
gs, LLC Gointly,
The motion of Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdin
order with respect to and an
"Burns "), filed Novem ber 20, 2017, for the entry of a protection
Bank of Idaho having been
order quashing the subpoena by Defendant Teton County to the
at the duly noticed hearing
briefed by counsel for the respective parties and argued to the Court
cause for the entry of a
on the motion held Novem ber 27, 2017, and the Court finding good
of Idaho;
protective order with respect to documentation produced by the Bank
tion pursuant to the
IT IS HERE BY ORDE RED that the Bank of Idaho ' s produc
ant Teton County for the
subpoena served upon it on or about Novem ber 16, 2017, by Defend

financial

this Court enters a
records of Burns be, and hereby is, stayed until such time as

ANT TO SUBP OENA -!
ORDER STAYING BANK OF IDAHO'S PRODUCTION PURSU
21813.00 I\4823-821 3-3335vl
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under subpoena or this Court otherwise
protective order with respect to the financial records
rescinds the stay hereby granted.
DATED this ~da y of Nove mber 2017.

PURSUANT TO SUBPOENA - 2
ORDER ST AYING BANK OF IDAHO'S PRODUCTION
21813.00 I\4823-82 I 3-3335vl
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

7.Jj

day of November 2017, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER STAYING BANK OF IDAHO'S PRODUCTION

PURSUANT TO SUBPOENA to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Robert B. Burns
Parsons Behle & Latimer
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile: (208) 562-4901
Billie Jean Siddoway
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Facsimile (208) 354-2994

□ U.S.Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
~mail: rburns@parsonsbehle.com

D
D
D
0

U.S.Mail
D Facsimile
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
~ a i l : bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us

Court Clerk
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FILED IN CHAMBERS
at Idaho Falls
Bonneville County,
.
Honorable Jud~e\NQ.:l:¥10$

~.ate

l:1lo;l
_
--+.:.a.-------

1ime _~""""'-'1-:
DGputy Clerk
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TETON COUNTY
BURNS CONCRETE, INC. et al.,

Case No. CV-2013-165

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

V.

TETON COUNTY,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on January 17, 2018 on Defendant's

!

Motion to Reconsider Protective Order. Plaintiffs were represented by Robert
Burns, who appeared by telephone. Defendant was represented by Billie Siddoway.
!

Based on the information presented to the Court, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Teton County $hall be allowed to
'

,.

request and obtain from Bank of Idaho the monthly and annual financial
statements provided by or on behalf of Burns Concrete, Inc. and.Burns Holdings,
LLC to Bank ofidaho from January 1, 2007 through October 31, 2017.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the documents produced by Bank of Idaho
will he designated as "Confidential Information" under, and be subject to the terms
of the Protective Order of November 28, 2017.

I'
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The unders igned certifies that on the date set forth below a true and conect
copy of the foregoing was caused to be sent by U.S. Mail, postag e prepai d,
to:
Robert B. Burns
Parson s Behle & Latime r
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208·56 2-4901
and by Courth ouse Mailbox to:

Teton County Prosec uting Attorn ey
230 N Main St
Driggs, ID 83422
Fax: 208-35 4·2994
Date:

f.

ilJJ ·( 5

Deputy Clerk

()1 \0

ORDER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-165

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND MOTION IN
LIMINE

FILED IN CHAMBERS

at Idaho Faus
Bonneville County.

WAftin<;

Ho.nor.able Judge
Date 'L · 1'2. ·-Z.01e,

unterclaimant.
_____Defendant/Co
_____
_____

Time ~i..c½~M..___ __
I.

Dt:puty Clerk

(;b11C..,

STATEMENT OF THE C A S E -

Teton County moves to reconsider this Court's May 2, 2017, Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of breach of contract and
rescission. Teton County also filed a motion in limine seeking to limit evidence of damages.
Teton County's motion for reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part. Its
motion in limine is granted in part and denied in part.
II.

ISSUES

1. Did Teton County breach the Developer's Agreement?
2. Is Bums entitled to rescission of the Developer's Agreement?
3. What is the appropriate measure of damages?
4. Are Plaintiffs entitled to prejudgment interest?
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Ill.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Burns Holdings, LLC and Bums Concrete, Inc. are Idaho entities under the common
ownership of Kirk Burns.
Bums Concrete purchased property in Teton County (the County) to build and operate a
ready-mix concrete manufacturing facility. On February 26, 2007, the County approved a zone
change of the property from C-3 (commercial) to M-1 (light industrial), conditional on Burns
Holdings entering a development agreement with the County pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67651 lA. The real property was located within the Driggs city impact area, where the County and
Driggs had agreed, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-6526, that the Driggs zoning laws would apply.
Driggs zoning ordinances provided that any building or structures could not exceed forty-five
feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit (CUP). Burns Holdings submitted a
CUP application to the Driggs planning and zoning department, which reviewed and
recommended the application for approval. Bums Holdings then forwarded the CUP application
to the County.
On August 31, 2007, the County and Burns Holdings executed "Developer' s Agreement
for Burns Holdings, LLC" (Agreement).
The Agreement provides, in part:
2.
Conditions on Development: The sole use allowed and restrictions ,
pursuant to this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows:
a.
The property shall be used exclusively for the operation of a readymix concrete manufacturing facility.
b.
At the current time the property has been re-zoned to Ml, Light
Industrial as described in paragraph 1. Above. Part or' such appioval and ·
recommendation was based upon execution of this development agreement to
identify responsibilities and obligations pertaining to certain' matters relating to
the improvement and operation of the property. This development aµd operation .
shall be subject to the following terms and conditions, in addition tb the other
1

terms hereof:
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Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete
(i)
Manufacturing facility (a "Facility") on the property.
All operations on the property shall comply with all
(ii)
applicable and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances and laws relating to dust,
noise, water quality and air quality.
Attached as Exhibit "B" - Site plan, and Exhibit "C" (iii)
Building Elevations, and by this reference incorporated herein are plans for
construction of Developer's intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility").
Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer
(iv)
The
shall order and commence construction of the Permanent Facility.
(18)
eighteen
installation of the Permanent Facility shall be completed within
months of execution of this Agreement by the County, su~ject to delays resulting
from weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other
act of force majeure or action beyond Developer's control.
In order to facilitate and support the construction of the
(v)
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite commercial operations,
the Developer shall erect and operate a temporary concrete batch plant on site as
shown in Exhibit "B" -Site Plan and Exhibit "D".
In the event that the Permanent Facility is not completed
(vi)
within the time allowed herein, the County shall have the right to revoke the
authority to operate the Temporary Facility. The grant of authority of the
Temporary Facility is to allow Developer to operate Developer's business until
the Permanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate the Temporary
Facility shall terminate upon completion of the Permanent Facility even if sooner
·
than the described eighteen ( 18) month time period.

Zoning Reversion Consent: The execution of this Agreement · shall be
5.
deemed written consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditi,ons imposecl'by this
Agreement. No reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter
pursuant to Idaho Code §67-651 IA. Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this
Agreement and in Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached
Exhibit "A" is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends or is ab'andoned,
the Board of county Commissioners may, upon receiving a recommenda'.tion from
the City's governing board, order that the property wtll revert to the zoning
designation (and land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing
immediately prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to the
·'
C3, Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation.
1
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Default and Remedies: In the event of a default or breach of this
8.
shall
Agreem ent or of any of its terms or conditions, the party alleging default
, in
Default
of
Notice
give the breaching party not less than thirty (30) days
of the
writing, unless an emergency exists threatening the health and safety
ble
public. If such an emergency exists, written notice shall be given in a reasona
the
of
time
The
time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach.
of
giving of the notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice
and,
default
alleged
the
of
Default. The Notice of Default shall specify the nature
may
where appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said default
shall not be
be satisfactorily cured. During any period of curing, the party charged
on, or the
reversi
zoning
or
conside red in default for the purposes of termination
exist
institution of legal proceedings. If the default is cured, then no default shall
and the charging party shall take no further action.

Compliance with Laws: Developer agrees to comply with all federal , state,
l 0.
county and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject
of this
property. Develo per's failure to comply with the above laws or the terms
in a
Agreement wil1 subject Developer to an enforcement action by the County
court of competent jurisdiction.

12.

Miscellaneous Provisions:

The parties agree that this Agreement shall run with the land and
be
bind the property in perpetuity, and shall inure to the benefit of · and
heirs,
,
enforceable by the parties, and any of their respective legal representatives
successors, and assigns.

b.

Develo per's Agreem ent at 2-6 (emphasis in original).

.I ,
'

'

.,

'

schematics
Exhibit C, attached and incorporated in the Agreement, contained elevatio n
d Bums Holdings to
that showed a 75-foot tall building. Paragraph 2.d. of the Agreement require
concret e block
make improvements, including: highway and street improvements; decorative
walls along property boundaries, and landscaping.

'I .
!'.

In Novem ber 2007, the County denied Bums Holdin gs' conditional use permit
court ultimately
application. Bums Holdings sought judicia l review of the decision. The district

upheld the County's denial. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court on the

AND MOT10N
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basis that a zoning variance, rather than a condition use permit, is required to waive a zoning
ordinance's height requirement. Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 152
Idaho 440,272 P.3d 412 (2012) (Burns I).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Burns I, Burns Holdings applied for a zoning
variance, which Teton County denied on September 13, 2012. In order to obtain a zoning
variance, a party must prove an "undue hardship because of characteristics of the site." LC. §
67-6516. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the site is without problematic characteristics, which
would enable it to secure a variance under Section 67-6516.
On October 4, 2012, Teton County sent Burns Concrete a letter revoking its authority to
operate the Temporary Facility and demanding its removal from the property.
In November 2012, Teton County sent Plaintiffs a letter demanding they remove the
Temporary Facility.
On May 10, 2013, Plaintiffs executed an Assignment and Assumption Agreement
whereby Bums Holdings assigned Burns Concrete "an undivided interest in all of Burns
Holdings' rights and benefits and duties and obligations in, to, and under the Agreement .... "
Second Aff. of Kirk Bums (March 30, 2017), Ex. B.
On May 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this action, alleging causes of action {or declaratory
1

judgment, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Teton County counterclaimed, alleging
breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment for the removal of the Temporary Facility.
Teton County then filed a motion for summary judgment, which this Court granted on the
basis that the denial of a zoning variance was foreseeable, making ~e Agreement's force
majeure clause(~ 2.b.(iv)) inapplicable. This Court held that because the force majeure clause
was inapplicable, it did not excuse Burns Holdings from constructing the Permanent Facility and
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the County's revocation of Burns Holdings' right to operate the Temporary Facility was
permissible under the Agreement.
After this Court denied Burns' motion for reconsideration, Bums appealed. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that this Court erred in determining the force majeure clause did not apply.
It explained:

The clause states that it applies to "delays resulting from weather, strikes,
shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act offorce majeure or
action beyond Developer's control." (Emphasis added.) The wording "or
any other act of force majeure" could certainly be read as referring to some other
act that was of the type previously mentioned. However, the clause then states,
"or action beyond Developer's control." That shows that the "action beyond
Developer's control" was something other than the type of acts that were
previously mentioned in the clause as being an act of force majeure. The County's
conduct certainly constitutes an action beyond the Developer's control.

Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton Cty., 161 Idaho 117, 120-21, 384 P.3d 364, 367-68 (2016), reh'g
denied (Dec. 6, 2016) (Burns JI).
On remand, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. This Court entered an Order
Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 2, 2017. That
Order provided:
1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs partial summary judg111ent on the liability
component only of Count II of Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint ... for breach of
contract and rescission of the Developer's Agreement ....
i

2. No order is entered on Count I of the Complaint for decl~ratory judgment,
on said
Plaintiffs having withdrawn their request for summary judgment
· 1
'
:
count.
Order at 2.
Teton County filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Summary Ju,dgment and a
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Measure of Damages on January 3, 2018.
This Court heard argument on those motions on January 17, 2018.
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IV.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A. Motion for Reconsideration
Rule 1 l.2(b)(1) states:
A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment
may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final
judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after the entry of final
judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the order.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained:
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). On a
motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence
or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH Mortg.
Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823,
800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, a motion for reconsideration need not be
supported by any new evidence or authority. When deciding the motion for
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the
court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. In other
words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so
is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original
order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the
motion for reconsideration.

Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if imy, show th~t thyre. is no
,

i

I

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is e~tit1Jd to Ju4gmel)-t as a matter
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller 1:'·

Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at al.I ttmes, on the 1no~ing ·party to
,

,I

.

'

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho .586, 21
P.3d 908 (2001).

I'

The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catr~tt, 477 U.S: 317,i106 S.Ct.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION IN LlMINE 7

Page 81

2548 (1986), stated:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ''the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. ... One of
the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in
a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.

Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin. , 137 Idaho 663 , 52 P.3d 307
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Parkv. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634,962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a cqmplete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily
renders
al~ other
,
I ,
facts immaterial. Id
'

Generally, the trial court is not permitted to weigh the evidence' or resolve
controverted factual issues when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. AID
Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 119 Idaho 897, 900, 811 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct.App.1 99 1).
However, where the "evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather
than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible
for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Rive~side Developm~nt Co.
v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See also AID Ins. Co.,
119 Idaho at 900, 811 P .2d at 510 (if the court will be the ultimate finder of fact,
both parties have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the
same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment is appropriate .even though
conflicting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely
to the record"); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91 , 92
(Ct.App.1985) (when the judge will be the trier of fact, he or she is free to arrive
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverteq evidentiary

facts).
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Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,334,971 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct. App. 1998); accord Drew v.
Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534,539,989 P.2d 276,281 (1999).
C. Motion in Limine

Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. Appel v.
LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 135, 15 P.3d 1141, 1143 (2000). A trial court's motion
in limine ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Leavitt, 133
Idaho at 631, 991 P.2d at 356. This standard requires a three-pronged inquiry to
determine whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Leavitt, 133 Idaho at 631, 991 P.2d
at 356; Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767-68, 86 P.3d 475,

481-82 (2004).
V.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Reconsideration
1. Teton County breached the Developer's Agreement.

Teton County argues that it did not breach the Agreement. It notes that this Court's May
2, 2017, Order did not indicate which contractual provision the County preached or cite to any
facts in support of the breach.
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment argued several bases for breach of
contract: (1) the County violated the express terms of Paragraphs 2.4 and 8 of the Agreement; (2)
the County violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ,by its satne actions; and
(3) the County violated another implied term of the Agreement, by not granting Bums all
necessary permits to construct the Permanent Facility.
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a. Paragraphs 2.4 and 8

nt's
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the docume
P.3d
160
308,
304,
language. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho
in
743, 747 (2007). "In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed
the
from
derived
g
meanin
the
to
its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according
25
plain wording of the instrument." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765,
P.3d 76, 78 (2001). Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining
to
whether there has been a violation of that contract is an issue of law subject
P.3d
38
,
free review. Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605--06
t
1258, 1261--62 (2002). A contract term is ambiguous when there are two differen
Beco
v.
n
Swanso
sical.
reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsen
t is
Constr. Co. , 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). Whether a contrac
of
ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue
P.3d
108
190,
185,
fact. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 141 Idaho
332, 337 (2005) (quotation omitted).
P.3d 1277, 1280
Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,63 3,226
(2010).
The language of the Agreement is unambiguous. Under Paragraph 2.b.(iv), the
ex,~c.utjon. That
Permanent Facility was to be completed within 18 months of the Agreement's
beyond Burns
!
provision contained an exception, however, for delays resulting froril' actions
I j

zoning
ofthe
.
.
Holdings' control. As held by the Supreme Court in Burns JI, the County'sI deniat'
'

!

2.b(iv), Burns
variance was beyond Burns Holdings' control. Consequently, under Paragraph
~t F~cility J~
,,
Holdings was given a reprieve from the 18-month time limit for thei: Pe~~e
I

I

construction.

.•,

,

Burns
Under Paragraph 2.b.(vi), Teton County only haq th~ ~utl),ority to r~voke
,,
'
'

was not timely
Holdings' authority to operate the Temporary Facility if the Permanent Facility
when the
completed. Because the language of Paragraph 2.b.(iv) did not impose a time li111it
Permanent Facility's construction was delayed by actions beyond Bums Holdin

gs' control, the

rary Facility
County did not have authority to revoke Burns Holdings' right t9 operate the Tempo
'

•

I

,Burns
and the County breached the express language of Paragraph 2.b.(vi) wheµ it or~~r~d
Holdings to cease operating the Temporary Facility and removeit.I
MOTION
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Furthermore the County did not provide Burns with a Notice of Default or an opportunity
to cure, as required by Paragraph 8 of the Agreement. The County's October 4, 2012, letter
revoking Burns' authority to operate the Temporary Facility and demanding its removal,
therefore, violated the express language of Paragraph 8.
The County breached the Agreement by violating the express terms of Paragraph 2.b.(iv)
and (vi) and Paragraph 8.
b. Implied covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing

Plaintiffs also claimed the County breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
In Luzar v. Western Surety, 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984), this Court,
without defining the nature of the covenant involved, stated that,
"Good faith and fair dealing are implied obligations of every contract." 107 Idaho
at 696, 692 P.2d at 340. In Metca?f v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778
P.2d 744 (1989), we first defined what constitutes a breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by stating, "Any action by either party ·
which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the .. co~tract is a
violation of the implied-in-law covenant." 116 Idaho at 627, 778 P.2d at 749.
Further, we stated in Metcalf that "the covenant is implied in contracts," and that
the breach "results in contract damages, not tort damages." 116 Idaho at 626, 778
P.2d at 748 .... In First Security Bank ofIdaho v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d
683 (1988), we pointed out that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be inconsistent with the agreement executed by the parties:
Gaige claims First Security breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing
implied in the guaranties. However, we agree with the trial court's ruling
that First Security did not breach any duty to Gaige by merely exercising
its express rights under the guaranty agreement. There is no basis for
claiming implied terms contrary to express rights contained in the parties'
agreement.
l 15 Idaho at 176, 765 P.2d at 687 (emphasis supplied).
Our analysis and definition of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is consistent with surrounding states. In Badgett v. Security State Bank, 116
Wash.2d 563,807 P.2d 356 (1991), the Washington Supreme Court just this year
described the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as follows:
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There is in every contract an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
This duty obligates the parties to cooperate with each other so that each
may obtain the full benefit of performance. ... However, the duty
of good faith does not extend to obligate a party to accept a material
change in the terms of its contract. ... Nor does it "inject substantive terms
into the parties' contract." Rather, it requires only that the parties perform
in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement. ... Thus, the duty
arises only in connection with terms agreed to by the parties ....
807 P.2d at 360 (emphasis supplied).
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' contract. No covenant will
be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed
by the parties. First Security Bank of Idaho v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683
(1988); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298, 766 P.2d 768 (1988)
(an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override an express
provision in a contract). The covenant requires "that the parties perform
in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement," Badgett v. Security
State Bank, 116 Wash.2d 563, 807 P.2d 356, 356 (1991), and a violation of
the covenant occurs only when "either party ... violates, nullifies or significantly
impairs any benefit of the ... contract.... " Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc. , 118 Idaho
664, 669, 799 P.2d 70, 75 (1990); Metca/f v. lntermountain Gas Co., I 16 Idaho
622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989).
' .
. . . [B]y merely standing upon the terms of a contract, a party does hot fail to deal
honestly with another party regardless of how onerous the temis of that contract
maybe ... .
Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287-89, 824 P.2d 841, 862-64
(1991) (emphasis added).
By denying Burns Holdings the right to operate the Temp~rary Facility, th~ County
I.

violated, nullified and significantly impaired one of the Agreement's benefits. m.µnelY:tpat
'

Burns Holdings could continue to operate the Temporary Facility beyond 18 months if a'delay
.
'
'.

outside Burns Holdings' control occurred.

j

''i

I

I

I
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c. Implied term to grant all necessary permits
In their motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs also argued the County breached
an implied term to approve all zoning and building permits in order to construct the Permanent
Facility. Plaintiffs cited Davis v. Prof! Bus. Servs., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 813-14, 712 P.2d 511 ,
514-15 ( 1985), which states:
In every contract there exist not only the express promises set forth in the contract
but all such implied provisions as are necessary to effectuate the intention of the
parties, and as arise from the specific circumstances under which the contract was
made. Miller v. Independent School District No. 56 of Garfield County, 609 P.2d
756, 758 (Okla.1980); Wiles v. Wiles, 202 Kan. 613,452 P.2d 271, 278-79 (1969)
(4'[P]rovisions not specifically mentioned in a written contract, but which are
essential in carrying out its purposes, may be implied, and, when properly
implied, are as binding as if written therein."). In implying terms to a contract that
is silent on the particular matter in question, only reasonable terms should be
implied. State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 621 P.2d 1329, 1332
(Alaska 1981). Such implied terms are as much a part of the contract as those
which are expressed. Wiles, supra; Demand v. Foley, 11 Ariz.App. 267, 463 P.2d
851,856 (1970).
(Emphasis added).
As held by the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act did not
permit the County to grant Burns a CUP for a height variance. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs
acknowledge, 1 the property did not have any problematic site characteristi.cs .and the County
could not, therefore, grant a zoning variance. Paragraph 10 of the Agree~ent s{ates ''De,veloper
•

'

I

agrees to comply with all federal, state, county and local laws, rules
and regulatio1,1s,
\\'.hich
I
•
.
I

.

.

appertain to the subject property." The express language of Paragraph 10,.togeth~~ wi~11 the
,'

County's inability to grant a zoning variance, refutes the existence
'·

'

.

I

;~f~ impJied 90.veriapt that
;

·,

I

I

'

!·

I

'

:

the County would approve all zoning and building permits. Bliss, supra, ("N6 covenant will
be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and exe~uted by the

parties.").
1

Plaintiffs' Supporting Mem. at 9, n. 4.
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d Conclusion regarding breach of contract
The County breached the Agreement by violating the express terms of Paragraph 2.b.(iv)
and (vi) and Paragraph 8. The County also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by denying Burns the benefit of operating the Temporary Facility.
Because no genuine issue of material fact existed on the issue of breach of contract, This
Court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of Burns Holdings on its breach of
contract claim. The County's motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Burns Holdings on its breach of contract claim should be denied.
2. Plaintiffs are not entitled to rescission of the Developer's Agreement.

The County argues that this Court should not have ordered rescission of the Agreement
because: (1) the Court did not make any findings that Teton County materially breached the
Agreement; (2) Teton County did not give sufficiently prompt notice ofrescission; and (3) the
parties can not be returned to the pre-contract status quo.

a. Material Breach
The decision to award rescission of a contract is a matter of discretion. Murr, v. Selag ·
1

Corp. , 113 Idaho 773, 778, 747 P.2d 1302, 1307 (Ct. App. 1987).
Rescission is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and seeks to
restore the parties to their original positions. It is normally granted only in those
circumstances in which one of the parties has committed a breach so material
that it destroys or vitiates the entire purpose for entering into the
contract. Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971).

Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dep't ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663,668, ~2 P.3d 307,312
.,

I

!

(2002) (emphasis added).
Rescission of a contract is available only when one of the parties has committed a
material breach which destroys the entire object of entering into the contract and
which touches the fundamental purpose of the contract. Ervin Construction Co. v.

Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 699-700, 874 P.2d 506, 510-11 (1993). Rescission is
not available, however, where the breach of contract is only incidental and
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION IN LIMINE 14
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subordinate to the main purpose of the contract. Id. A breach of contract is not
material if substantial performance has been rendered. Mountain Restaurant
Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall, 122 Idaho 261,265,833 P.2d 119,123 (Ct.App.1992).
Substantial performance is performance which, despite a deviation from contract
requirements, provides the important and essential benefits of the contract to the
promisee. Id Whether a breach of contract is material is a question of fact. Id.

First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 13 l Idaho 787, 792, 964 P.2d 654,659 (1998).
The primary object of entering the Agreement was to impose conditions on Burns
Holdings in exchange for granting a zone change to light industrial so as to permit the operation
of a concrete batch plant. Although the Agreement provided for the construction and operation
of a Temporary Facility, the fundamental purpose and objective of the contract was the
construction of a Permanent Facility. Burns Holdings was unable to build the Permanent Facility
because it could not obtain a zoning variance due to non-problematic site characteristics. It was
this inability to obtain a zoning variance that frustrated the Permanent Facility's construction.
Pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, the County was without power to grant the
'

variance. Although Teton County's revocation of the right to operate the Temporary Facility
prevented Plaintiffs from operating any concrete plant, even in th~ form of the Temporary
Facility, the Temporary Facility's operation was not the main purpose o(the ?ontract.
Additionally, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether .?lainti,ffs could
have used an alternative Permanent Facility design that would not require a zoning variance.
Finally, Plaintiffs discontinued Temporary Facility operations in 2009 or early 2010,

2

prior to the County's October 4, 2012, letter. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
whether Plaintiffs' decision to cease operations in. 2010 was the result of mm-ket conditions or
the County's threats ofrevocation.

2

'I

June 15, 2017, Kirk Bums Depo., p. 105 and 119.
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These issues present, at a minimum, a question of fact regarding whether the County's ·
revocation of the right to operate the Temporary Facility vitiated the Agreement's entire purpose.
Consequently, this Court cannot determine at the summary judgment stage whether the County's
revocation of the right to operate the Temporary Facility constituted a material breach, sufficient
to order rescission of the Agreement.
b. Prompt notice

Under the common law, it is well established that the party seeking rescission
must act promptly once the grounds for rescission arise. Farr v. Mischler, 129
Idaho 201, 205, 923 P.2d 446, 450 (1996),citing Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho
215,218,485 P.2d 957, 960 (1971). "Once a party treats a contract as valid after
the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of rescission, the right of rescission is
waived." Id The record reveals that White first prayed for rescission in his
amended complaint that was dated approximately twenty-six months after
completion of the sale.
White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,888, 104 P.3d 356,362 (2004).

Bums Holdings first sought rescission in the Complaint filed on May 21, 2013. Although
that was nearly six years after the County denied the CUP, it was only eight months after the
County denied its request for a zoning variance. Bums Holdings acted sufficiently promptly in
seeking rescission once it became clear it could not obtain a zoning variance.
c. Restoration to status quo
Rescission is an equitable remedy aimed at restoring the parties tb tlu:ir precontract status quo, Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, ,485 P.2d 957
( 1971 ), overruled on other grounds, Barnard & Son, Inc. v. Akin$, 10,9 I4aho 466,
708 P.2d 871 (1985), and is proper where a mutual mistake of (act is material or
fundamental to the creation of a contract. 77 AM.JUR.2D f:endor And
Purchaser §§
538, 552
(1975); RESTATEMENT .
(SECONl))
OF CONTRACTS§ 152 chapter 6 (1981) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT); D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3 at 256 (1973)
(hereinafter DOBBS).

No fault is necessary to warrant rescission of such a contract,
though rescission is also available where the defendant is guiltf ~f fault,

such as fraud. But it does not follow that rescission is given for every
serious mistake. The parties may have changed p~sition, of restoration
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO RECONSiDER AND MOTI()N
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may be extremely difficult to compute with any assurance of accuracy,
or rescission and restitution may be a radical and destructive remedy
where an award of damages may repair the mistake with a minimum of
dislocation. Thus the remedy is neither given nor withheld automatically,
but is awarded as a matter of judgment.
Dobbs at 256. See generally Annotation, Mistake In Quantity Of Land, Relief, l
A.L.R.2d 9 (1948).
Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 777-79, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306-08 (Ct. App. 1987)

It is also clear from the record that substantial reconstruction and remodeling had
been done to the property by the time White filed the amended complaint.
Because rescission requires restoration to the status quo, Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho
259, 262, 646 P .2d 1030, 1033 (Ct.App.1982), White's remodeling efforts
rendered rescission an impossibility. The district court's denial of common law
resc1ss10n was proper.

White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356,362 (2004). See also Robinson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180-81, 45 P.3d 829, 836-37 (2002) ("the party seeking
rescission must tender back any consideration or benefit received under the contract.").
Plaintiffs operated the Temporary Facility between 2007 and 2010. They ·ben.efited from
the Agreement and from the County's grant of a conditional rezone of the property to Ml.
Because Plaintiffs operated the concrete plant for several years, and have not tendered back the
benefit received thereby, there is no way to return the parties to the status quo, as it existed prior
to the Agreement and rescission is improper. Consequently, rescission is unavailable as matter
I

oflaw.

. i

I

I

,

d. Conclusion regarding rescission

The County's motion for reconsideration of the May 2, 2017, Order should be granted.
This Court's previous order granting rescission should be vacated.

MEMORANDU M DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND MOTJO,N !N LIMINE 17

Page 91

B. Motion in Limine
1. Burns Holdings is entitled to damages based on its reliance interest.
The County seeks to limit the evidence produced at trial to that establishing expectation
damages. It suggests that anything above expectation damages would inappropriately punish
the
County.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained what measure of damages is available for
breach of contract:
[I]n general, when a contract has been breached, the aggrieved party may seek
compensation for infringement upon any of three separate interests embodied in
the contract.
Judicial remedies ... serve to protect one or more of the following interests
of [one who has been promised performance under a contract]:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not been made, or
'
(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979) . .. .

Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 198-200 , 722 P.2d 1062,
1065-67 (Ct. App. 1986).
The Court in Brown defined reliance interest as "the claim for recovery of out-ofpocket expenses incurred in anticipation of mutual performance of the contract." Id. at
200, 722 P.2d at 1067. It explained:
! .

I.

Compensation of this interest customarily is available when a contract has been

breached, even if the aggrieved party elects to rescind the contract. E.g. , Blinzler

v. Andrews, supra; Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, 75 Idaho 436, 273 ,P.2d
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399 (1954); Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 697 P.2d 1244
(Ct.App.1985). (,_Y- French v. Nabob Silver-Lead Co., 82 Idaho 120, 350 P.2d 206
(1960) (holding that damages for breach of contract may include expens
es
incurred by a party in anticipation of or preparation for performance).

Id.
Burns Holdings may seek reliance damages as compensation for Teton County

's breach

of contract.
2. The County may produce evidence of losses Burns Holdings would have
suffered
if the Agreement had been performed.

The County next seeks to reduce the amount of reliance damages Bums Holdin

gs can

recover by any amount it can prove Bums would have lost if the contract had been
fully
performed. Teton County points to Restatement (Third) Restitution§ 38 for the
measure of
damages calculation.
Section 38 of the Restatement provides:
(2) Performance-based damages are measured by
(a) uncompensated expenditures made in rec:1sonable reliance on the
contract, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in
performance, less any loss the defendant can prove with reasonable certainty
the plaintiff would have suffered had the contract been performed
(Restatement Second, Contracts § 349); or
(b) the market value of the plaintiffs uncompensated contractual
performance, not exceeding the price of such performance as determined by
reference to the parties' agreement.

(3) A plaintiff whose damages are measured by the rules of subsectton (2) may
also recover for any other loss, including incidental or consequential foss, caused
by the breach.
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ 38(201 1).
Burns objects to the use of the Restatement for determining the measure of damage

s

because the Idaho Supreme Court has not adopted that section of the Restatement.
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of
"The Restatement is not law unless it has been adopted by this Court." Estate
(2004).
862
856,
Skvorak v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 22, 89 P.3d
"This Court will not adopt a Restatement provision if it is inconsistent with Idaho
d
precedent, a different formulation resolved the issue, or the issue can be resolve
by current Idaho law." Id.
271 P.3d
Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 338,34 5,
1194, 1201 (2012).
formula
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has not adopte d§ 38 of the Restatement, its
Beatrice Foods
for determining restitution damages is consistent with Idaho law. See King v.

tion
Co. , 89 Idaho 52, 58-59, 402 P.2d 966, 969 (l 965) ("It may be stated as a general proposi
such as this,

t
that, in an action for damages occasioned by breach of a partially executed contrac

may be, in the
the purpose of [sic] objective of the court is to place the injured party, so far as
been performed.");
position no better and no worse than he would have occupied had the contract
1
1 Williston
Young Elec. Sign Co. v. Capps, 94 Idaho 518,52 2,492 P.2d 57, 61 (1971) (9u~ting 1

rformance .. .
on Contracts, 3d ed., s 1339 (1968)) ("In a case where '(t)he defendant's·non-pe
his own part, . . .
saves the plaintiff from the labor or expense of wholly or partly performi:ng on
this saving
in order to settle finally the rights of both parties in a single action, the court deducts
d have
made by the plaintiff from the value of the performance which the defendant shoul.
(h?lding that
made." '); Christensen v. Christensen, 100 Idaho 733, 736, 605 P.2d 80, 83 (1 ~79)
better
an award for breach of contract is improper if it puts plaintiff "in a positi?n
'
'

than that they

would have occupied had there been no breach").
e Court
Furthermore, comment c. to § 344 of the Restatement, which the Idaho Suprem
I

'

I

'

the scope of
applied in Brown, supra, cites§ 349 of the Restatement to further .define and clarify
recovery under a reliance interest.
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Section 349 of the Restatement similarly provides:
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 34 7 [pertaining to
expectation interest], the injured party has a right to damages based on his
reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or
in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable
certainty the irifured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 (1981) ( emphasis added).
If Plaintiffs would have suffered a loss in operating the Temporary Facility, the amount

of that loss should be accounted for when determining the amount of Burns Holdings' damages
based on reliance interest. Otherwise, Burns Holdings would receive a windfall from having the
County pay all of its reliance expenditures without any consideration of money Burns Holdings
ultimately would have lost had there not been a breach. The County's motion in limine,
regarding evidence of losses Burns Holdings would have suffered had Teton County not
breached the Agreement, should be granted.
3. The question of pre-judgment interest is deferred.
The County argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgi,nent interest bedause they did
not provide notice at the pleading stage that they would seek prejudgment interest and because
the Agreement does not address prejudgment interest. The County also argues prejudgment
interest may not be awarded because the amount of Plaintiffs' claimed interest is unascertainable
by mere mathematical process.
The Idaho Supreme Court does not require "(A] claim for p~~-judgme,nt int~rest to be
included in the complaint .... " Rosecrans v. lntermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho 785,
788-89, 605 P.2d 963, 966-f)7 (1980).

Bums failure to include a claim for prejudgment interest in its Complaint does not bar its

recovery.
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[P]re-judgment interest should not be allowed when the principal amount of
liability was unliquidated. . . . When the amount of liability is mathematically
and definitely ascertainable, pre-judgment interest may be awarded. Id. at 920,
478 P.2d at 300.

Id at 788-89, 605 P.2d at 966-67 (note omitted). See also Beco Const. Co. v. Harper
Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 11-12, 936 P.2d 202, 209-10 (Ct. App. 1997) (affirming denial
of prejudgment interest because "The amount of gravel that [plaintiff] crushed ... was not a
known or agreed upon amount prior to trial; hence, the mathematical product of the amount of
gravel multiplied by the cost of crushing the gravel was not ascertainable prior to the
deliberations of the jury").
Idaho statutory law, Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award
of prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law likewise
calls for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust enrichment. Jones v.
Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Ct.App.1987). Under either
the
statute
or
the
equitable
remedy
of
unjust
enrichment,
however, prejudgment interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated
or readily ascertainable by mathematical process. Id ; Chila v. Blaser. 111 Idaho
702, 706, 727 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct.App.1986). This limitation is based upon
"equitable considerations," Farm Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 9~ Idaho 918, 920,
478 P.2d 298, 300 (1970), which presumably include the notion that a person who
could not determine the amount owed should not be charged ,interest on the sum
that is ultimately found to be due. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 654 (1988).
However,
"where
the
amount
of
liability
is:
liquidated
or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical processes" interest is allowed
from a time prior to judgment, "for in that event the interest in fully 1compensating.
the injured party predominates over other equitable considerations." Farm Dev.
Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co. , 92 Idaho 889,900, 452 P.2d 993, 1004
(1969)). See also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 814,
919 P.2d 334, 343 (1996); Davis v. Prof! Bus. Serv., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 817,
712 P.2d 511, 518 (1985); Child, 111 Idaho at 706--07, 727 P.2d at 897-98.
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated dpes no,t _re'n~e~ damages
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could cfelay payment 'w ithout
incurring interest expense
by
disputing
and
litigating' ' any , claim,
I
and prejudgment interest would never be awarded. Ace Realty, · Inc. v.
Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751, 682 P.2d 1289, 129~ (Ct.App.1984). See
also Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 235, 506 P.2d 455, 462 (1972). Rather,
.i

,,

'

'' . '

damages are unascertainable where some factor necesfory' to calculate the
amount of damages must be determined by a trier offact. 'Conversely:
.
···;

:

,

l

t

l

•

.

I
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A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed,
makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance
upon opinion or discretion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a
fixed sum, claims for money had and received, claims for money paid out,
and claims for goods or services to be paid for at an agreed rate.
Seubert Excavators, inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d 555,
561 n. 2 (Ct.App.1993), affd, 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994). There need be
no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justify the award
of prejudgment interest. Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at
300; Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323, 326
(Ct.App.1992) .
. . . Our inquiry in this case ... is whether the district court abused its discretion
in finding that Rick's damages were not liquidated or ascertainable by
mathematical process ....

. . . [AJ claim that is liquidated or readily ascertainable when standing alone may
be rendered uncertain in amount by an adverse party's countervailing
unliquidated claim or setoff. According to our Supreme Court:
[P]rejudgment interest is precluded where the amount awardable on one
party's claim for a liquidated amount cannot be ascertained because ·of the
other party's unliquidated claim. This will occur, for instance, in cases
where the unliquidated claim challenges the value of the performance
forming the basis of the liquidated claim.
··
Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41 ;:47, 896 P.2d 949,
955 (1995) (citations omitted).
Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276-78, 178 P.3d 639, 641-43 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added).
When considering a motion in limine, a trial court may "decide that it is
inappropriate to rule in advance on the admissibility of evidence . based on
a motion in limine" and "may defer [its] ruling until the case unfolds and there is
a better record upon which to make [its] decision." State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688,
700, 760 P.2d 27, 39 (1988). Here, the magistrate ... explained that it was
deferring its ruling until trial because it was uncertain w.hat other evidence the
State would offer for foundation. See id at 699-700, 760 P.2d at '3 8-39 ("It is
often difficult, and sometimes impossible, for the trial judge to make a proper
ruling without the benefit of all the other evidence admitted at trial.").
State v. Boehm, 158 Idaho 294, 301-02, 346 P.3d 311, 318-19 (Ct. App. 2015).
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This case potentially involves a complex determination of damages. Because it is nof yet
clear whether those damages are ascertainable by mere mathematical process or whether factual
determinations must be made, it is inappropriate to rule on the County's motion in limine at this
time. This Court defers ruling on the motion in limine regarding prejudgment interest until trial
or such time as a sufficient record exists to make the determination.
4. Burns Holdings' Damages
The County notes that the Agreement was with Burns Holdings, but Bums Concrete
incurred all the claimed damages. The County argues that Bums Holdings did not suffer
damages from breach of contract and has not identified any damages that are assignable to Burns
Concrete.
The determination regarding whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently established damages
should be deferred until such time as sufficient record exists to make th~ determination.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The County's motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgm~nt in favor of Plaintiffs
on their breach of contract claim is denied.
The County's motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs
on rescission is granted. This Court's previous order granting rescission of the Agreement is
vacated.
The County's motion in limine seeking the exclusion of evidence pertaining to reliance
damages is denied. Bums Holdings may pursue reliance damages as compensation for the
County's breach of contract.
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The County's motion in limine is granted insofar as it seeks the admission of evidence of
losses Burns Holdings would have suffered if Teton County had not breached the Agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this@_ day of

F~

2018.

NE H. WATKINS, JR.
D1 trict Judge
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TETON COUNTY
BURNS CONCRETE, INC. et al,

Case No. CV-2013-165

Plaintiffs,

[DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED]
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

TETON COUNTY,
Defendant.

PREFACE 1
Defendant Teton County respectfully submits these proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law based on the evidence presented at the trial of this
matter on March 7·9, 2018 and May 11, 2018. An electronic copy in .DOCX format is
submitted concurrently herewith, along with the evidence cited herein.
Prior to trial, the Court ruled that Teton County breached the Developer's
Agreement of August 31, 2007 by violating the express terms of Paragraph 2.b.(iv)

1

This preface is not provided for inclusion in the District Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, but rather to provide an introduction and roadmap for the proposed findings
and conclusions which follow.
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and (vi) and Paragraph 8 and by violating the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing inherent to the Developer's Agreement. (Mem. Dec. & Or. of Feb. 12,
2018.) By letter of October 4, 2012, the County demanded that Burns Holdings
cease operation of the Temporary Facility. (Stipulated Facts ,r 16.) Under the
Court's prior ruling, the County breached of the Developer's Agreement when it
denied Burns Holdings the right to operate the Temporary Facility. (Id) Based on
the Court's pretrial rulings, the issues remaining for trial are Plaintiffs' remedies.
Plaintiffs elected to pursue recession of the Developer's Agreement coupled with
reliance damages.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any
damages award. The method for calculating reliance damages in the context of
rescission is discussed in Restatement (Third) Restitution§ 38 (2011). Reliance
damages are capped at the amount a plaintiff would have lost absent the breach thus preventing a windfall. (Id) Plaintiffs admit that they lost money on the
Temporary Facility. As explained by expert witness Richard Hoffman, Plaintiffs
would not have been able to make any profit from the operation of the Temporary
Facility because the economic downturn would have required Plaintiffs to cease
operations and liquidate assets to reduce debt. In fact, that is exactly what
happened. Because Plaintiffs were not able to generate profit from the Temporary
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Facility, even in the absence of breach, the Plaintiffs' recovery must be capped at
zero.
Notwithstanding the cap, reliance damages are limited to those expenditures
caused to a contracting party by a contractual breach. Merry Gentlemen v. Keaton,
799 F.3d 827, 831 (7 th Cir. 2015). Burns Holdings - which was a party to the
Developer's Agreement- did not identify any of its own expenditures as reliance
damages. Accordingly, there can be no award to it. Burns Concrete, in contrast, was
not a party to the Developer's Agreement and cannot recover under it.
Even if Burns Concrete had rights under the Developer's Agreement, the
majority of its claimed expense items have no causal link to any breach of the
Developer's Agreement. Notably, well over 1,500 of its claimed expense items
predate the Agreement; and nearly 5,000 items predate Burns Concrete's purported
acquisition of any interest under the Developer's Agreement. Once these
unrecoverable expense items are eliminated, only 157 actual expense items remain,
amounting to just $22,872.66. Yet even this amount is not recoverable, because
Burns Concrete is not a beneficiary of the Developer's Agreement, Burn Concrete
did not effectively obtain an assignment from Burns Holding, and the expenses do
not flow from any breach identified by the Court. Accordingly, even without the
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consideration of expert testimony, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any monetary
award.
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter came before the Court for trial on March 7·9, 2018 and May 11,
2018. Robert B. Burns and the law firm of Parsons Behle & Latimer, PC appeared
for Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC. Billie Jean Siddoway,
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney, appeared for Defendant Teton County. Based
on the evidence presented at trial, the Court enters its findings of fact and
conclusions of law as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue
1.

The Parties to this action are Plaintiff Burns Concrete, Inc. ("Burns

Concrete"), Plaintiff Burns Holdings, LLC ("Burns Holdings") and Defendant Teton
County (the "County"). Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings may be referred to
collectively as "Plaintiffs". Plaintiffs and the County may be referred to collectively
as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party". (Stipulated Facts ,r I.)
2.

This action involves a claim for breach of contract in an amount

exceeding $10,000. (Stipulated Facts ,r 2.)
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3.

This action involves a claim against Teton County, a county

established by Idaho Code§ 31 ·143. (Stipulated Facts ,r 3.)

The Property
4.

By warranty deeds dated December 18, 2006, and recorded in the

records of Teton County on December 28, 2006 as Instrument Numbers 183802 and
183803, Burns Concrete acquired two parcels of real property identified as Lots
lB·W and lB·E, Teton Peaks View Subdivision, Teton County, Idaho and commonly
known as 1723 North Highway 33, Driggs, Idaho 83422 (the "Property''). (Stipulated
Facts ,r 4; Warranty Deed, PL Ex. 1; Warranty Deed, PL Ex. 2.)
5.

Burns Concrete bought the property on that date because of timing

issues with the sellers, both of whom were divorcing and one of whom was in jail.
(K. Burns, Tr. at 220:9-21.)
6.

Burns Concrete paid $823,119 to acquire the Property. (Stipulated

Facts ,r 5.)
7.

Near the time of purchase, Bank of Idaho requested an appraisal of the

property. (K. Burns, Tr. at 370:2-6.) The appraised value was around $805,000. (Id)
8.

On February 26, 2009, Burns Concrete, Bank of Idaho and First

American Title Company entered into a Deed of Trust for the benefit of Bank of
Idaho. (Stipulated Facts ,r 6; K. Burns, Tr. at 372:8-21; PL Ex. E.)
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9.

By the Deed of Trust, Burns Concrete conveyed its interest in the

Property to First American Title for the benefit of Bank of Idaho. (Def. Ex. 3 at 1.)
10.

As part of the Deed of Trust with Bank of Idaho and First American

. Title, Burns Concrete agreed that it would not "abandon or leave unattended the
Property." (Deed of Trust, Def. Ex. E, at p. 2.)
11.

On or about December 11, 2017, Curtis Boam appraised the Property

at a fair market value of $476,155. (PL Ex. 13.)

The Developer's Agreement
12.

At the time Burns Concrete purchased the Property, the Property was

zoned as C-3, a commercial use. (Stipulated Facts, 8.)
13.

Plaintiffs desired to obtain a zone change to M-1, light industrial, to

allow for the operation of a concrete batch plant. (Stipulated Facts , 9; K. Burns,
Tr. at 376:6-24.)
14.

The County approved the zone change on February 26, 2007, subject to

the execution of a development agreement. (PL Ex. P; see Stipulated Facts , 11.)
15.

Around July 16, 2007, after the County approved of the conditional

zone change, Burns Concrete caused renderings of the Permanent Facility to be
prepared. (K. Burns, Tr. at 392:9-393:7_) These renderings are attached to the
Developer's Agreement.
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16.

The attorney for the City of Driggs drafted the Developer's Agreement.

(K. Burns, Tr. at 227=19·23, 377=8·12.)

17.

Plaintiffs had an opportunity to review and revise the Developer's

Agreement. (K. Burns, Tr. at 377=13·18.) In fact, the law firm of Martin & Eskelson
did revise the Developer's Agreement. (Supp. to Ex. 8 at Bl 7321 ·22, Bl 7325.)
18.

Burns Holdings and Teton County entered the Developer's Agreement

for Burns Holdings, LLC, dated August 31, 2007, and entered in the records of
Teton County on September 5, 2007 as Instrument Number 191250 (the
"Developer's Agreement"). (Stipulated Facts ,r 10; K. Burns, Tr. at 381=1 ·5, 381=22·
24; PL Ex. 3.)
19.

Although Plaintiffs asserted at trial that the Property and Developer's

Agreement were subject to a joint venture, the testimony was not persuasive. (K.
Burns, Tr. at 190=25·191=18, 246=20·248=10.) As evidenced by the warranty deeds
and the Plaintiffs' own admission, Burns Concrete owned the Property. (PL Exs. 1·
2; K. Burns, Tr. 231=16·17.) Burns Holdings was a party to the Developer's
Agreement, which made no mention of Burns Concrete or a joint venture. (See K.
Burns, Tr. at 381=22·382:3; Pl. Ex. 3.) When asked whether Burns Holding and
Burns Concrete had a written joint venture agreement, Kirk Burns responded that
they had "this assignment agreement." (Tr. at 440=21 ·441=4.) He clarified that it was

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PAGE7

Page 106

the "only agreement" between Burns Holdings and Burns Concrete. (Tr. at 441:710.) The Assignment Agreement does not establish a joint venture. (See Pl. Ex. 5.)

The Temporary Facility
20.

Burns Concrete acquired a temporary concrete batch plant from

Johnson Ross Corporation between 2000 and 2002. (Stipulated Facts ,r 12.) Thus,
Burns Concrete acquired the temporary concrete batch plant five to seven years
before Burns Concrete acquired the Property. ( Compare Stipulated Facts ,r 12 with

,r 4.)
21.

The temporary concrete batch plant is approximately 65 feet high. (K.

Burns, Tr. at 388:8-11.) Plaintiffs have not applied for a height variance for the
temporary plant. (K. Burns, Tr. at 398:16-21.)
22.

Burns Concrete grubbed the Property and extended utilities to the

Property. (Stipulated Facts ,r 13.) Prior to November 15, 2007, Burns Concrete
transported its temporary concrete batch plant to the Property and erected the
temporary batch plant on the Property. (Stipulated Facts ,r 14.) (The temporary
batch plant erected on the Property is referred to as the "Temporary Facility.")
(Stipulated Facts ,r 14.)
23.

Burns Concrete began operating the Temporary Facility in November

2007. (K. Burns, Tr. at 388:15-16.) Burns Concrete ceased operating the Temporary
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Facility around January 2010. (K. Burns, Tr. at 388:13-15; A. Barger, Tr. at 14=6·
10.) (The duration from November 2007 through January 2010 is referred to herein
as the "Operating Period".)

The Purported Transfer
24.

A Quitclaim Deed, executed on May 6, 2013, purports to convey a 50%

interest in the Property from Burns Concrete to Burns Holdings. (Pl. Ex. 4.)
25.

Plaintiffs did not record the Quitclaim Deed with the Teton County

Recorder. (K. Burns, Tr. at 463:19·23.)
26.

The Property was subject to the Deed of Trust held by First American

Title for the benefit of Bank of Idaho. (See Def. Ex. E.) Although the debt on the
Property has been refinanced and consolidated, the Property is still identified as
collateral on the new note. (K. Burns, Tr. at 432:2-17.)
27.

Neither Bank of Idaho nor First American Title reconveyed the Deed of

Trust to allow Burns Concrete to convey an interest in the Property. (K. Burns, Tr.
at 431:24-432:2.)
28.

Plaintiffs did not present any evidence to demonstrate that Bank of

Idaho or First American Title ever conveyed or consented to the conveyance of any
interest in the Property to Burns Holdings. Plaintiffs did not notify Bank of Idaho of
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the purported transfer of the collateral to Burns Holdings. (K. Burns, Tr. at 452:46.)

29.

Burns Concrete's Balance Sheets do not show any change in the value

of its land assets from 2008 through 2013. For the year ending December 31, 2008,
Burns Concrete identified the value of its land assets to be $3,427,186.36. (K.
Burns, Tr. at 437=20·25, 444=18·21.) On December 31, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013,
Burns Concrete identified the value of its land assets to be $3,427,186.36.
(K. Burns, Tr. at 445:15-25, 446=14·20, 446:24-447:3_) Burns Concrete's Balance
Sheets show that Burns Concrete did not convey an interest in the Property to
Burns Holdings at any time between December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2013.
30.

Based on all of the relevant evidence, the Court finds that Burns

Concrete has not conveyed a 50% interest in the Property to Burns Holdings.

The Assignment Agreement
31.

On May 10, 2013, just four days after executing the Quitclaim Deed,

Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings entered an Assignment and Assumption
Agreement (the "Assignment Agreement"). (Pl. Ex. 5.)
32.

The Assignment Agreement purports to give Burns Holdings the

option to purchase the Property at the price of "all costs [Burns Concrete] has
incurred through the date of such purchase in connection with purchasing and
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holding the Property and making all improvements required by the terms of the
[Developer's] Agreement. (PL Ex. 5 at 1 1.) According to Kirk Burns, that price has
not been determined, but it would be "in the millions." (K. Burns, Tr. at 400=7·

33.

Burns Holdings purports to have assigned to Burns Concrete "an

undivided interest in all of Burns Holdings' right and benefits and duties and
obligations in, to, and under the Agreement, including all claims causes of action,
and rights of enforcement of Burns Holdings related to the [Developer's] Agreement,
that are now in existence or may hereafter arise". (PL Ex. 5 at 1 2.) Burns Concrete
accepted and assumed "all such rights and benefits and duties and obligations." (Id)
34.

Burns Concrete assigned to Burns Holdings "an undivided interest in

all claims and causes of action of Burns Concrete, whether sounding in or arising
under contract, statute, ordinance, or otherwise, related to the Property and/or the
Agreement that are now in existence or may hereafter arise." (Stipulated Facts

1 15; PL Ex. 5 at 1 3.)
35.

According to Kirk Burns, Burns Holdings would exercise the option to

acquire the property upon completion of the permanent facility. (Tr. at 405:13·19.)
However, the parties executed the Assignment Agreement in 2013, and Kirk Burns
had already determined back in 2010 that the Permanent Facility was not going
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forward, and it received the "final nail in the coffin" by 2012. (Tr. at 408=13·21.)
Moreover, Burns Holdings did not give any consideration for the option. (K. Burns,
Tr. at 408:4-10.)
36.

The Parties to the Assignment Agreement did not intend to make a

complete transfer of rights to another and relinquish control. According to Kirk
Burns, it was not the intent that "Burns Holdings transfer all of its claims against
Teton County to Burns Concrete." (Tr. at 407:5-7.) He understood that Burns
Holdings will maintain control of and participation in the claim. (Tr. at 408:8-12.)
37.

As a factual matter, the Assignment Agreement does not appear to be

a genuine transfer of rights or obligations.

The Permanent Facility
38.

In 2007, the Teton County Board of Commissioners denied a request

for a conditional use permit to allow the construction of the Permanent Facility. (K.
Burns, Tr. at 396=16·21.)
39.

Then, in 2012, the Teton County Board of Commissioners denied an

application for a variance to allow the Permanent Facility to exceed the height
limit. (K. Burns, Tr. at 396=22·25.)
40.

The Teton County Board of Commissioners reasoned that the Property

was not eligible for a variance because there were "no unusual circumstances on the
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property that would allow a variance" under the variance ordinance. (K. Burns, Tr.
at 397:1-4.)
41.

Plaintiffs did not acquire renderings for the Permanent Facility which

are attached to the Developer's Agreement until July 2007. (K. Burns, Tr. at 392:23-

42.

Plaintiffs have not ever acquired or developed formal architectural

plans or building plans for the construction of the Permanent Facility. (K. Burns,
Tr. at 393:19-21.)
43.

Plaintiffs have not ever developed or obtained an estimate of the cost

to construct the Permanent Facility. (K. Burns, Tr. at 396=7·10.)
44.

It would be possible to construct the Permanent Facility below ground

level so that it conforms to the governing height restriction, such as the Walters
plant in Teton County. (See K. Burns, Tr. 397:10-18.) However, Plaintiffs have
elected not to construct the Permanent Facility below ground level.
45.

As of the date of trial, Plaintiffs have not constructed the Permanent

Facility.

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PAGE 13

Page 112

Cessation of Operations
46.

On October 4, 2012, Kathy Rinaldi, Chairman of the Teton County

Board of Commissioners, sent a letter to Kirk Burns of Burns Concrete stating,
among other things, the following:
The County has revoked Burns Holdings [sic] authority to operate
their "temporary facility." Please commence removal activity
immediately.
(Stipulated Facts 1 16.)
4 7.

Plaintiffs did not remove the Temporary Facility in response to the

October 4 Letter. (K. Burns, Tr. at 414=18·415=16.) The Temporary Facility has not
ever been removed. (Id)
48.

Plaintiffs did not cease operations of the Temporary Facility in

response to the October 4 Letter. By 2010, two years before the letter, Burns
Concrete had already decided to close the Temporary Facility. According to Kirk
Burns the loss in court caused the shut down:
Well, it pretty much stopped all the customers. By the time whenwhen Judge Moeller ruled against us, there was newspaper articles to
the effect of Burns - Burns' plant is - is extinguished.
It's like there was continual articles in the paper. I mean, people were
- people just were scared to death at that point. We had phone calls
saying, We can't buy from you now. You're a sole source. You can't run.
(K. Burns, Tr. at 260=14·21; see also K. Burns Tr. at 411=13·23.)
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49.

Burns continued to explain that, in 2010, "Everybody said, You can't do

it, and you're an eyesore, and you're blocked in Teton County." (Tr. at 261=21·25.)
50.

By 2010, Kirk Burns decided that he did not want to move forward

with the Driggs operation, and this conviction was strengthened in 2012. (K. Burns,
Tr. at 408=16·21.)
51.

According to Kirk Burns, by 2012, Burns Concrete had become "a

pariah". (Tr. 408=22-24.) By that time, Burns Concrete was done doing business in
Teton County. (Tr. 409:4-6.)

Rescission ofthe Development Agreement
52.

Plaintiffs first sought rescission in the Complaint filed on May 21,

2013. (Stipulated Facts ,r 18.)
53.

As a result of the Development Agreement, Plaintiffs received the

benefit of a conditional zone change from C-3 to M-1 from 2007 through 2010. (K.
Burns, Tr. at 390:25-391:4_)
54.

Plaintiffs did not present any evidence that either of them tendered

back to Teton County the benefit of the zone change.

Plaintiffs' Claimed Damages
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55.

Allen Barger has been Burns Concrete's Controller since August 2013.

(A. Barger, Tr. at 8=22·23, 9:3-6.) Barger does not work for Burns Holdings. (A.

Barger, Tr. at 118=7·8.)
56.

Barger prepared Plaintiffs' Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. (A. Barger, Tr.

at 13:2-10, 21:12-14, 88=1 ·3, 68=2·9, 91:21-24, 81=4·6.)
57.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7 is an early summary of Burns Concrete's

estimated losses at the Temporary Facility. (Pl. Ex. 7; A. Barger, Tr. at 121:17·20.)
58.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8 is a comprehensive spreadsheet created by

Plaintiffs to identify all charges and credits for the Temporary Facility (the
"Claimed Damages"). (A. Barger, Tr. at 21:15-23, 61:21-62:3_) The information in
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8 is based on a combination of accounting records, an appraisal
commissioned by the County, and the opinions of Kirk Burns. (A. Barger, Tr. at
67=12·16, 6h=12·15.) According to Plaintiffs, the charges -- also referred to as the
expense items -- were "applicable to the Driggs facility" and "were necessary when
they were purchased". (A. Barger, Tr. at 22:1-6; R. Burns, Tr. at 672=13·20.) The
Claimed Damages identified in Exhibit 8 amount to $1,905,344.78. (A. Barger, Tr.
at 89=16·22; K. Burns, Tr. 290:6-11; Pl. Ex. 8 at 1.)
59.

Barger testified the Claimed Damages were not generated from

accounting software and that they were not standard financial reports. (Tr. at
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177:16-178=7.) The Claimed Damages were developed by Barger with assistance

from Kirk Burns and Burns Concrete's attorney. (Tr. at 178:5-14.) Barger testified
that it took him a year to prepare the Claimed Damages. (Tr. at 178=15·16.)
60.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 includes only those Claimed Damages supported

by documentary evidence - a subset of Exhibit 8. (A. Barger, Tr. at 92:5-11.) Those
expenses and credits amount to $4,621,610.51. (A. Barger, Tr. at 92:20-93:1; see Pl.
Ex. 10 at 1.) Barger testified that the $4,621,610.51 amount equated to the total
documented expenditure items applicable to Driggs. (A. Barger, Tr. at 121=8-10.)
61.

The $4,621,610.51 expense amount in Exhibit 10 is greater than the

$4,139,550 expense amount in Exhibit 7 because the amount in Exhibit 7 was an

early calculation developed before Plaintiffs "started digging deeper into the
records." (A. Barger, Tr. at 121:17·20.)
62.

When Barger prepared the Claimed Damages, he did not review or rely

on any records related to Burns Holdings. (A. Barger, Tr. at 119:10-18.) The
Claimed Damages are solely from Burns Concrete. (A. Barger, Tr. at 120:20-121:1.)
63.

Exhibit 8 includes expenditures incurred prior to the execution of the

Developer's Agreement -August 31, 2007. Exhibit 8 does not identify the date that
Burns Concrete incurred the expense. (A. Barger, Tr. at 120:6-8; 128=19-23.) The
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date that Burns Concrete incurred the expense can be determined by information
on Exhibit 8 and testimony provided by Barger.
a. According to Barger, Burns Concrete did not pre-pay expenses. So,
everything paid prior to August 31, 2007 was for an expense incurred
prior to that date. (A. Barger, Tr. at 128=24-129:5.) The Claimed
Damages paid prior to August 31, 2007 are identified on Exhibit 8 by
the following item numbers: 1, 15-17, 31-36, 40, 47-52, 84-153, 281-354,
408-411, 421-422, 474- 476, 1012-1085, 1139-1142, 1152-1153, 12051207, 1743-1747, 1752-1759, 1764-1814, 2474·2547,2601-2604,26142615, 2667-2669, 3205-3227, 3253-3258, 3277-3279, 3415-3664, 36873936, 3960-4159, 4166-4167, 4171-4183, 4232-4475, 4504-4620, 46624663, 4669-4670, 4672, and 4738-47 45. (Pl. Ex. 8.)
b. According to Barger, the Claimed Damages paid after August 31, 2007
but incurred prior to that date are identified by the following item
numbers: 11 (Tr. at 129:13-17), 53 (Tr. at 132:20-133:5), 154-204 (Tr. at
134:14-144:17), 4643 (Tr. at 145=3-16), 4687-4692 (Tr. at 145:17148=14), 5078-5115 (Tr. at 148:15-149:4), 5133-5134 (Tr. at 148:15149:4) and 6598-6599 (Tr. at 148:15-149:4)_
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c. Plaintiffs cannot identify whether the Claimed Damages associated
with item 12 were incurred prior to or after August 31, 2007, because
the invoice represents progress billing for professional services during
the period of August 31, 2007 through September 22, 2007. (A. Barger,
Tr. at 129=18-130=25.)
d. Items 37-38 may have included expenses incurred prior to August 31,
2007 or a combination of expenses incurred prior to or after that date.
(A. Barger, Tr. at 131:8-132:19.)

64.

The Claimed Damages include expenses incurred by Burns Concrete

prior to the Assignment Agreement. ( Compare Pl. Ex. 5 with Pl. Ex. 8.) The specific
expenses incurred by Burns Concrete prior to the Assignment Agreement are
identified by the following item numbers: 1, 4·43, 45, 47-4670, 4672-4763, 46724736, 4738-4748, 4752-4856, 4953-5040, 5042-5045, and 5078-5099. (A. Barger
Test., Tr. 150:16-152:24.)
65.

The Claimed Damages include expenditures that relate to retained

assets. Kirk Burns agreed, prior to trial, that specific expenditures related to
retained assets should not be included in the total damages claim. (See K. Burns,
Tr. at 418:7-11.) Specifically, Kirk Burns agreed that credits should apply to exclude
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expenditures identified by the following item numbers: 23, 24, 27, 84·280, and 3415·
4641. (Tr. at 418=12-421:11.)
66.

The Claimed Damages include legal expenses. (A. Barger, Tr. at 35:24-

37:12; Pl. Ex. 8 at p. 65·66, including supporting documentation for items 4695·4764
identified as Bates Nos. Bl 7142·17400 and admitted by the Court at Tr. 356=17·
356:357:3.)2 The supporting documents demonstrate that the claimed legal expenses
include fees that predate the Developer's Agreement, fees related to the failed
application for a conditional use permit and appeal of its denial, legal claims
against the County, prior requests for an award of attorneys' fees, and relocation of
the Temporary Facility, as follows:
a. The supporting documents demonstrate that Burns Concrete is
claiming legal fees that predate the Developer's Agreement. (See, e.g.,
Bl 7295·96, Bl 7300·01, Bl 7305, Bl 7309, Bl 7313, Bl 7317·18, Bl 7321 ·
22, B17325, B17329,
b. The supporting documents demonstrate that Burns Concrete is
claiming legal fees related to the failed application for a conditional
use permit (see, e.g., Bl 7144, Bl 7147·48, Bl 7151 ·53) and appeal of its
denial (see, e.g., B17151·52, B17156, B17162, B17168·69, B17172,

2

The documents identified as Bates Nos. Bl 7142·17400 were also labeled as Defense Exhibit 0.
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PAGE20

Page 119

B17176, B17180, B17184, B17187, B17190, B17196·95, B17198·99,
B17204, B17207, B17210·11, B17214·15, B17218·19, B17222·23,
Bl 7226, Bl 7230, Bl 7234, Bl 7238, Bl 7245, Bl 7248, Bl 7252, Bl 7255,
Bl 7259·60, Bl 7266, Bl 7347·48.)
c. The supporting documents demonstrate that Burns Concrete is
claiming legal fees related to potential and actual legal claims asserted
against the County. (See, e.g., research re police powers and unjust
enrichment at Bl 7152; communications re tort claims at Bl 7156;
federal due process claims at Bl 7242, Bl 7273; review materials
pertaining to breach of contract claim at Bl 7369, Bl 7373; research
statute oflimitations on claim against county at Bl 7369, Bl 7373;
discuss prospective suit against Teton County at Bl 7377, Bl 7386;
discuss claim for breach of contract at Bl 7390; prepare engagement for
anticipated suit against Teton County at Bl 7395; confirm intent to file
suit at Bl 7395; strategy to file counterclaim at Bl 7395, discuss
litigation strategy at Bl 7399.)
d. The supporting documents demonstrate that Burns Concrete already
asked for an award of attorneys' fees. (See, e.g., Bl 7190, Bl 7198·99,
Bl 7210, Bl 7252,
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e. The supporting documents demonstrate the Burns Concrete consulted
with counsel regarding the relocation of the Temporary Facility. (See,

e.g., Bl 7259.)
67.

With respect to legal expenses, Barger initially testified that the legal

expenses related to this litigation. (A. Barger, Tr. at 37:3-12.) Specifically, when
asked: "Did you see anything in any one of those invoices that relate to those line
items that related to this litigation?", Barger answered: ''Yes." (A. Barger, Tr. at
37:3-12.) Plaintiffs counsel attempted to resuscitate Barger's testimony by eliciting
a different response. (See., e.g., Tr. at 41=5-19, 42=12·18.) However, on cross·
examination it became evident that Barger was not qualified to determine which
legal expense, if any, were related to litigation. (See, e.g., A. Barger, Tr, at 124:23128=5.) In fact, Barger admitted that he could not know whether the legal expenses
were related to this litigation. (A. Barger, Tr. at 127=21-128=5.) The supporting
documents are the more persuasive evidence of whether legal expenses should be
included in Claimed Damages.
68.

The Claimed Damages include proposed demobilization costs. These

are costs that have not been incurred nor paid. These proposed demobilization costs
are identified by item numbers 5116-5126. (See PI. Ex. 8.)
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69.

The Claimed Damages include utility costs. (Tr. at 51:20-52:3.) These

utility costs consist of payments to AT&T for a Tl line for the computer network
connection (Pl. Ex. 8 at item nos. 4953-5000), payments to Fall River Rural Electric
for electricity (Pl. Ex. 8 at item nos. 4765·4952, 5127-5130, 5135·5138, 6588·6593,
6595·96, 6600-6603), payments to Silver Star Communications for telephone service
(Pl. Ex. 8 at item nos. 5001 ·5045), payments to Silver Star Communications for DSL
line for access to security cameras (Pl. Ex. 8 at item nos. 5046·5077, 5131 ·32, 5139·
5140, 6585·87, 6597, 6604·05). Additional utility costs were added as item nos.
6585-6605. (See PI. Ex. 8.) The claimed utility costs relate to the Temporary Facility
when it is not in operation. (Tr. at 51:25-52:3.) As discussed above, the security
expenses were required by the Deed of Trust and not attributable to the Developer's
Agreement. (See Def. Ex. E.)
70.

The Claimed Damages include amounts that Burns Concrete paid to

itself, including item numbers: 3305·3414 and 4505·4642. (A. Barger, Tr. at 168=23·
169=17.)
71.

Item numbers 5141 through 6567 establish credits for certain retained

assets as discussed above. (See Pl.'s Ex. 8.)
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72.

Items numbers 6568 through 6584 establish credits for certain utility

expenses identified by item numbers 4766, 4772·78, 4784·89, and 4798·800. (See
Pl.'s Ex. 8.)
73.

Item numbers 6606-6944 are purported labor expenses which are

credited back at item numbers 6944 [sic]-7282. (See Pl.'s Ex. 8.)
74.

Item numbers 7283·7303 are purported expenses for parts and

supplies which are credited back as item numbers 7304·7324. (See Pl.'s Ex. 8.)
Profitability

75.

Burns Concrete lost money on the Temporary Facility because it didn't

have enough sales volume to cover its costs. (A. Barger, Tr. at 14:12-23; 19=18·24.)
76.

According to Burns Concrete's own calculations, it lost money on the

Temporary Facility. (See Pl.'s Ex. 7.) Burns Concrete generated sales from the
Temporary Facility of $625,420.77. (Tr. at 153:21-154:11.) There have been costs of
sales in the amount of $213,053.82. (Tr. at 154:12-17.) There are write·offs of
$146,609.67. (Tr. at 157:6-11.) Burns Concrete initially estimated expenses,
including amortized plant and equipment costs, at $4,139,550. (Tr. at 156:12·18.)
That estimate did not include parts and equipment expenses which were identified
after the creation of Exhibit 7. (Tr. 175=23·176:5.) Based on the initial estimate of
costs, Burns Concrete suffered a net loss of at least $2,099,698 at the Driggs
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location. (See PI. Ex. 7.) If the estimate were adjusted to include previously omitted
costs, that would potentially increase the amount of Burns Concrete's loss on the
Temporary Facility. (A. Barger, Tr. at 157=19-158:9.) Plaintiffs did not "take all the
extra time to go through all the specific costs because it was obvious you would lose
money." (K. Burns, Tr. at 431:6-8.)
77.

When Burns Concrete proposed expansion to Driggs in 2006, it

anticipated increasing demand. (Def. Ex. D.) According to Kirk Burns: "Everything
was getting strong." (Tr. at 213=22·24.) He continued: "We were all in that la-la land
time period as far as the building, with people buying houses from all over." (Id)
Teton Valley had a lot of commercial and residential construction work at that time.
(Tr. at 364=22-24.) Burns Concrete anticipated a 1,700 unit PUD proposed for
development across the highway from the Property. (Tr. at 364=10-21.)
78.

From 2008 through 2011, the Teton County construction market

crashed. (W. Danielson, Tr. at 466=21-467=16.) In 2007, Teton County issued 379
building permits. (Id) In 2007, the County issued 348 building permits. (Id) In
2008, the County issued 187 permits. (Id) In 2009, the County issued 100 building
permits. (Id) In 2010, the County issued 80 building permits. (Id) In 2011, the
County issued 48 building permits. (Id)
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79.

According to Plaintiffs, Burns Concrete's business started to drop in

2009. (K. Burns, Tr. at 382=4·8.) Burns Concrete ceased operations at the
Temporary Facility in 2010. (Burns, Tr. at 388=13·15; A. Barger, Tr. at 14=6·10.)
According to Richard Hoffman, this cessation of operations is significant:
Well, that's meaningful to me because that shows that Burns - Burns
Concrete behaved in a way that's entirely consistent with my calculations
and- and, frankly, is entirely consistent with common good business
practices.
The plant - the temporary plant was not generating enough money during
that time period that the Burns' financial showed they were in desperate
financial straits.
And the financials show that Burns began liquidating assets in order to pay
down debts.
And - and so the fact that they would shut down voluntarily during this time
period is consistent with my analysis ...
(R. Hoffman, Tr. at 540=19·541·11.)
80.

The construction market began to recover in 2012. However, the

recovery has been slow. In 2012, the County issued 63 building permits. (W.
Danielson, Tr. at 382:17·383:4.) In 2013, the County issued 98 building permits.
(Id) In 2014, the County issued 98 building permits. (Id) In 2015, the County

issued 145 building permits. (Id) In 2016, the County issued 165 building permits.
(Id) In 2017, the County issued 216 building permits. (Id)
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81.

Richard Hoffman used building permits as a proxy to project sales. (R.

Hoffman, Tr. at 542:22-543:20.) Using proxy data is a usual way to project financial
data. (R. Hoffman, Tr. at 543:21-544:3; B.L. Ross, Tr. at 739:12-20.) Hoffman used
other proxies to test his theory, including yards of concrete sold by Walters Ready
Mix and Burns Concrete's financial statements. (See R. Hoffman, Tr. at 544:4545:5_) The data sets using building permits, yard of concrete sold, and Burns

Concrete's financial statements produced consistent projections. (R. Hoffman, Tr. at
545=6·15.) The comparison confirmed that Hoffman's projections were based on

reasonably certain methods. (R. Hoffman, Tr. at 545:12-15.)
82.

According to Hoffman's projections, if Burns Concrete would not have

closed the Temporary Facility, it would have expected total sales of $1,016,938, as
follows:
a. From February 2010 through the end of that year, Burns Concrete
would have generated $158,869 in sales.
b. In 2011, Burns Concrete would have generated $126,693 in sales.
c. In 2012, Burns Concrete would have generated $197,078 in sales.
d. In 2013, Burns Concrete would have generated $197,078 in sales.
e. In 2014, Burns Concrete would have generated $293,606 in sales.
(Tr. at 547:4-21.)
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83.

Based on the testimony of Allen Barger and Plaintiffs Exhibit 10,

Richard Hoffman assumed a cost of $4,621,000 to bring the Temporary Facility into
operation. (Tr. at 554:2-20.) The actual amount of costs in Exhibit 10 were closer to
$5,500,000. (Tr. at 554:17·20.) The lower amount results from the application of
credits. (See PI. Ex. 10.)
84.

According to Burns Concrete's Financial Statements, in 2007, Burns

Concrete had a debt to equity ratio of 47.46%. (R. Hoffman, Tr. at 555:8-15.) That
meant that it would require debt of $2,193,000 to operate the Temporary Facility.
(R. Hoffman, Tr. at 556:2-6.)

85.

According to Burns Concrete's Financial Statements, the weighted

average of the interest rate that it was paying at the relevant time was 7 .54%. (R.
Hoffman, Tr. at 555:16-24.)
86.

Using the amount of required debt and interest rate, Hoffman was able

to create an amortization table and calculate debt payments. (R. Hoffman, Tr. at
556=2-6.)
87.

After servicing the debt on the cost of the temporary facility, Burns

Concrete's shareholders would have suffered losses year-over-year from 2007
through 2016. (See PI. Ex. 32.)
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88.

Based on these projections, Hoffman opined that Burns Concrete

"would have negative cash available to equity holders through the end of 2016." (Pl.
Ex. 31 at p. 7.)
89.

Hoffman then turned to the Burns Concrete financial statements to see

if the larger corporation - outside of just the Temporary Facility - had the
wherewithal to cover the debt. (Tr. at 557:9-12.)
90.

Hoffman determined that Burns Concrete had negative working

capital in every relevant year except 2015 and 2016. (Pl. Ex. 31 at p. 7.) Burns
Concrete's Financial Statements included "Going Concern" notes indicating that the
company may not have enough resources to stay in business for a full year. (R.
Hoffman, Tr. at 559:17·561=19.) In order to survive, Burns Concrete planned to sell
assets, pay off debt, reduce payments to the bank, and consolidate operations. (R.
Hoffman, Tr. at 561:20·6.} Burns Concrete survived during that time period because
it was selling off assets to pay the bank. (R. Hoffman, Tr. at 566=16·17.)
91.

In some situations, shareholders may put money into a company

suffering losses to sustain its operations, but in this case, Burns Concrete did not
have the money available to keep the Temporary Facility operating. (Tr. at 567:1017 .) Burns Concrete voluntarily closed the Temporary Facility because it was a
fiscally prudent choice. (See id.}
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92.

In order to keep the Temporary Facility operating as originally

planned, Burns Concrete would have been required to invest an additional
$1,589,000 into the Temporary Facility to stay in business through 2015. (Tr. at
567=23-568:4.) According to Hoffman, that amount is accurate to a degree of
reasonable certainty. (Tr. at 568:9-11.)
93.

The "Going Concern" note remained present in Burns Concrete's

financial statements through December 31, 2016. (Tr. at 575:18-24.) Accordingly,
Burns Concrete could not have put the required investment into the Temporary
Facility as monies were needed.
94.

The County has proven with reasonable certainty that, even if the

County had not breached the Developer's Agreement, the Temporary Facility would
have operated at a loss and eventually closed.
95.

The Plaintiffs' expert witness admitted that he was not familiar with

the calculation of reliance damages. (Tr. at 741=13·16.) He did not opine on
profitability or a reliance damages amount.
96.

There was no situation presented at trial which would have allowed

Plaintiffs to make a profit on the Temporary Facility through 2016. (R. Hoffman, Tr.
at 692:3-10.)
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97.

Applying the methodology in the Restatement of Restitution Section

38, "the Plaintiffs weren't harmed" by the County's actions because the inability to
construct the Permanent Facility during that time period actually prevented them
from losing even more money. (R. Hoffman, Tr. at 691:5-692:2.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction and Venue
98.

The District Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to

Idaho Code § 1·705.
99.

The Parties have not contested personal jurisdiction and are subject to

the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5·504.
100.

Because this matter involves a claim against Teton County, venue

exists in the Teton County under Idaho Code § 5·403.

Forfeited Claims
101.

Plaintiffs abandoned claims for Declaratory Relief and Unjust

Enrichment against Defendant. (See Compl. of May 21, 2013.) Defendant
abandoned its counterclaim for breach of contract and declaratory judgment against
Plaintiff. (See An. & Countercl. of June 11, 2013.) All untried claims are dismissed.

Election ofRemedies
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102.

A plaintiff cannot recover both expectation damages and reliance

damages. See King v. Beatrice Foods Co., 89 Idaho 52, 57, 402 P.2d 966, 968 (1965).
Where a plaintiff elects a remedy and the evidence before the court is limited to that
remedy, the court may limit its decision to that remedy. See Sullivan v. Bullock, 124
Idaho 738, 744, 864 P.2d 184, 190 (Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to consider quantum
meruit or restitution damages where claimant did not present evidence to support
such a remedy). Plaintiffs have elected the remedy of rescission of the contract
coupled with reliance damages. Thus, the Court will limit its decision to the elected
remedy and will not consider expectation damages.

Breach of Contract
103.

Prior to trial, the Court concluded that the County breached the

Developer's Agreement by violating the express terms of Paragraph 2.b.(iv) and (vi)
and Paragraph 8, and that the County also breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by denying Burns Holdings the right to operate the Temporary Facility.
(Mem. Dec. & Or. of Feb. 12, 2018.)

Assignment of Contract
104.

"An assignment is a transfer of rights or property." First State Bank of

Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608,612, 130 P.3d 1146, 1150 (2006) (citing Purco
Fleet Srvcs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't ofFinance, 140 Idaho 121, 125, 90 P.3d 346,
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350 (2004)). "To be effective, an assignment must be completed with a delivery, and
the delivery must confer a complete and present right on the transferee. The
assignor must not retain control over the property assigned, the authority to collect,
or the power to revoke." First State Bank, 142 Idaho at 612, 130 P.3d at 1150 (citing
Purco Fleet Srvcs., 140 Idaho at 125, 90 P.3d at 350.) (emphasis in original)). Burns
Holdings and Burns Concrete did not effect a legal assignment of Property or
interest in the Developer's Agreement because neither party transferred rights or
property to the other nor relinquished control. Rather, each party purported to
retain an undivided interest in the whole. (Stipulated Facts ,r 15; Tr. at 407:5-7,
408=8-12.)
105.

"An assignment of a chose in action transfers to the assignee and

divests the assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the assignee
becomes the real party in interest." St. Lukes Magic Valley Regional Medical

Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 41, 293 P.3d 661, 665 (2013) (internal citations
omitted>. Burns Holdings and Burns Concrete did not transfer their legal claims
against the County because neither assigned all control to the other. Rather, each
purported to retain an undivided interest in the whole. (Stipulated Facts ,r 15; Tr.
at 407=5-7, 408:8-12.)
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106.

A deed of trust is defined as "a deed executed in conformity with this

act and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an
obligation of the grantor or other person named in the deed to a beneficiary." Idaho
Code§ 45-1502(3). A deed of trust conveys title of the property to the trustee.

Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 665, 978 P.2d 222, 225 (1999). After
an obligation secured by a deed of trust is satisfied, the deed of trust is reconveyed
to the grantor. Id The Plaintiffs in this case did not effect a legal assignment of the
Property because, at all relevant times, the Property was secured by a Deed of Trust
conveying title of the Property to Bank of Idaho. (See Def. Ex. E.) Therefore, Burns
Concrete did not have the legal authority to transfer ownership.

Rescission
107.

A party seeking rescission must be able to restore all parties to the

status quo as it existed prior to the contract. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 112
P.3d 788 (2005) (upholding denial of rescission where the claimant did not make an
adequate tender to restore the status quo to the other party); White v. Mock, 140
Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (2004) (upholding denial of rescission where
restoration and remodeling prevented return to the status quo); Robinson v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173 (2001) (denying rescission as a remedy for
misrepresentation where the rescinding party failed to tender back any benefit
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received under the contract within a reasonable time); Rino v. Statewide Plumbing

& Heating Co., 74 Idaho 374, 262 P.2d 1003 (1953) (denying rescission where the
claimant used the heating system and could not return the benefit it
received); Weber v. Pend D'Oreille Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Idaho 1, 203 P. 891
(1921) (holding that rescission was not appropriate where the rescinding party did
not offer to place the other party in statu quo and it was apparent that he could
not).
108.

Plaintiffs operated the Temporary Facility during the Operating

Period and received the benefit of a zone change from C-3 to M-1. Plaintiffs have not
returned that benefit and restored Teton County to the status quo as it existed prior
to the Developer's Agreement. (Id)
109.

Because the Plaintiff has not offered to return the County to the status

quo ante, rescission of the Developer's Agreement is unavailable as a matter oflaw.
(Mem. Dec. & Or. of Feb. 12, 2018 at 17.)

Reliance Damages
110.

Reliance damages are measured by plaintiffs expenditures made in

performance or preparation for performance capped at the amount the plaintiff
would have lost absent the breach. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §349
(1981); Restatement (Third) Restitution§ 38 (2011). Reliance damages are not
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available if the plaintiffs' expenses would be subsumed by the plaintiffs' expectation
under the contract. King v. Beatrice Food Co., 89 Idaho 52, 59, 402 P.2d 966, 970
(1965). Because the Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs could not have sustained
operations of the Temporary Facility from 2010 through 2016, the amount Plaintiffs
can recover under the reliance theory of damages is capped at zero.
111.

Reliance damages, compensate the plaintiff "for any reasonably

foreseeable costs incurred or expenditures made in reliance on the promise that has
now been broken." See Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738,864 P.2d 184 (Ct. App.
1993) (overruling trial court's award of damages where court improperly failed to
deduct amounts plaintiff saved as a result of the defendant's breach). Plaintiffs
claim that they ceased operation of the Temporary Facility due to a letter from the
County. However, Plaintiffs ceased operation of the Temporary Facility two years
prior to the County's demand; and Plaintiffs did not ever remove the Temporary
Facility. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown any reliance damages.
112.

"Reliance damages include expenses reasonably related to the

purposes of the contract which would not have been incurred but for the contract's
existence." Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 9, 936
P.2d 202, 207 (Ct. App. 1997). Plaintiffs cannot recover expenses incurred prior to
the existence of contract, because those expenses were not made in reliance on the
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contract. Accordingly, the following line items will not be included in reliance
damages: 1-3, 11-12, 15-17, 31-38, 40, 45, 47-53, 84-204, 281-354, 408-411, 421-422,
474-476, 1012-1085, 1139-1142, 1152-1153, 1205-1207, 1743-1747, 1752-1759,
1764-1814, 2474-2547, 2601-2604, 2614-2615, 2667-2669, 3205-3227, 3253-3258,
3277-3279, 3415-3664, 3687-3936, 3960-4159, 4166-4167, 4171-4183, 4232-4475,
4504·4620,4643,4662·4663, 4669-4670, 4672, 4687-4692,4738·4745, 5029, 50785115, 5133-5134, and 6598-6599.
113.

Reliance damages are limited to those expenditures caused by the

breach. Merry Gentlemen v. Keaton, 799 F.3d 827, 831 (7 th Cir. 2015) (recognizing
that, in a case of partial performance, an "injured party cannot reasonably claim
that all of its expenditures were caused by the other party's breach"). In this case,
the Plaintiffs have claimed expenditures related to the acquisition of the Property
and installation of the Temporary Facility. These expenditures do not flow from the
actions giving rise to breach under this Court's prior rulings. Accordingly, they are
not recoverable.
114.

Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs are not recoverable as reliance

damages because the expenditures include fees which have already been litigated,
fees which relate to this litigation, and other unrecoverable amounts.
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Prejudgment Interest
115.

"Prejudgment interest should be awarded on a claim that is

ascertainable by mere mathematical process." Beco Const. Co. Inc. v. Harper

Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 936 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1997). Barger testified the
Claimed Damages were not generated from accounting software and that they were
not standard financial reports. (Tr. at 177=16·178:7.) The Claimed Damages were
developed by Barger with assistance from Kirk Burns and Burns Concrete's
attorney. (Tr. at 178:5-14.) Barger testified that it took him a year to prepare the
Claimed Damages. (Tr. at 178=15·16.) Because the Claimed Damages were not
ascertainable by mere mathematical process, prejudgment interest will not be
awarded.

Prevailing Party
116.

On May 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this action, alleging claims for

declaratory judgment, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Over the course of
this action, Plaintiffs abandoned their claims for declaratory judgment and unjust
enrichment. At the time of trial, Plaintiffs only surviving claim was for breach of
contract.
117.

The County asserted counterclaims against Plaintiffs for breach of

contract and declaratory judgment, but the County abandoned its counterclaims.
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118. At trial, Plaintiffs sought damages in the amount of 1,905,344.78 and
interest of approximately$ 6,127,122.14 for a total of $8,032,466.92. (See Pl. Ex._.)
Because this Court has not awarded damages to the Plaintiff (or damages anywhere
near the amount requested by Plaintiffs), Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party in
this action.
Date: - - - - - - BY THE COURT

The Honorable Dane Watkins
District Court Judge
Respectfully submitted on August 24, 2018.
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUN1Y PROSEClITING ATTORNEY

B
Lindsey .
Counsel for Teton County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the date set forth below a true and correct
copy of the foregoing was caused to be sent by electronic mail and by facsimile to:
Robert B. Burns
Parsons Behle & Latimer
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208-562-4901

Date: August 24, 2018.
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNIY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

By:
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PAGE 40

Page 139

Robert B. Bums, ISB #3744
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
rbums@parsonsbehle.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation,
and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

Case No. CV-2013-165
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
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Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, Inc. ("Burns Concrete") and Bums Holdings, LLC ("Bums
Holdings," and jointly with Burns Concrete "Burns") submit these proposed findings and
conclusions based on (i) the facts established by the parties' pleadings on file, stipulations
submitted at trial, and testimony and exhibits admitted at trial, and (ii) the law applicable to such
established facts and the parties' claims set forth in their respective pleadings on file.

I.
A.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

Preliminary Statement.
1.

Counsel for the respective parties stipulated to the admission at trial of the

following trial exhibits (each a "Trial Exhibit"): Burns' Trial Exhibits 1-5, 7, and 13 and Teton
County's Trial Exhibits A and C. Trial Stipulation 1 p. 1.
2.

The trial transcript reflects on pages 4 and 5 that the following Trial Exhibits were

subsequently admitted during the course of trial: Bums' Trial Exhibits 1-11 and 13 and Teton
County's Trial Exhibits E-H and P.
3.

As discussed with citation to the trial transcript in paragraph 92 below, the

transcript establishes that Trial Exhibits 29-32 were also accepted into evidence during the
course of trial.
4.

Burns holds all rights of the defined "Developer" under that certain Developer's

Agreement for Burns Holdings, LLC, made by and between Burns Holdings, LLC and Teton
County and recorded September 5, 2007 by Teton County as Instrument #191250 (the

1 Stipulated

Exhibits and Stipulated Facts, filed March 7, 2018 ("Trial Stipulation").
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Complaint2 «J 1; Trial Stipulation «J«J 4, 10 & 15; Trial Exhibits 1-5; Burns

"Agreement").

Testimony3 «J 68, below.
5.

A true and correct copy of the recorded Agreement is attached to the Complaint as

Exhibit 1. Complaint «J 2; Answer4 «J 2; Trial Exhibit 3.

B.

Parties.
6.

Burns Concrete is an Idaho corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of

concrete, and Burns Holdings is an Idaho limited liability company engaged in the holding of
real property, with the two companies being under common ownership and together holding all
rights of the defined Developer under the Agreement. Complaint «J 4; Burns Testimony «J«J 59-61
& 68, below.
Teton County is a political subdivision of the State of Idaho. Complaint «J 5;

7.

Answer«J 5.

C.

Jurisdiction and Venue.
8.

Jurisdiction exists in this Court under Idaho Code § 5-514.

Complaint «J 6;

Answer«J 6.
9.

Venue exists in Teton County under Idaho Code§ 5-403. Complaint «J 7; Answer

«J7.

2 Verified Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract and
Rescission, (iii) Unjust Enrichment, filed May 21, 2013 ("Complaint").

3 March 8, 2018 trial testimony of Kirk Burns ("Burns Testimony").
4

Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013 ("Answer").
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D.

Relevant Terms of the Agreement.

10.

The real property subjected to the Agreement is located within the Area of Impact

of the City of Driggs, Teton County, Idaho and described in Exhibit "A" to the Agreement (the
"Property"). Complaint ,i 8; Answer ,i 8; Burns Testimony ,i 64, below.
11.

Pursuant to Paragraph 1 (titled, Zoning Ordinance Amendment) of the

Agreement, Teton County agreed to "adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Area of Impact
Zoning map to rezone the property to Ml." The Property was thereafter rezoned by Teton
County to Ml (Light Industrial). Complaint ,i 9; Answer ,i 9; Burns Testimony ,i 64, below.
12.

Pursuant to Paragraph 2 (titled, Conditions on Development) of the Agreement:
The sole use allowed and restrictions pursuant to this conditional
rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows:
a.
The property shall be used exclusively for the operation of
a ready-mix concrete manufacturing plant.
b.
. .. This development and operation shall be subject to the
following terms and conditions, in addition to the other terms
hereof:
(i)
Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete
Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property.
(ii)
All operations on the property shall comply with all
applicable and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances and laws
relating to dust, noise, water quality and air quality.
(iii)
Attached as Exhibit "B" - Site Plan, and Exhibit
"C" - Building Elevations, and by this reference incorporated
herein are plans for construction of Developer's intended
permanent facility ("Permanent Facility").
(iv)
Immediately upon execution of this Agreement,
Developer shall order and commence construction of the
Permanent Facility. The installation of the Permanent Facility
shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of
this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or
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any other act of force ma1eure or action beyond Developer's
control.
(v)
In order to facilitate and support the construction of
the Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite
commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and operate a
temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in Exhibit "B" Site Plan and Exhibit "D".
(vi)
In the event that the Permanent Facility is not
completed within the time allowed herein, the County shall have
the right to revoke the authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
The grant of authority of the Temporary Facility is to allow
Developer to operate Developer's business until the Permanent
Facility is constructed. The authority to operate the Temporary
Facility shall terminate upon completion of the Permanent Facility
even if sooner than the described eighteen ( 18) month time period.
(Bolding in original; underscoring added.) Complaint 110; Answer 110.
13.

Pursuant to Paragraph 5 (titled, Zoning Reversion Consent) of the Agreement:
The execution of this Agreement shall be deemed written consent
by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property to its
prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions
imposed by this Agreement No reversion shall take place until
after a hearing on this matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6511 A.
Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this Agreement and in
Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached Exhibit
"A" is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends or is
abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may, upon
receiving a recommendation from the City's governing board,
order that the property will revert to the zoning designation (and
land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing immediately
prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to the
C3, Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation.

(Underscoring added.) Complaint 1 11; Answer 1 11.
14.

Pursuant to Paragraph 8 (titled, Default and Remedies) of the Agreement:
In the event of a default or breach of this Agreement or of any of
its terms or conditions, the party alleging default shall give the
breaching party not less than thirty {30) days' Notice of Default, in
writing, unless an emergency exists threatening the health and
safety of the public. If such an emergency exists, written notice
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the
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circumstances of the breach. The time of the giving of the notice
shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of Default.
The Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged
default and. where appropriate. the manner and period of time
during which said default may be satisfactorily cured. During any
period of curing. the party charged shall not be considered in
default for the purposes of termination or zoning reversion. or the
institution of legal proceedings. If the default is cured, then no
default shall exist and the charging party shall take no further
action.
(Underscoring added.) Complaint, 12; Answer, 12.
15.

Pursuant to Paragraph 12.b of the Agreement, the Agreement runs with the land,

binds the Property in perpetuity, and inures to the benefit of and is enforceable by Developer and
its assigns. Complaint, 13; Answer , 13.
16.

Finally, Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibit C of the Agreement expressly provide for

and depict Burns' construction of its desired 75-foot "Permanent Facility." Complaint , 14;

Answer, 14.
E.

Undisputed Facts Supporting Grant of Summary Judgment.

17.

When considering whether to expand its business operations into Teton County,

Kirk Burns met with representatives of both Teton County and the City of Driggs to determine
whether and where to construct a concrete batch plant in the area. All such representatives
encouraged Burns to construct such a plant, with both Teton County and the City of Driggs
designating the Property as the specific site where Burns should construct it. Complaint , 23;

Burns Testimony, 64, below.
18.

Burns purchased the Property based on the representations made by Teton County

and the City of Driggs and with the reasonable expectancy of entering into the Agreement with
Teton County, after having first filed for a change of zoning for the Property to allow for the
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construction and operation of the proposed Permanent Facility.

Complaint 124; Burns

Testimony 164, below.

19.

In accordance with Teton County's requirements, the City of Driggs' Planning

and Zoning Commission heard on July 11, 2007 and recommended for approval by Teton
County both the Agreement and the issuance of a conditional use permit allowing the 75-foot
height of the Permanent Facility (the "CUP"). Complaint 115; Answer 115; Burns Testimony
164, below.
20.

Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2007 Teton County and Bums entered into the

Agreement and Teton County caused the Agreement to be recorded. Complaint 1 16; Answer
116; Burns Testimony 167, below.
21.

Following the execution of the Agreement, Bums expended substantial sums in

constructing and implementing the commitments imposed under the Agreement, including
(a) erecting and operating the existing concrete batch plant (the "Temporary Facility") required
under Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement, which required Bums to incur substantial expense for
site demolition, remediating the site for prior waste disposal, clearing and grubbing the site,
extending utilities to the site, and transporting to and erecting on the site the Temporary Facility;
(b) constructing the road and highway improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the
Agreement, which required Bums to incur substantial expense for barrier fencing with concrete
foundations, new tum lanes, landscaping, and performance bonds; and (c) applying for and
taking all actions necessary to obtain the CUP and variance required to construct the Permanent
Facility. Complaint 117; Trial Stipulation 1113-14; Burns Testimony 165, below.
22.

On November 15, 2007, after Bums had incurred substantial costs required by the

Agreement, and notwithstanding the recommendation for approval by the City of Driggs'
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Planning and Zoning Commission, the Teton County Board of County Commissioners voted to
deny the CUP. Complaint 1 18; Burns Holdings J5.
23.

The Idaho Supreme Court held in Burns Holdings I that a provision in the relevant

zoning ordinance was void and that Burns must obtain a zoning variance from Teton County,
rather than a CUP, in order to construct the Permanent Facility. 6 Burns then applied for the
required variance, which the Teton County Board of County Commissioners voted to deny on
September 13, 2012. Burns Concrete I. 7
24.

Burns cannot now construct the Permanent Facility without an amendment to the

ordinances of Teton County. Complaint 121; Answer 121.
25.

By letter dated October 4, 2012 from its Board of County Commissioners, Teton

County revoked Burns' authority to operate the Temporary Facility and demanded its immediate
removal from the Property. Complaint 132; Answer 132; Trial Stipulation 116.
26.

In response to Teton County's revocation and demand, counsel for Burns

provided Teton County written notice by letter dated October 15, 2012 that Teton County's
action constituted a breach of the Agreement and demanded the following:
(i)
If the County contends the Developer has breached or is in
default of the Agreement, that the County provide the Developer
with "not less than thirty (30) days' Notice of Default, in
writing . . . [and] specify the nature of the alleged default and,
where appropriate, the manner and period of time during which
said default may be satisfactorily cured" - in accordance with the
requirements imposed under Paragraph 8 of the Agreement;
See Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 152 Idaho 440, 442-45, 272
P.3d 412, 414-17 (2012) (hereinafter "Burns Holdings I").
5

6 To obtain a variance, Burns was required "to show that there was undue hardship
because of the site characteristics and that the variance would not conflict with the public
interest." Burns Holdings I.

Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton Cnty., 161 Idaho 117, 119-20, 384 P.3d 364, 366-67
(2016) (hereinafter "Burns Concrete I").
7
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(ii)
That the County take no further action adverse to the
Developer's rights under the Agreement without first providing a
written Notice of Default and opportunity to cure the alleged
default - as is expressly required by Paragraph 8 of the Agreement;
and

(iii)
That the County provide the Developer with a written
retraction of its notice of revocation dated October 4, 2012, within
30 days of the County's receipt of this letter - which demand is
hereby made subject to the Developer's reservation of rights to
treat any further action by the County that is adverse to the
Developer's rights under the Agreement or the County's failure to
retract its notice of revocation within said 30 days as a repudiation
of the County's obligations under the Agreement.
Complaint 133 (underscoring added); Answer 133.

27.

Nevertheless, by letter dated October 23, 2012 from the Teton County

Prosecuting Attorney, Teton County resubmitted to the City of Driggs a previously withdrawn
application for a recommendation by the city that the zoning of the Property should revert to C3
(Service and Highway Commercial). Although a final decision on the application was tabled by
the City of Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission, Teton County's proposal to rezone the
Property remains pending. Complaint 1 26; Answer 1 26.
28.

Additionally, by letter dated November 5, 2012 from the Teton County

Prosecuting Attorney to Bums' counsel, Teton County asserted that the clause in
Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement extending the 18-month period to construct the Permanent
Facility "is inapplicable to the present situation" and threatened to file suit to force Bums'
removal of the Temporary Facility from the Property. Complaint 128; Answer 128.
29.

Thus, Teton County responded to Bums' October 15 notice and demand

referenced in paragraph 26 above, (a) by acting to rezone the Property, and (b) by the Teton
County Prosecuting Attorney's November 5 response referenced in paragraph 28 above, which

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 8
21813.001 \4812-7274-7l04v3

Page 149

rejected all of the demands made by Bums and threatened suit to compel Bums' removal of the
Temporary Facility from the Property. Complaint, 34; Answer, 34.
30.

Additionally, Teton County sought and obtained from this Court, among other

relief, "a decree stating that Teton County has the right, by agreement and by law, to rezone the
subject property" and "a decree stating that the Temporary Facility has been in violation of the
Teton County zoning laws .... " Counterclaim 8 14-15 (Prayer,, 5-6); Memorandum Decision
and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, filed December 19, 2014, at 24 (Conclusion and
Order).
31.

In reversing this Court and holding that the force majeure clause in the Agreement

did in fact apply to this dispute, the Supreme Court ruled that "[i]t would not be foreseeable that
the County would require the Developer to build a facility 75 feet in height and then prevent the
Developer from doing so." Burns Concrete I (emphasis added).
F.

Pretrial Rulings.

32.

Shortly before trial this Court ruled that Teton County breached the terms of the

Agreement in the following three ways:
(a)
"[T]he County breached the express language of Paragraph
2.b.(vi) when it ordered Bums Holdings to cease operating the
Temporary Facility and remove it." Decision9 I 0.
(b)
"[T]he County did not provide Bums with a Notice of
Default or an opportunity to cure, as required by Paragraph 8 of the
Agreement." Decision 11.
(c)
"By denying Bums Holdings the right to operate the
Temporary Facility, the County violated, nullified and significantly
impaired one of the Agreement's benefits - namely that Bums
Holdings could continue to operate the Temporary Facility beyond
8

Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013 ("Counterclaim").

9 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Motion in Limine,
filed February 12, 2018 ("Decision").
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18 months if a delay outside Burns Holdings' control occurred."
Decision 12.
33.

Notwithstanding the foregoing established breaches of the Agreement, this Court

also ruled that Teton County did not breach the Agreement by failing to take such action as
required to permit the construction of the Permanent Facility. Decision 13. Thus, based on this
Court's pretrial rulings, all of Teton County's breaches of the Agreement pertain to its conduct in
either preventing Burns from operating the Temporary Facility or in failing to provide Bums
notice with an opportunity to cure.
34.

Based on Teton County's breaches, this Court confirmed its earlier grant of

"summary judgment in favor of Burns Holdings on its breach of contract claim." Decision 14.
And with respect to recovering on the claim, this Court also ruled that "Bums Holdings may seek
reliance damages as compensation for Teton County's breach of contract." Decision l 9.
35.

After ruling on Teton County's breaches of the Agreement and on Bums' right to

seek reliance damages, the Court identified the following genuine issues of material fact to be
determined at trial:
(a)

Re: Rescission of Agreement.
(i)

"[W]hether Plaintiffs could have used an alternative Permanent Facility

design that would not require a zoning variance."

10

Decision 15.

IO Although Kirk Burns provided undisputed testimony at trial establishing why an
alternative design was not feasible, Bums respectfully draws this Court's attention to the
following ruling in Burns Concrete I: "Thus, to comply with the agreement, the Developer would
be required to build a facility that was 75 feet in height." Or stated otherwise, the Supreme Court
has expressly ruled that Burns was required to build the Permanent Facility depicted in the
exhibits to the Agreement. See Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA., 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713
P.3d 1374, 1380 (1985) ("'where, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case
presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
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(ii)

"[W]hether Plaintiffs' decision to cease operations in 2010 was the result

of market conditions or the County's threats of revocation." Decision 15.
(iii)

"[W]hether the County's revocation of the right to operate the Temporary

Facility vitiated the Agreement's entire purpose." Decision 16.
(iv)

Whether by operating "the Temporary Facility between 2007 and 2010

[Burns] benefitted from the Agreement and from the County's grant of a conditional rezone of
the property to Ml." Decision 17.
Re: Amount of Reliance Damages. "If Plaintiffs would have suffered a loss in

(b)

operating the Temporary Facility, the amount of that loss .... " Decision 21.
Re: Right to Damages.

(c)

"Whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently established

damages ...." Decision 24.
Re: Right to Prejudgment Interest. Whether prejudgment interest is precluded

(d)

because the damages incurred are neither liquidated nor ascertainable by mere mathematical
process. Decision 24.

G.

Burns' Direct Witnesses and Trial Exhibits.
(a)

Allen Barger.

36.

Allen Barger has been the controller for Burns Concrete since August 2013, Tr.

8:22-9:7; 11 and he has been licensed as a certified public accountant by Wisconsin since 1991,
Tr. 9:17-21. 12 Prior to becoming the controller for Burns Concrete, Mr. Barger worked for a
certified public accounting firm for two years and then as the controller for two mechanical

progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal ... "' (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
11

I.e., Transcript page 8, line 22 to page 9, line 7.

12

I.e., Transcript page 9, lines 17 to 21.
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contractors for a total of 20 years. Tr. 10:9-11: 14. Mr. Barger is in charge of accounting and
finance for Burns Concrete and also provides information technology services. Tr. 12:7-10.
37.

Mr. Barger prepared Trial Exhibit 7 to determine whether Burns Concrete made

money or lost money from operating the Driggs facility during those years (2007-2010) in which
it was operated.

Tr. 13:2-15.

Mr. Barger testified that the Temporary Facility lost money

because it had insufficient sales volume to cover the amortized costs of the equipment and plant.
Tr. 14: 12-15: 11. However, Mr. Barger testified that if the equipment and plant amortization were
disregarded, the Temporary Facility generated a profit. Tr. 18:1-4 & 19:7-9. Mr. Barger also
testified that Trial Exhibit 7 was not a detailed income statement and was prepared to establish
that Burns Concrete didn't make a profit from the Temporary Facility. Tr. 20:21-25 & 154: 2325.
38.

Mr. Barger confirmed that he believed the cost of operating the Temporary

Facility would be a lot less than that of Burns Concrete's other operations because only one onsite employee and one mixer driver was required to operate the Driggs facility, with the batching
and dispatching being handled at Burns Concrete's Idaho Falls facility. Tr. 19:25-20:14.
39.

Mr. Barger prepared Trial Exhibit 8 to summarize all of the charges and credits

applicable to the Driggs facility from inception through the first day of trial, March 7, 2018. Tr.
21 :12-22:8 & 94:9-17. These generally include the costs of land and improvements, equipment
and improvements, labor relating to the improvement of the land and equipment, taxes, attorney
fees, utilities, insurance, etc., but exclude those costs relating to the sale of concrete from the
Driggs facility, such as the utilities during the months the facility was operated. Tr. 95:5-18 &
167:19-25.
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40.

Mr. Barger personally inserted the information in every line item on Trial

Exhibit 8. Tr. 58:1-7. He started his work in March 2017 and finished the exhibit the week
before trial, making corrections and additions as they were identified. Tr. 60:20-61 :20. Mr.
Barger testified that Trial Exhibit 8 is as comprehensive as he could make it, reflecting every
charge and every credit related to the acquisition and holding of the land and equipment that
comprises the Driggs facility. Tr. 61:21-62:3. He also confirmed that he is unaware of the
omission of any credits from Trial Exhibit 8 that would work to the benefit of Teton County, but
is aware of omitted charges that would work to the benefit of Burns Concrete, such as certain
state and federal employment taxes and charges for which paper documentation could not be
found. Tr. 62:9-63:1 & 74:20-75:7.
41.
three sources:

The information supporting the line items reflected in Trial Exhibit 8 came from
Bums Concrete's accounting records, directly from Teton County, or from

valuation opinions provided by Kirk Bums. Tr. 67:12-16 & 70:21-24.

Bums Concrete's

accounting records were both in computer and paper form. Tr. 70:25-71:8. But as stated in the
prior paragraph, only those costs that were supported by paper documentation in Burns
Concrete's accounting files were included in Trial Exhibit 8. Mr. Barger also testified that the
computer files and paper files on which he relied (a) were of the type over which he had control
as Bums Concrete's controller, (b) were maintained as a regular part of Bums Concrete's
business, (c) were typical accounting files and records, and (d) with one exception, were
prepared in the ordinary course of Bums Concrete's business operations. Tr. 75:8-76:9. Mr.
Barger also established that there were "thousands upon thousands" of business records
pertaining to the over 7,300-line items included in Trial Exhibit 8. Tr. 59:11-14.
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42.

The one exception to Mr. Barger's reliance on accounting records prepared in the

ordinary course of Burns Concrete's business operations related to the labor and burden costs
summarized in a large spreadsheet that Mr. Barger distilled from thousands of additional Burns
Concrete accounting records. Tr. 76:10-21. The entire spreadsheet was prepared by Mr. Barger
from time cards and other accounting documentation and tax returns prepared in the ordinary
course of Burns Concrete's business operations Tr. 78:15-80:18.
43.

The information supporting line items reflected in Trial Exhibit 8 that came

directly from Teton County was the appraisal report by Curtis Boam (Trial Exhibit 13), which is
the basis for the credits reflected as line items 2 and 3 on Trial Exhibit 8. Tr. 63:14-21, 119:1318 & 189:13-17.
44.

The valuation opinions provided by Kirk Burns supporting line items reflected in

Trial Exhibit 8 are all also reflected in Trial Exhibit 9. Tr. 68:2-69:5.
45.

With the exception of certain credits reversing earlier charges in Exhibit 8 for

which supporting documentation is included in the 73 binders produced at trial, the
documentation supporting the 7,300+ line items reflected in Trial Exhibit 8 is included in the 73
binders. Tr. 58:13-59:9 & 66:2-24. The documentation included in the 73 binders supports the
information reflected in all of the columns contained in Trial Exhibit 8 up to the final four
columns relating to the computation of prejudgment interest. Tr. 109:19-110:24.
46.

The column in Trial Exhibit 8 titled Check Date/EFT Date/Financed Date"

reflects the actual date a payment was made or a credit was received by Burns Concrete for
purposes of calculating prejudgment interest. Tr. 105:11-24 & 109:2-18.
47.

The column in Trial Exhibit 8 titled "Applicable $ to Driggs" reflects all of the

charges and credits that are in fact applicable to the Driggs facility. Tr. 109:19-24.
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48.

Mr. Barger confirmed on redirect that counsel for Teton County did not in her

cross-examination dispute in any way either the relevant dates or amounts reflected in Trial
Exhibit 8.:
Q:
Did Ms. Siddoway in her cross-examination to your
understanding in any way dispute the amounts that are reflected on
Exhibit 8 with respect to the date of payment, the amount of
payment, or the amount that was applicable to Driggs?

A:

She didn't ask about any of those.

Tr. 186:25-187:5.
49.

The final four columns of Trial Exhibit 8 calculate the amount of prejudgment

interest applicable to the charges and credits reflected in the column titled "Applicable $ to
Driggs" through the first day of trial based on two alternative assumptions: (a) the first two of
these columns are based on the assumption that prejudgment interest should be calculated from
the date reflected in the column titled "Check Date/EFT Date/Finance Date" even if that date is
prior to the August 31, 2007 date of the Agreement, and (b) the final two columns are based on
the assumption that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the later of the date reflected
in the column titled "Check Date/EFT Date/Finance Date" or the August 31, 2007 date of the
Agreement. In both sets of columns, the calculations are made by the Excel program based on
simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum and the actual days elapsed. Tr. 110:22-114: 16.
50.

The total amount of the charges and credits applicable to the Driggs facility that

are included in Trial Exhibit 8 is $1,905,344.78, as reflected at the top of each page to Trial
Exhibit 8 in three places; this is the principal amount of the damages claim by Bums, exclusive
of prejudgment interest. Tr. 114:20-115:7. The total amount applicable to the Driggs facility is
the summation of the individual amounts reflected in the column titled "Applicable $ to Driggs"
as calculated by the Excel program. Tr. 93:14-21.
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51.

The total prejudgment interest through the first day of trial (March 7, 2018) under

the assumption (a) that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date reflected in the
column titled "Check Date/EFT Date/Finance Date" is $6,127,122.14, and (b) that prejudgment
interest should be calculated from the later of the date reflected in the column titled "Check
Date/EFT Date/Finance Date" or the August 31, 2007 date of the Agreement is $5,989,436.95,
both of which amounts are reflected at the top of each page to Trial Exhibit 8 and are the
summation of the individual interest calculations in the two respective columns as calculated by
the Excel program. Tr. 115:8-117:19.
52.

Teton County introduced no evidence at trial disputing any of the information

reflected in Trial Exhibit 8, although Mr. Barger was cross-examined with respect to certain
charges, such as whether portions of select invoices from the law firm Moffatt Thomas related to
the present lawsuit and should be excluded and whether a $100 per hour charge for the use of a
truck with welding and other equipment at the Driggs facility was effectively Burns Concrete
charging itself. However, on redirect Mr. Barger (a) reviewed the Moffatt Thomas invoices in
question, which related to the year prior to the commencement of this lawsuit, and confirmed
that there was nothing in any of the invoices relating to the preparation of a complaint against
Teton County, Tr. 182:9-185:10; and (b) also confirmed that the $100 per hour charge was an
allocation for the cost, wear and tear, and maintenance of the truck while being used to build the
Driggs facility, Tr. 185: 12-186:6. Teton County introduced no evidence relating to the Moffatt
Thomas invoices or the propriety of the $100 per hour truck charge.
53.

Mr. Barger prepared Trial Exhibit 9 to identify and summarize all of the valuation

information applicable to the Driggs facility included in Trial Exhibit 8 that Kirk Burns provided
by copying the relevant information in Trial Exhibit 8 and pasting it into Trial Exhibit 9. Tr.
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68:2-69:5 & 92:12-19. Because the information in Trial Exhibit 9 was not based on Bums
Concrete's accounting records nor provided directly by Teton County, Bums assumed that Teton
County might contest the valuations in the exhibit and titled it "Damages Schedule thru 3/7/18Only Disputed Items." The total valuations provided by Kirk Bums is in the negative amount of
$2,716,265.73, as reflected at the top of Trial Exhibit 9 in three places, which is the summation
of the individual amounts reflected in the column titled "Applicable$ to Driggs" as calculated by
the Excel program. Tr. 69:6-69:22. The negative amount represents a reduction in the total
amount reflected in Trial Exhibit 8 and thus benefits Teton County. Tr. 69:23-70:3.
54.

Mr. Barger prepared Trial Exhibit 10 to summarize all of the charges and credits

applicable to the Driggs facility included in Trial Exhibit 8 excluding those provided by Kirk
Bums (and included in Trial Exhibit 9) by copying the relevant information in Trial Exhibit 8
and pasting it into Trial Exhibit 10. Tr. 91 :23-24 & 92:5-19. Because the information in Trial
Exhibit 10 was based on Bums Concrete's accounting records or provided directly by Teton
County, Bums assumed that Teton County would not likely contest the information in the exhibit
and titled it "Damages Schedule thru 3/7/18-Only Undisputed Items." Tr. 91 :25-92:7 The total
amount of the charges and credits not provided by Kirk Bums is $4,621,610.51, as reflected at
the top of each page to Trial Exhibit 10 in three places, which is the summation of the individual
amounts reflected in the column titled "Applicable $ to Driggs" as calculated by the Excel
program. Tr. 92:20-93:4.
55.

Because Trial Exhibit 10 includes both land and holding costs, among others,

together with costs incurred for every year after 2010, the total amount in Trial Exhibit 10
($4,621,610.51) does not equate to the amount of equipment and plant costs amortized in Trial
Exhibit 7 ($4,139,550). Tr. 155:25-157:1 & 179:4-18.
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56.

Because this Court could order Burns to convey the Driggs facility to Teton

County to ensure Burns doesn't receive a double recovery (in which event Burns would no
longer own the facility), Mr. Barger prepared Trial Exhibit 11 to summarize the total of (a) all of
the credits in Trial Exhibit 8 that are applicable to those components of the Driggs facility still
owned by Burns as of trial (and for which Teton County received credit in Trial Exhibit 8), and
(b) the estimated demobilization costs identified in Trial Exhibit 9 to relocate the equipment at
the Driggs facility back to Idaho Falls from where it came and to restore the Driggs site to a
marketable condition (and for which Teton County also received credit in Exhibit 8). Tr. 81:482:7 & 84:12-85:1. Trial Exhibit 11 was prepared by copying the relevant information in Trial
Exhibit 8 and pasting it into Trial Exhibit 11. Tr. 82:8-16. The total amount of the charges and
credits summarized in Trial Exhibit 11 is -$2,306,666.33, as reflected at the top of each page to
Trial Exhibit 11 in three places, which is the summation of the individual amounts reflected in
the column titled "Applicable$ to Driggs" as calculated by the Excel program. Tr. 82:17-25.
57.

Trial Exhibit 11 establishes the total amount ($2,306,666.33) to be added back to

the total principal amount of Trial Exhibit 8 ($1,905,344.78) should this Court order Burns to
convey the Driggs facility to Teton County, so as to ensure Burns doesn't receive a double
recovery. Tr. 85:10-87:7. No interest is computed for the credits reflected in Trial Exhibit 11 for
the elemental reason that Burns still owns all of the land and equipment comprising the Driggs
facility, the costs of which Burns has been carrying for many years. Tr. 180:20-181 :24.
58.

Mr. Barger is competent to provide the foregoing uncontroverted testimony

concerning his preparation and the contents of Trial Exhibits 7-11, and his testimony is found to
be credible and adopted as findings of the Court.
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(b)

Kirk Burns.

59.

Kirk Bums is the president and CEO of Bums Concrete and controls 100% of its

common stock. Tr. 190:20-24 & 192:13-17. Bums Concrete has been a concrete and aggregate
producer in Southeastern Idaho since 1989, currently having about 40 employees. Tr. 192:18193 :7. Bums Concrete owns multiple land holdings, aggregate facilities, batch plants, aggregatehandling equipment, and mixers, including a 50% interest in the Driggs land. Tr. 193:8-25.
Bums Concrete's offices are located in Idaho Falls, out of which the operations of the Driggs
facility are conducted. Tr. 194: 1-10.
60.

Mr. Bums is the sole member and owner of Bums Holdings, which was formed in

2004 for the initial purpose of purchasing land in Rexburg for the development of an
industrial/commercial facility, including a batch plant. Tr. 194:25-195:15. Bums Holdings, as its
name implies, holds land, including a 50% undivided interest in the Driggs land, but has no
employees, offices, or equipment. Tr. 191 :4-12 & 195: 16-24.
61.

Bums Concrete and Bums Holdings work together in connection with Mr. Bums'

concrete operations as joint venturers for tax purposes and have joint ventured the Driggs facility
from day one. Tr. 191 :4-17, 245:5-8 & 247:9-12.
62.

In 1985 Mr. Bums obtained a B.S. in construction engineering from Arizona State

University's College of Engineering.

Tr. 196:2-10.

Mr. Bums has worked in construction

management and the concrete industry since graduating college and had extensive experience in
estimating construction work before starting Bums Concrete. Tr. 197: 17-201: 14. For the last 29
years Mr. Bums, as the president and chief officer of Bums Concrete, has done everything from
managing a large "nuclear" job at the Idaho National Laboratory purchasing and mobilizing
batch plants and producing concrete to estimating the costs of and demobilizing batch plants. Tr.
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202:5-203:13. Mr. Burns has numerous industry affiliations, including with the Associated
General Contractors, National Ready Mix Concrete Association, American Concrete Institute,
Strategic Development Council of the American Concrete Institute, Strategic Development
Council for the ACI (American Concrete Institute) Foundation, John Deere Construction
Corporation, and Oshkosh Corporation. Tr. 203:19-207:22. Mr. Burns is known for his expertise
in concrete batch plants, concrete mixers, and aggregate production facilities. Tr. 209:18-23. He
has been qualified as an expert witness and testified in two trials in Bonneville County, Tr.
208: 1-8, in addition to being qualified as an expert during the trial of this dispute, Tr. 281 :25282:2.
63.

Mr. Burns was personally involved in the purchase of the land and all of the

equipment acquired and dedicated for use at the Driggs facility, as well as with all of the
improvements made to the Temporary Facility, and he was the only person involved in Burns
Concrete's sale or transfer of those pieces of equipment that are no longer dedicated to the
Driggs facility. Tr. 210:2-211: 11.
64.

In late winter or early sprmg of 2006, Mr. Burns began discussing his

development of a concrete batch plant in the Driggs area with Kurt Hibbert and Doug Self, who
were the planning and zoning directors for Teton County and Driggs, respectively. Tr. 216:1-9.
Mr. Hibbert thought it was a very good idea, and both he and Mr. Self pointed Mr. Burns to the
specific property that was acquired for the Driggs facility (the "Property"), which was in Driggs'
Area of Impact. Tr. 218:6-22. Development of the proposed batch plant on the Property was
approved in the fall of 2006 by Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission before the Property
was purchased, and from the date of that approval Mr. Burns knew that a development
agreement would be required for the Property. Tr. 219:11-220:3 & 221 :8-12. There was little or
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no opposition to the proposed batch plant through the approval of the zone change to M-1 by the
Teton County Board of County Commissioners on February 26, 2007, with a development
agreement expressly being required by that approval. Tr. 220:5-8, 220:22-221 :5, 459: 14-22 &
460:8-25 and Ex. Pat p. 8.
65.

The Property was acquired in December 2006 by the deeds marked as Trial

Exhibits 1 and 2. Tr. 230:20-231: 15. And in reliance of the fact that a development agreement
would be approved by Driggs and Teton County, Mr. Bums commenced working on and
ordering the equipment necessary for the Driggs facility in March 2007. Tr. 229:1-230:6.
66.

In order to finance the construction of the Permanent Facility, title to the Property

was initially taken in the name of Bums Concrete, with Mr. Bums intending to convey the
Property to Bums Holdings after the required conditional use permit was issued and the
Permanent Facility constructed in 2007 or 2008. Tr. 231: 16-233: 16.
67.

The Agreement (Trial Exhibit 3) was prepared by the Driggs city attorney, with

Driggs and Teton County working together in its preparation. Tr. 236:24-237:4 & 237:23-238:5.
A single draft of the Agreement was prepared, which included all of the provisions required by
Teton County. Tr. 237:5-32 & 238:6-9. Because the legal descriptions attached as Exhibit "A"
to the Agreement use the precise metes-and-bounds descriptions as those used in the two deeds
by which Bums Concrete acquired the Property (Trial Exhibits 1 and 2) and expressly
incorporate the recording numbers of those two deeds, the preparer of the Agreement knew that
title to the Property was held in the name of Bums Concrete. Tr. 235:17-236:18 & 238:10-23.
Teton County recorded the Agreement against the Driggs site, thereby binding the Property and
the parties, together with their successors and assigns, as provided in paragraph 12.b of the
Agreement. Tr. 240:3-22. Based on the terms in the Agreement specifying Bums Concrete's
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operations and Mr. Burns' meeting with the county's and city's planning and zoning directors,
Kurt Hibbert and Doug Self, Mr. Burns believed when he signed the Agreement that it was
binding on both Burns Concrete and Bums Holdings. Tr. 241: 1-24.
68.

By the Quitclaim Deed marked as Trial Exhibit 4, which was executed and

notarized on May 6, 2013 and recorded in Bonneville County, Burns Concrete conveyed an
undivided 50% interest in the Property to Bums Holdings. Tr. 242:4-243:6 & 463:19-23. And
by the Assignment and Assumption Agreement marked as Trial Exhibit 5, which was executed
by Mr. Burns and notarized on May 10, 2013, (a) Bums Holdings assigned to Bums Concrete an
undivided interest in the Agreement, including all related claims, causes of action, and rights of
enforcement of Burns Holdings, and (b) Bums Concrete assigned to Burns Holdings an
undivided interest in all claims and causes of action related to the Property and/or the Agreement
of Burns Concrete. Tr. 244:8-246:12. Mr. Burns' intent in executing Trial Exhibit 5 was to
ensure that both Bums Concrete and Bums Holdings would have equal rights, claims, and
obligations under the Agreement. Tr. 246:20-247: 1. By reason of Trial Exhibits 4 and 5, Bums
Concrete and Burns Holdings each own equal undivided interests in both the Property and all
claims under the Agreement against Teton County. Tr. 247:18-248:10.
69.

In consideration of the increased efficiencies of operating a taller 75-foot concrete

batch plant, the maintenance and operation costs resulting from installing a 45-foot batch plant
complying with Teton County's ordinances would have been exorbitant and economically
infeasible. Tr. 248:18-252:19.
70.

In April 2012 Teton County first gave written notice to Burns that its authority to

operate the Temporary Facility had been revoked.

Tr. 253:20-254:7 & 413:7-414:5. See also

Trial Exhibit 6 at p. 9, , 10 (establishing April 9, 2012 as the precise date). Teton County has
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not ever rescinded or withdrawn its revocation, and Burns Concrete has been unable to legally
operate the Temporary Facility since the 2012 revocation. Tr. 254:8-18 & 259:22-25.
71.

By its Counterclaim marked as Trial Exhibit 6, Teton County sued both Burns

Concrete and Burns Holdings for breach of the Agreement. Tr. 256:2-257:7; see also Trial
Exhibit 6 at p. 8. As alleged in its Counterclaim, Teton County maintains "that the Temporary
Facility has been in violation of the Teton County zoning laws since March 1, 2009." Trial
Exhibit 6 at p. 14,

~

43(e). And as established by Mr. Burns' uncontroverted trial testimony,

Teton County has maintained since sometime in 2009 or 2010 through trial that the Temporary
Facility has been in violation of Teton County's zoning laws. Tr. 259: 12-25. As also explained
at length by Mr. Burns uncontroverted trial testimony, the foregoing conduct by Teton County
effectively shut down the Driggs facility and shifted its costs onto the other operations of Burns
Concrete. Tr. 260:1-264:20 & 278:8-23.
72.

Mr. Burns further established that neither Burns Concrete nor Burns Holdings

made any money operating the Driggs facility nor did either of them in any way benefit from the
Agreement, because Teton County stopped Burns Concrete from producing concrete since at
least 2012 and has never allowed the Temporary Facility to again operate. Tr. 268:6-269:12,
280:6-22 & 284:16-285:2. Mr. Burns also confirmed that Burns Concrete would have continued
to operate the Driggs facility had Teton County allowed it to do so because all of the costs of the
Driggs facility have been paid for already and Burns Concrete's operations would yield a 30% to
40% gross margin, which would have allowed it to recover all of the costs that are on Trial
Exhibit 8 over time and then generate a profit.

Tr. 269:13-275:14 & 283:15-284:4. Finally,

Mr. Burns established why in his expert opinion it was not possible to reasonably establish the

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 23
21813.001 \4812-7274-7104v3

Page 164

profits that the Driggs facility would have in the past realized or would in the future generate.
Tr. 282:10-283:14 & 284:7-15.
73.

Mr. Bums directed Allen Barger to prepare Trial Exhibit 8 so that all of the

charges and credits applicable to the Driggs facility would be contained in a single spreadsheet.
Tr. 285:10-20. Mr. Bums confirmed that tens of thousands of Bums Concrete's business records
would pertain to the 7,300+ line items included in Trial Exhibit 8. Tr. 285:22-286:9. He also
confirmed that these business records were contained in the 73 binders and boxes of time cards
and payroll records that were brought to the courtroom and earlier provided to Teton County.
Tr. 286:10-287:7. As was Allen Barger, Mr. Bums is unaware of any omitted corrections to
Trial Exhibit 8 that would work to Teton County's benefit. Tr. 289:21-24. Finally, Mr. Bums
confirmed that he had personally reviewed each of the line items on Trial Exhibit 8, that all of
these line items relate to the Driggs facility, that there are no operational costs on Trial Exhibit 8
that relate to the sale of concrete, and that all of the line items on the exhibit relate to the
property, plant, and equipment or other costs related to holding the Property. Tr. 290:12-291 :4
& 291:10-16.
74.

Mr. Bums corroborated Allen Barger's trial testimony that all of the charges

included in Trial Exhibit 8 are based on the actual costs incurred by Bums Concrete with two
exceptions: (a) the $200,000 estimated value of the Johnson Ross temporary batch plant before
improvements set forth on line item 45, Tr. 296:9-297:5; and (b) the estimated future costs of
demobilizing the Driggs facility, including moving the equipment back to Idaho Falls and
removing the concrete slabs to facilitate the sale of the Property, Tr. 298:11-299:5 & 300:10-13.
The initial $200,000 value of the Johnson Ross plant, which was below its cost to Bums
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Concrete, was estimated because the plant was purchased about 18 years ago and the cost records
are no longer available. Tr. 297:10-22 & 298:7-10.
75.

Mr. Burns provided additional and corroborating testimony to that of Allen

Barger supporting the following charges included in Trial Exhibit 8: (a) the taxes, insurance, and
other payroll-related costs, Tr. 300:14-22; (b) the $100 per hour truck charge, Tr. 301:4-304:5;
and (c) the attorney fees related to the Driggs facility, Tr. 304:8-25.
76.

As also stated above with respect to Allen Barger's trial testimony, Teton County

introduced no evidence at trial disputing any of the information reflected in Trial Exhibit 8,
although Mr. Bums was cross-examined with respect to certain charges and credits, such as
whether the unimproved value of the Johnson Ross temporary batch plant charged on line item
45 and credited on line item 46 should have been greater than $200,000 (which, because of the
accrual of prejudgment interest, would have worked against Teton County's interests) and
whether credit was given for all of those items Mr. Bums admitted in his deposition should be
credited to the benefit of Teton County. Mr. Burns confirmed on redirect, however, that credits
were in fact provided in Trial Exhibit 8 for all of these items. Tr. 455:5-456: 11.
77.

Mr. Burns also provided detailed explanations supporting all of the valuation

information contained on Trial Exhibit 9, which contains the various charges and credits related
to the Driggs facility that are not based on either (a) Bums Concrete's accounting records, or (b)
with respect to the credit for the current value of the Driggs site, Teton County's own appraisal
report (Trial Exhibit 13). Tr. 313:5-339:6.
78.

Finally, Mr. Burns provided corroborating testimony to that of Allen Barger with

respect to the creation and purpose of Trial Exhibit 11. Tr. 339: 14-341 :23.
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79.

Trial Exhibit 8 was admitted into evidence upon stipulation of counsel subject to

the limitations that (a) the prejudgment interest calculations reflected in the final four columns
will not be considered by the Court until after it enters judgment, with the Court to determine at
that time how prejudgment interest should be calculated and accrued based on post-judgment
submissions, and (b) that the legal expenses reflected in line items 4695-4764 would be
supplemented by the applicable supporting documentation for the Court's consideration.
Tr. 351:21-353:6, 356:14-357:3 & 358:3.

Counsel for Teton County did not subsequently

introduce any of the documentation supporting line items 4695-4764 into evidence, however, and
both Burns and Teton County rested their respective cases, except with respect to the "battle of
the experts" held on the final day of trial, without any of Burns' 73 binders of supporting
documentation being introduced into evidence. Tr. 530: 10-16 & 531: 7-14.
80.

Trial Exhibits 9-11 were also admitted subject to the limitation that the final four

columns relating to prejudgment interest would be disregarded by the Court. Tr. 358:20-359:22.
81.

Mr. Burns is competent to provide the foregoing uncontroverted testimony

concerning the preparation and contents of Trial Exhibits 8, 9, and 11, and his testimony is found
to be credible and adopted as findings of the Court.

H.

Teton County's Direct and Rebuttal Witnesses.
82.

Teton County called no witnesses and introduced no trial exhibits other than

relating to the trial testimony of Teton County's expert witness Richard Hoffman.

(a)

Wendy Danielson.

83.

Wendy Danielson testified that as a building department manager for Teton

County she maintains records of the building permits issued by the county. Tr. 456:7-17. Ms.
Danielson testified on March 9, 2018 that the total number of building permits issued by Teton
County for each fiscal year from 2007 through 2017 was as follows:
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Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Permits
348
187
100
80
48
63
98
98
146
165
216

Tr. 466:18-468:4.
84.

Ms. Danielson could provide no information concerning the value of the permits

that were issued by Teton County in any year, although she admitted that such information was
maintained in the county's records. Tr. 468:18-469:9. Ms. Danielson also admitted that the
information she provided at trial did not pertain to any building permits that were issued by the
cities of Driggs, Victor, or Tetonia, nor to permits issued for municipal projects by any of these
cities, nor to permits issued by the State of Idaho for bridges, nor to curb and gutter permits by
any of the cities or Idaho. Tr. 471 :3-472:4.
(b)

Richard Hoffman.

85.

Richard Hoffman testified on both March 9 and May 11, 2018. However, his

March 9 testimony was stricken upon stipulation of counsel. Tr. 527:2-528:7.
86.

Mr. Hoffman admitted on cross-examination that in forming his expert opinions:

(a)

Hoffman did not consider the actions taken by Teton County to effectively shut

down the Driggs facility as early as 2009, as established by Kirk Burns' unrebutted trial
testimony. Tr. 595:24-596:9.
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(b)

In projecting Burns Concrete's revenues based on the quantity of concrete sold in

Teton County by Walters Ready Mix and Valley Ready Mix, Hoffman did not obtain any
information concerning their revenues or the price for which they sold concrete, nor any
documentation verifying the quantity of concrete they purportedly sold. Tr. 596:19-597:5 &
598:7-14. In fact, Hoffman didn't obtain any information from anybody concerning the price of
concrete when he projected Burns Concrete's sales. Tr. 599:14-600:3.
(c)

In projecting Burns Concrete's revenues based on building permits, Hoffman

didn't know if he even obtained any detailed data from Victor, Driggs, or Teton County, let
alone investigated its accuracy. Tr. 601 :21-602: 13.
(d)

In projecting Burns Concrete's revenues based on the building permits that

Wendy Danielson testified were issued by Teton County, Hoffman did not consider Teton
County's Permit Report (Trial Exhibit 29). Tr. 600:11-13 & 602:14-14. A comparison of the
information contained in Trial Exhibit 29 with that provided by Ms. Danielson and included both
in Schedule 3.1 of Hoffman's March 1 report (Trial Exhibit 30) and in Schedule 3.1 of
Hoffman's March 30 report (Trial Exhibit 31) reflects numerous material discrepancies, such as
Hoffman using 48 building permits for 2011 whereas Trial Exhibit 29 reflects that 148 building
permits had a 2011 "Permit Date"--or 300% of Hoffman's/Danielson's number. Incredibly,
Hoffman doesn't have "any concerns" with the discrepancies between the information contained
in Trial Exhibit 29 and that used by him in preparing his two expert reports even though it was
Ms. Danielson who submitted the Permit Report to Teton County's trial counsel. Tr. 606:18-24
& 613:13-19.
87.

In projecting Bums Concrete's assumed debt and debt payments applicable to the

Driggs facility reflected in hand-marked pages 7-8 of Trial Exhibit 31, Hoffman used the total
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amount of charges and credits ($4,621,610) summarized in Trial Exhibit 10. Tr. 646:11-648:7.
The assumed annual debt payments Hoffman calculated ($300,449) were then deducted from
Hoffman's projected revenue for the Driggs facility set forth in hand-marked page 5 (Schedule
2.1) of Trial Exhibit 31 to determine the projected cash available to the equity holders of Burns
Concrete.

Tr. 648:8-16.

As reflected in Schedule 2.1, Hoffman projected that after debt

payments were made the Driggs facility would generate a cash shortfall to the equity holders of
$1,589,471.
88.

As Allen Barger established by his uncontroverted trial testimony, Exhibit 10

does not include the value of equipment transferred from the Driggs facility to other operations
of Burns Concrete in the amounts established by the uncontroverted trial testimony of Kirk
Burns and included in Trial Exhibit 9.

The total value of this transferred equipment was

$1,538,808. Tr. 648:22-653:8. Hoffman confirmed that transferring the equipment and using it
in other operations is the economic equivalent of selling the equipment to a third party. Tr.
687: 1-19. Hoffman further confirmed that the Driggs facility should get the benefit of the debt
relating to the transferred equipment when it was transferred.

Tr. 687:20-688:8. Hoffman,

however, was unable to demonstrate where in his expert report the Driggs facility received credit
for either the $1,538,808 in transferred equipment or the paydown of the associated debt. Tr.
688:15-689:5.
89.

Hoffman also admitted that the demonstrative exhibits he used during trial (Trial

Exhibit 32) both (a) overstated the debt payments included in Trial Exhibit 31 and were thus
inconsistent with his expert report, Tr. 680:9-682:22; and (b) did not reflect in any way the
transfer of equipment from the Driggs facility or the paydown of the associated debt, Tr. 683 :22684:4.
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90.

The only expressed opinion in Hoffman's March 1 report (Trial Exhibit 30) was

that the Permanent Facility would not have been constructed. Tr. 614:24-615:3 & 618:18-619:4.
Yet Hoffman admitted that in his opinion both (a) Burns Concrete would have realized $186,080
in net incremental profits for the period 2011-2017, as reflected in Schedule 2 of Exhibit 30, Tr.
626:22-627:5; and (b) Burns Concrete would have paid off all of its debt associated with the
Driggs facility and realized $48,193 in net income in 2017, as also reflected in Schedule 2, Tr.
628:9-629:14.
91.

Hoffman's March 30 report (Trial Exhibit 31) purportedly supports the following

opinions Hoffman provided at trial, Tr. 630:24-631:1 & 631:20-23: (a) Burns Concrete would
have lost even more money than it did if it had continued to operate the Driggs facility,
Tr. 632:1-8; (b) Burns Concrete's Idaho Falls facility would not have been able to finance the
Driggs temporary facility had it continued to operate, Tr. 632:9-22; and (c) Bums Concrete's
Idaho Falls facility was not in a position to finance the Driggs facility until it became profitable,
Tr. 632:23-633:6.

Notwithstanding the foregoing opinions, Hoffman admitted that Burns

Concrete's Idaho Falls facility had remained in continuous operations through trial and that he
didn't know whether the Driggs facility had remained in operating condition from 2010 through
trial. Tr. 633:7-634:8. Moreover, Hoffman admitted that the financial projections reflected on
Schedule 2.1 of Trial Exhibit 31 set forth his expert opinion that the Driggs facility (a) would
have generated $488,632.42 in net incremental profits for the period of 2010-2017, with such
profits being generated in every year the facility operated, (b) would have paid off all of its
associated debt by 2016, and (c) would have generated net cash flow of $115,602 in 2017 after
the payment of all related expenses. Tr. 637:24-638:13, 640:14-25 & 643:6-17.
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92.

Trial Exhibit 29 (Teton County's Permit Report) was admitted into evidence

stripped of its email cover from counsel for Teton County to counsel for Burns. Tr. 600: 11-22,
751:21-25, 752:22-753:3 & 754:6-7. Trial Exhibit 30 (Hoffman's March 1 expert report) was
admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes with the complete report following the handnumbered excerpts referenced during Hoffman's cross-examination. Tr. 754:6-12 & 755:25756:22. Trial Exhibit 31 (Hoffman's March 30 expert report) was also admitted into evidence for
impeachment purposes with the complete report following the hand-numbered excepts
referenced during Hoffman's cross-examination. Tr. 758:9-25. Trial Exhibit 32 (Hoffman's
demonstrative trial exhibits) was admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes with a
complete copy of the demonstrative exhibits following the hand-numbered excerpts referenced
during Hoffman's cross-examination. Tr. 759:7-760:10 & 776:25-777:10.
93.

In the light of Mr. Hoffman's questionable diligence in preparing his two expert

reports, his evolving expert opinions as expressed in his two expert reports, and his opinion that
the Driggs facility (a) would have generated $488,632.42 in net incremental profits for the period
of 2010-2017, with such profits being generated in every year the facility operated, (b) would
have paid off all of its associated debt by 2016, and (c) would have generated net cash flow of
$115,602 in 2017 after the payment of all related expenses, his opinion that Burns Concrete
would have lost even more money than it did if it had continued to operate the Driggs facility is
not credible. Moreover, by expressing his foregoing opinions supporting the profitable operation
of the Driggs facility, Hoffman failed completely in proving the amount of loss that Burns would
have suffered in operating the Temporary Facility in years after 2017.
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I.

Burns' Rebuttal Witnesses.
(a)

Tom Davis.

94.

Tom Davis is the building official for Teton County.

Tr. 749:7-9.

Wendy

Danielson, who is Mr. Davis's assistant, prepared the Permit Report marked as Trial Exhibit 29
to reflect the building permits that were issued by Teton County for the period reflected at the
top of the first page (i.e., l/1/2007-3/1/2018). Tr. 750:2-11 & 751:11-20. Mr. Davis believes
the report is fairly accurate, although he also believes there "might be a few permits missing, but
there wouldn't be many." Tr. 752:7-16.

(b)

Bruce L. Ross.

95.

Bruce Ross holds bachelor degrees in accounting and psychology from Pitzer

College, which is one of the Claremont colleges. Tr. 696:5-9. He is a certified public accountant
licensed by California and has professional affiliations with the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, the California Society of Certified Public Accountants, and the Institute of
Business Appraisers.

Tr. 696: 15-20.

Mr. Ross has taught courses on the computation of

economic/lost-profits damages, among other subjects, for the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants and the accounting firms of Arthur Andersen & Co. and Laventhol and
Horwath.

Tr. 697:2-698:7. Mr. Ross has provided expert testimony over the last 40 years in

courts and before arbitration panels approximately 350 times in California, Arizona, Nevada, and
North Carolina. Tr. 698:13-699:12. He has also been appointed by both federal and state courts
as a special master or referee. Tr. 700:3-5.
96.

To form his rebuttal opinions provided at trial, Mr. Ross reviewed Richard

Hoffman's March 30 expert report (Trial Exhibit 31), the Complaint, and sales and costs reports
for the Driggs facility that he obtained from Burns Concrete, together with both (a) interviewing
Kirk Burns, Allen Barger, and Burns Concrete's office manager, Linda Szimhardt, in regards to
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the incremental costs associated with operating the Driggs facility, and (b) observing Richard
Hoffman's trial testimony. Tr. 700:21-701:23. Mr. Ross also inspected the Driggs facility with
Kirk Burns and Linda Szimhardt and confirmed with them that the Driggs facility was still
operational but not being operated. Tr. 701 :24-702: 13.
97.

Mr. Ross has had no prior personal or business contacts with Kirk Burns, Bums

Concrete, or Burns Holdings and was expressly qualified by the Court as an expert to provide
rebuttal testimony to that provided at trial by Richard Hoffman. Tr. 702:14-703:1.
98.

Mr. Ross provided the following summary explanation of Richard Hoffman's

elemental error in his use of debt payments or sunk costs in his economic analysis:
Your Honor, the key to making a decision, an economic
business decision associated with alternatives, where should I do,
you know, Alternative A or Alternative B, is - is an incrementalcost analysis.
And as even Mr. Hoffman just testified to, bank debt is not
incremental.
In other words, if you borrow money and you buy a bunch
of equipment and you open up a temporary facility and then you
have to close that temporary facility, you still owe the bank debt.
So the fact that the facility's operating or not doesn't
change the bank debt. And, as Mr. Hoffman just testified, you
remove it from your analysis.
Tr. 703:10-22. Based on this elemental error, together with the calculational errors pointed out
by Mr. Ross at trial, he opined that Richard Hoffman did not comply with the professional
standards promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts and that his
opinions were inaccurate, unreliable, and misleading.

Tr. 696:21-697:1, 704:9-23 & 723:6-

727:13.
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99.

In discussing the various pages contained in his demonstrative exhibit used at

trial, Mr. Ross explained the following deficiencies, among others, contained in Richard
Hoffman's March 30 report (Trial Exhibit 31):
(a)

Hoffman incorrectly defined his task by calculating the approximate return

to Burns Concrete's shareholders, which does not relate to the decision to close or keep open the
Temporary Facility, rather than determining whether Burns Concrete would benefit from
operating the Temporary Facility. Tr. 705:3-706:2.
(b)

Hoffman applied the working capital incorrectly in his calculations, which

should be applied as a change in working capital, rather than as an absolute dollar amount, and
be based on the working capital for the Temporary Facility, rather than for Burns Concrete
overall, and be added when Hoffman subtracted it and vice versa. Tr. 706:3-25 & 717:1-718:17.
(c)

Hoffman should have calculated and used an incremental profit rate to

determine whether the Temporary Facility would be operated because it would be better
economically for Burns Concrete to operate it than close it, and thereby generate incremental
profits. Tr. 707:1-708:18.
(d)

The number of building permits for Teton County used in Hoffman's

report was different in every year from that reflected in Teton County's Permit Report (Trial
Exhibit 29). Tr. 708:22-709:7 & 710:15-711:14.
(e)

Although Hoffman assumed the same rate of growth in sales for the

Temporary Facility as for Waters Ready Mix ("WRM"), Hoffman (i) obtained only a one-page
summary of sales and no source documentation supporting WRM's purported concrete sales, (ii)
did not explain why it would be reasonable to rely on WRM's purported sales, (iii) failed to
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consider the impact of sales from the Temporary Facility on WRM's purported sales, and (iv)
disregarded changes in the sales price of concrete. Tr. 711:15-712:3.
(f)

Hoffman's calculation of the cost-of-goods-sold percent and the operating-

expense percent was based on Burns Concrete's overall operations and not on its operation of the
Temporary Facility, which was highly automated and required minimal personal. Tr. 712:4714:16.

(g)

Because interest expense on debt and principal repayments have to be paid

whether the Temporary Facility is closed or operated, they are not relevant to determining
incremental profits or whether to operate the Temporary Facility and should therefore have been
disregarded by Hoffman. Tr. 714:24-717:1.
100.

Mr. Ross also calculated the incremental profit rate and cash flow for the Driggs

facility starting with the information contained in Hoffman's report and then providing the
explanation for each adjustment that was made. Tr. 718:18-720:18. Mr. Ross summarized his
economic analysis as follows:
Q.
So looking at this Slide 20, then, what is that telling you
with respect to every dollar of concrete sales that would be made
down at the Driggs facility? What is the impact, then, on
incremental profits?
A.
The impact is that Mr. Burns and - and I think Mr.
Hoffman used these words - would be putting [sic] 45 cents for
every dollar of concrete he could sell.

So for - for every yard of concrete he put out there,
he'd be earning a 45 percent profit rate or cash flow rate.
Q.
So for every dollar he collected, he put 45 percent - 45
cents in profits into his pocket, right?
A.

Right.

Q.

Does that give him the incentive to sell concrete?
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A.
Absolutely. He's already paid all the money to - to - to
make the facility operate. All of that is debt. He had - he
wouldn't [sic] have a profit overall at- at some point.

But every time he sold a yard, he'd be earning
money. So he'd want to sell more and more yards. He'd want to
sell as many yards as he could.
Q.
And that's because he'd already paid for all the plant and
all of the equipment and all of the fixed costs associated with
running it?
A.

Correct.

Q.
And all of the plant and all of the equipment and all of the
fixed costs for running it are still out there [or] at the site over in
Idaho Falls, ready to be used, to your knowledge, right?

A.
Based on what I've been informed about and based on my
own physical observation.
Q.
And is - are those the so-called sunk costs that we've
talked about?
A.

They are.

Q.

They don't relate to incremental profits, do they?

A.
They do not.
profits.

Sunk costs do not relate to incremental

***
Q.
Is he [Hoffman] also assuming that the - ultimately, that
the - that the temporary facility is not out there when it is out
there; that it's not operational when it is operational;?
That it could not earn a profit or generate a return to
Burns when it, in fact, would have if it had been allowed to
operate; all those things?
A.
Yeah. I mean, as I said before, he's really calculating a
return to shareholders.

And he may be right on that point in the sense that
the shareholders might not have gotten a return at this point
because the temporary facility's been -you know - you know, had
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- it's been closed. It had its problems. It suffered from - that's
been described in this case.
But I - you know, it's pretty clear that, if he can sell
a minimal number of yards, he would earn money on those yards.
And any reasonable businessperson would want him
to operate a facility because he's already spent all the money. It's
just sitting out there. He's not getting anything back for all the
money spent.
And he - according to the numbers that we have in
front of us - and this is where Mr. Hoffman and I agree - that, on
an incremental basis, the Driggs facility, the temporary facility,
would have earned an incremental profit.
Q.
And that was reflected in every single year in Mr.
Hoffman's report for the temporary facility, that it was generating
an incremental profit - a significant incremental profit if you lay
aside the debt payments, right?

A.
Yes.
Again, your Honor, I'm just looking at Mr.
Hoffman's Schedule 2.1. And in there, he has a line item that says
"Expected Net Incremental Profit."

And over the years of - the partial year 2010
through 2017, he shows $488,000 in profit, incremental profit.
Q.

Incremental profit.

A.
And I - I disagree with that number. I think it would be
higher because he put in those extra expenses that shouldn't be
there. But if you leave out the debt, he's - he and I are in total
agreement.

Q.
That being that the Driggs facility was generating an
incremental profit for every year of its operation, correct?
A.

And/or predicted operation.

Q.

And projected operations -

A.

Correct.

Tr. 721:20-723:5 & 727:14-729:6 (emphasis added).
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101.

Mr. Ross is competent to provide the foregoing expert testimony and his

testimony that Burns Concrete had an economic incentive to operate the Driggs facility, that the
Driggs facility generated an economic profit in every year that it operated if the debt payments
are disregarded, and that the Driggs facility was projected to generate an economic profit into the
future is found to be credible and adopted as findings of the Court.
II.

A.

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Regarding Pretrial Rulings.
102.

The Court's pretrial rulings that Teton County breached the Agreement by

preventing Burns from operating the Temporary Facility and in failing to provide Burns notice
with an opportunity to cure set forth in pages 10-12 of the Decision and summarized in
paragraphs 32-33 above are incorporated herein by reference.
103.

The Court's pretrial rulings granting Burns Holdings judgment on its claim for

breach of contract and the right to seek reliance damages as compensation for Teton County's
breach of contract set forth in pages 14 and 19 of the Decision and summarized in paragraph 34
above are incorporated herein by reference.
104.

In determining whether Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings have the right to

recover their damages, and as referenced in paragraph 35(c) above, the Court ruled in the
Decision that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether Burns can

sufficiently establish damages because Burns Concrete incurred all of the claimed damages but
the Agreement was with Burns Holdings.
105.

The law in Idaho with respect to the assignment of legal claims is set forth in

St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 41, 293 P.3d 661,

665 (2013), as follows:
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It is settled in Idaho that "choses in action are generally
assignable." Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep 't of Fin.,
140 Idaho 121, 126, 90 P.3d 346, 351 (2004). "An assignment of
the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the
assignee becomes the real party in interest." Id Thereafter,
"[ o]nly the assignee may prosecute an action on the chose in
action." Id
Moreover, Paragraph 12.b of the Agreement expressly provides:
The parties agree that this Agreement shall run with the
land and bind the property in perpetuity, and shall inure to the
benefit of and be enforceable by the parties. and any of their
respective legal representatives. heirs. successors. and assigns.
(Emphasis added.)
106.

By the Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment filed May 2, 2017, which counsel for Teton County prepared and submitted to the
Court, summary judgment on liability only was granted jointly to Burns Concrete and Burns
Holdings as the defined "Plaintiffs" for breach of the Agreement, with this component of the
order not being vacated by the Decision. Further, the evidence at trial cited in paragraphs 67 and
68 above established that (a) Teton County had both constructive and actual notice that title to
the Property was held in the name of Bums Concrete when the Agreement was prepared for
execution, (b) Burns Concrete and Bums Holdings have held undivided interests in all claims
and causes of action related to the Agreement and the property encumbered by the Agreement
since before the Complaint was filed on May 21, 2013, and (c) the Property has been owned as
tenants in common by these two affiliated plaintiffs since May 10, 2013.

Finally, the

uncontroverted trial testimony cited in paragraph 61 above established that Bums Concrete and
Burns Holdings worked together as joint venturers and joint ventured the development of the
Driggs facility from the inception of the project. Thus, stated in the language of 1.R.C.P. l 7(a),
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Burns Concrete and Bums Holdings together comprise the real party in interest entitled to
prosecute this lawsuit against, and obtain all recoverable damages from, Teton County.
107.

For the reasons set forth in paragraphs 103-106 above, Burns Concrete and Bums

Holdings are jointly granted judgment on their joint and undivided claims for breach of contract
against Teton County and have the joint right to seek reliance damages as compensation for
Teton County's breach of the Agreement.
108.

In reversing its prior order on summary judgment granting Bums rescission of the

Agreement, the Court ruled in the Decision that the four issues summarized in paragraph 35(a)
above, and addressed in paragraphs 109-112 below, presented "questions of fact regarding
whether the County's revocation of the right to operate the Temporary Facility vitiated the
Agreement's entire purpose .... sufficient to order rescission of the Agreement." Decision 16.
109.

With respect to the question of whether Burns Concrete could have used an

alternative Permanent Facility design that would not require a zoning variance, Kirk Bums'
uncontroverted testimony cited in paragraph 69 above established that the maintenance and
operation costs resulting from the installation of a 45-foot batch plant complying with Teton
County's ordinances would have been exorbitant and economically infeasible.

In addition,

because the Supreme Court ruled that Bums Concrete was required to build the Permanent
Facility depicted in the exhibits to the Agreement, consideration of this issue is foreclosed by the
law of the case. Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.3d 1374, 1380
(1985) ('"where, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the
law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court
and upon subsequent appeal. .. "' (citation omitted)).
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110.

With respect to the question of whether Bums Concrete's decision to cease

operations in 2010 was the result of market conditions or Teton County's threats of revocation,
Mr. Bums' uncontroverted testimony cited in paragraphs 71 and 72 above established that
(a) Teton County has maintained since sometime in 2009 or 2010 through trial that the
Temporary Facility has been in violation of the county's zoning laws and Teton County
effectively shut down the Driggs facility by its conduct, and (b) Bums Concrete would have
continued to operate the Driggs facility had Teton County allowed it to do so because all of the
costs of the Driggs facility had been paid for and Bums Concrete's operations would yield a 30%
to 40% gross margin, which would have allowed it to recover all of its costs over time and then
generate a profit. Further, Teton County's own expert, Richard Hoffman, opined at trial that the
Driggs facility (a) would have generated $488,632.42 in net incremental profits for the period of
2010-2017, with such profits being generated in every year the facility operated, (b) would have
paid off all of its associated debt by 2016, and (c) would have generated net cash flow of
$115,602 in 2017 after the payment of all related expenses.
111.

With respect to the question of whether Teton County's revocation of the right to

operate the Temporary Facility vitiated the Agreement's entire purpose, Mr. Bums'
uncontroverted testimony cited in paragraph 72 above established that (a) neither Bums Concrete
nor Bums Holdings made any money operating the Driggs facility, nor did either of them in any
way benefit from the Agreement because Teton County stopped Bums Concrete from producing
concrete since at least 2012 and has never allowed the Temporary Facility to again operate, and,
as also stated in the prior paragraph, (b) Bums Concrete would have continued to operate the
Driggs facility had Teton County allowed it to do so because all of the costs of the Driggs facility
had been paid for and Bums Concrete's operations would yield a 30% to 40% gross margin,

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 41
21813.001\4812-7274-7104v3

Page 182

which would have allowed it to recover all of its costs over time and then generate a profit.
Further, even Teton County's own appraiser opined in Trial Exhibit 13 that the value of the
Property with its changed zoning is now only $476,000, whereas it was purchased for $823,119
(or approaching double its current rezoned value), as is established by item numbers 1-3 in Trial
Exhibit 8.
112.

And with respect to the final question of whether by operating the Temporary

Facility between 2007 and 2010 Bums benefitted from the Agreement and from Teton County's
grant of a conditional rezone of the Property to Ml, (a) Mr. Bums' uncontroverted testimony
cited in paragraph 72 above established that neither Bums Concrete nor Bums Holdings made
any money operating the Driggs facility nor did either of them in any way benefit from the
Agreement, and, as also stated in the prior paragraph, (b) Teton County's own appraiser opined
in Trial Exhibit 13 that the value of the Property with its changed zoning is now only $476,000,
whereas it was purchased for $823,119 (or approaching double its current rezoned value), as is
established by item numbers 1-3 in Trial Exhibit 8.
113.

Teton County presented no evidence at trial with respect to the four questions of

fact raised by the Court in the Decision relating to the rescission of the Agreement. Nor did
Teton County provide any evidence supporting its failure through trial to withdraw its April 9,
2012 revocation of Bums Concrete's authority to operate the Temporary Facility,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Burns Concrete I and this Court's subsequent
order based thereon granting rescission of the Agreement (which was vacated by the Decision
pending determination at trial of the four questions of fact discussed above).
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114.

The general rule regarding the remedy of rescission is set forth in Primary Health

Network, Inc. v. State, Department of Administration, 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002), as

follows:
Rescission is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the
contract and seeks to restore the parties to their original positions.
It is normally granted only in those circumstances in which one of
the parties has committed a breach so material that it destroys or
vitiates the entire purpose for entering into the contract.
Id. at 668, 52 P .3d at 312 (citation omitted).

115.

In Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 543, 347 P.2d 341, 346 (1959), the Supreme

Court held that the repudiation of all liability under a compromise agreementl3 by the defendants
constitutes "a rescission of the compromise agreement on the part of defendants .... " Similarly,
the Supreme Court held in Sorensen v. Larue, 43 Idaho 292, 302, 252 P. 494, 497 (1926), that a
vendor plaintiff who "insisted up to the institution of this suit, and even until the interlocutory
decree, that [his] title was sufficient[ . . . had] by his conduct and by the bringing of the suit,
declared the contract rescinded without right to do so." Based on the holdings in Wilson and
Sorensen, Teton County's repudiation of all of Burns' continuing rights under the Agreement,

including the right to operate the Temporary Facility, and its filing of the Counterclaim to,
among other things, shut down the operation of the Temporary Facility, constitutes a rescission
of the Agreement.
116.

The rescission or repudiation of an agreement by a contracting party entitles the

other party to rescind. Wilson, 81 Idaho at 543, 347 P.2d at 346 ("A rescission or repudiation of
an executory compromise agreement by one party thereto confers a right of election upon the
other party. He may accept such rescission and himself rescind the agreement ... "); Sorensen,

13 As explained in Wilson, "Such a contract stands on the same footing as any other
contract and is governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable to contracts
generally." 81 Idaho at 542, 347 P.2d at 345.
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43 Idaho at 302, 252 P. at 497 ("The respondent, by his conduct and by the bringing of the suit,
declared the contract rescinded without right so to do. The appellants, if not in default, had a
right to adopt his rescission and breach of the contract, and thereupon to rescind ... "); Holley v.

Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 509, 915 P.2d 733, 739 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Wilson). Bums' right to
rescind the Agreement is therefore established both by Teton County's material breach of the
Agreement and by its repudiation and rescission of the Agreement.
117.

For the reasons set forth in paragraphs 107-116 above, Burns Concrete and Bums

Holdings are jointly granted the right to rescind the Agreement by the judgment to be entered in
this case.
118.

In determining whether a cap may apply to the amount of reliance damages that

are recoverable by Burns, and as referenced in paragraph 35(b) above, the Court ruled in the

Decision that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether Bums would have
suffered a loss in operating the Temporary Facility and, if so, the amount of that loss. The Court
cited the following section from the Restatement in support of its ruling:
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 34 7
[pertaining to expectation interests], the injured party has a right to
damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures
made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any
loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the
injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981) (emphasis added). Thus, Teton County
bears the burden of proving any such loss.
119.

For the reasons set forth in paragraph 93 above, Teton County failed completely

in proving the amount of loss Burns would have suffered in operating the Temporary Facility,
and thus no cap applies to the amount of reliance damages that are recoverable by Bums.
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120.

Finally, and as referenced in paragraph 33(d) above, the Court ruled in the

Decision that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether prejudgment

interest is precluded because the damages are neither liquidated nor ascertainable by mere
mathematical process. However, as referenced in paragraph 79 above, the Court ruled at trial
that it will not consider the question of prejudgment interest until after judgment is entered and
any applicable post-judgment submissions are made by the parties.
B.

Measure of Recoverable Damages.

121.

Idaho precedent holds that damages need not be proved with mathematical

exactitude, but only beyond speculation. Haener v. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170,
174, 697 P.2d 1184, 1188 (1985); Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 209,215,
814 P.2d 941, 947 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing inter alia, Haener), rev 'don unrelated grounds, 120
Idaho 185,814 P.2d 917 (1991).
122.

The measure of recovery for reliance damages is set forth in Beco Construction

Company, Inc. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 936 P.3d 202 (Ct. App. 1997):
Beco sought recovery of the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in anticipation of performance of the contract with
Harper. A party aggrieved by a breach of contract may be entitled
to reimbursement for losses caused by its reliance on the contract.
even if the aggrieved party elects to rescind the contract. Brown v.
Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd, 111 Idaho 195, 198, 722 P.2d
1062, 1065 (Ct. App. 1986). Reliance damages include expenses
reasonably related to the purposes of the contract which would not
have been incurred but for the contract's existence. Id at 198-200,
722 P.2d at 1065-1067. Beco's evidence showed that it incurred
expenses in crushing and testing gravel in preparation for
performance of the asphalt contract. After a thorough review of
the record, we conclude that there was substantial competent
evidence to support the jury's verdict that Harper was obligated to
pay Beco for the crushing and testing of gravel.
Beco, 130 Idaho at 9, 936 P.2d at 207 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, Idaho precedent

establishes that Bums has the right to recover its out-of-pocket expenses reasonably related to the
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purpose of the Agreement that were incurred in reliance on and in anticipation of performance
under the Agreement irrespective of whether the Agreement is rescinded.
123.

If the Agreement is rescinded, then the applicable measure of reliance damages is

that set forth in Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 772 P.2d 1062 (Ct.
App. 1986):
[T]he claim of an expectancy interest in full performance of a
contract is fundamentally inconsistent with a claim, made by the
buyers here, for rescission of the contract. "Rescission is an
eguitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and seeks to
restore the parties to their original positions. * * * [One who seeks
rescission] no longer treat[s] the contract as in existence." Blinzler
v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 218, 485 P.2d 957, 960 (1971),
disapproved on other grounds, Bernard & Sons, Inc. v. Akins, 109
Idaho 466, 708 P.2d 871 (1985). Consequently, we concur with
the district court that compensation for the expectancy interest
would have been inappropriate in this case.
Brown, 111 Idaho at 199, 772 P .2d at 1066 (emphasis added) (ellipsis and internal

brackets in quoted text). Accord Primary Health Network, supra, 137 Idaho at 668, 52 P.3d at
312.
124.

Economic damages include those for the loss of use of property. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 348(1):
If a breach delays the use of property and the loss in value to the
injured party is not proved with reasonable certainty, he may
recover damages based on the rental value of the property or on
interest on the value of the property.

(Emphasis added.) See also Idaho Code § 6-1601(3) and 22 AM.JUR 2D Damages § 87 (2013)
(citing Restatement§ 348).
125.

Additionally, Idaho precedent provides for the award of prejudgment interest at

the legal rate for the loss of use of property. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Remay, 58 Idaho
302, 312, 72 P.2d 859, 863 (1937) (awarding interest at the legal rate for the loss of use of an
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automobile); Schenk v. Smith, 117 Idaho 999, 1000-01, 793 P.2d 231, 232-33 (Ct. App. 1990)
(awarding interest at the legal rate for the loss of use ofreal and personal property).
126.

Based on the authorities citied in paragraphs 121-125 above, Burns is entitled to

either a damage award or to recover prejudgment interest (but not both) based on the legal rate of
interest and the value of the real and personal property dedicated to the Driggs facility.

C.

Damage Award.
127.

Burns Concrete and Bums Holdings are jointly awarded judgment against Teton

County in the principal amount of $1,905,344.78, as established by Trial Exhibit 8.
128.

Burns Concrete and Bums Holdings are also jointly entitled to recover from Teton

County for the loss of use of the real and personal property dedicated to the Driggs facility such
additional amount as the Court may award after judgment is entered and any applicable postjudgment submissions are made by the parties.
DATED this 23rd day of August 2018.

0

Bx.___ _ _ _-+-~--------Robert B. Bu
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 47
21813.001\4812-7274-7104v3

Page 188

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of August 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS'

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Billie Jean Siddoway
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Facsimile (208) 354-2994

0
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
D Hand Delivery
1:8:1 Overnight Delivery
D Email: bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us
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1

Robert B. Burns, ISB #3744
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
rbums@parsonsbehle.com
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AUG
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flME:
TETONco 10 r:,r,-

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC

O

_c:1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation,
and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,

Case No. CV-2013-165
REBUTTAL OF
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND SUPPLEMENTAL
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS
OFLAW

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

Plaintiffs Bums Concrete, Inc. ("Burns Concrete") and Bums Holdings, LLC ("Bums
Holdings," and jointly with Burns Concrete "Burns") submit their rebuttal to select factual
findings and legal conclusions proposed in Defendant Teton County's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law, filed August 24, 2018, together with select supplemental proposed
conclusions oflaw in response to Teton County's proposals.
Burns is limiting its rebuttal to those arguably material factual findings and legal
conclusions proposed by Teton County that are not specifically addressed in and controverted by
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, also filed August 24, 2018. For
ease of identification of the particular disputed factual finding or legal conclusion proposed by
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Teton County, reference is made at the beginning of each disputed item to the paragraph in Teton
County's submission where it is asserted (e.g., Disputed~ 9).
In response to the opposition expressed in Teton County's submission both to the
rescission of the Agreement and to this Court's grant of judgment on liability jointly to Burns
Concrete and Bums Holdings, as set forth in the Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs Renewed
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed May 2, 2017, which counsel for Teton County
prepared, Bums is also submitting three additional proposed conclusions of law.

I. DISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

Re: The Property.
1.

Disputed~ 9. Teton County asserts that by the deed of trust made for the benefit

of Bank of Idaho, "Bums Concrete conveyed its interest in the Property to First American Title."
As established by the authority cited in paragraph 24 below, however, Burns Concrete conveyed
only its title to the Property for purposes of the trust, and not all of its interest in the Property.
B.

Re: The Developer's Agreement.
2.

Disputed~ 15. Teton County asserts that Bums Concrete caused renderings of

the Permanent Facility to be prepared after Teton County approved the zone change for the
Property (citing Tr. 392:9-393:7 1). Kirk Burns' cited testimony, however, establishes only that
the invoice for the preparation of the renderings was dated July 16, 2007, and not when the
renderings were actually prepared or provided to Burns Concrete or Teton County.

I

I.e., Transcript page 392, line 9 to page 393, line 7.
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3.

Disputed , 17. Teton County asserts that the law firm of Martin & Eskelson

revised the Developer's Agreement (the "Agreement") on Burns' behalf (citing evidence not in
the record). Mr. Bums' uncontroverted testimony to the contrary is at Tr. 237:5-222.
4.

Disputed , 19. Teton County asserts that Mr. Burns' testimony establishing that

Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings joint ventured the Driggs facility is not persuasive. But see
Trial Exhibit 6 at 1 1, where Teton County admits in its verified answer that the Agreement was
recorded "at the request of Burns Concrete," and Mr. Burns' uncontroverted testimony at Tr.
191:4-17, 245:5-8 and 247:9-12.

5.

Disputed , 19. Teton Count asserts that the "only agreement" between Burns

Holdings and Burns Concrete is Trial Exhibit 5 (citing Tr. 441:7-10).

But see Mr. Burns'

testimony at Tr. 440:21-24 establishing that his testimony related to "a written joint venture
agreement"; Trial Exhibit 5 at Recital 5, setting forth Mr. Burns' intent when the Property was
acquired in 2006 "to cause Burns Concrete to sell and convey the Property to Burns Holdings";
and Mr. Bums' uncontroverted testimony at Tr. 191:4-17, 245:5-8 and 247:9-12.

C.

Re: The 'Purported" Transfer.

6.

Dispute, 25. Teton County asserts that Burns did not record Trial Exhibit 4 in

Teton County (citing Tr. 463: 19-23).

But as Mr. Burns' cited testimony establishes, the

quitclaim deed for the Property by Bums Concrete to Bums Holdings was recorded in
Bonneville County.
7.

Disputed, 27. Teton County asserts that Burns Concrete could not convey an

interest in the Property to Burns Holdings because neither the Bank of Idaho nor First American
Title reconveyed their interests in the deed of trust granted by Burns Concrete. However, as

2 I.e.,

Transcript page 237, line 5 to line 22.
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established by the authority cited in paragraph 24 below, no such reconveyance was necessary
for Burns Concrete to convey an undivided interest in the Property to Burns Holdings.

8.

Disputed

,r

28. Teton County asserts that neither the Bank of Idaho nor First

American Title "ever conveyed or consented to the conveyance of any interest in the Property to
Burns Holdings," nor did Burns notify the Bank ofldaho of Burns Concrete's conveyance (citing
Tr. 452:4-6). But Trial Exhibit E (the deed of trust) contains no restriction on the transfer of the
Property by Burns Concrete, and Mr. Burns' cited testimony establishes only that Mr. Burns did
not provide a copy of Trial Exhibit 4 (the quitclaim deed) to the bank, and not that he didn't
notify the bank of the conveyance by Burns Concrete.
9.

Disputed

,r 29.

Teton County asserts that Burns Concrete's 2013 balance sheet

establishes that Burns Concrete did not convey an interest in the Property to Burns Holdings.
But although the 2013 balance sheet for Burns Concrete appears not to have reflected the
conveyance of an undivided interest in the Property to Buns Holdings, Mr. Burns testified at Tr.
438:3-13 that Burns Concrete owned multiple commercial properties and he didn't know how his
accountant prepared Burns Concrete's balance sheets. See also Tr. 450:6-17.

D.

Re: The Assignment Agreement.
10.

Disputed ,i 35. Teton County asserts that Burns Holdings gave no consideration

for the purchase rights to the Property set forth in paragraph 1 of Trial Exhibit 5. But Trial
Exhibit 5 not only recites that the agreement between Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings was
made "for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged," but the agreement sets forth the express rights each party conveyed to the other
and paragraph 1 of the agreement sets forth the purchase price to be paid by Burns Holdings in
purchasing Burns Concrete's remaining undivided interest in the Property.
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E.

Re: The Permanent Facility.
11.

Disputed, 41. Teton County again cites Mr. Bums' testimony at Tr. 392:9-393:7

for the assertion that Bums did not acquire renderings of the Permanent Facility until July 2007.
But as stated in paragraph 2 above, Mr. Bums' cited testimony only establishes that the invoice
for the preparation of the renderings was dated July 16, 2007, and not when the renderings were
actually prepared or provided to Bums Concrete or Teton County.

F.

Re: Cessation of Operations.
12.

Disputed, 50. Teton County asserts that by 2010 Mr. Bums decided "that he did

not want to move forward with the Driggs Operation" (citing Tr. 408:16-21). But Mr. Bums'
cited testimony says nothing about what Mr. Bums wanted to do, and his lengthy trial testimony
regarding how Teton County effectively shut down the Driggs facility at Tr. 260: 1-264:20 and
278:8-23 was uncontroverted at trial.

13.

Disputed , 51. Teton County asserts that by 2012 "Bums Concrete was done

doing business in Teton County" (citing Tr. 409:4-6).

But paragraph 10 of Teton County's

verified counterclaim (Trial Exhibit 6) establishes that Teton County revoked authority to
operate the Temporary Facility on April 9, 2012, and Mr. Bums' cited testimony establishes only
that Bums Concrete was done doing business "for the time being"-which was obviously the
situation after it became illegal to operate the Temporary Facility.

G.

Re: Rescission of the Developer's Agreement.
14.

Disputed,, 53-54. Teton County asserts that Bums "received the benefit of a

conditional zone change from C-3 to M-1 from 2007 through 2010" but didn't "tender[] back to
Teton County the benefit of the zone change."

However, (a) Mr. Bums' uncontroverted

testimony at Tr. 268:6-269:12, 280:6-22, and 284:16-285:2 established that neither Bums
Concrete nor Bums Holdings made any money operating the Driggs facility, nor otherwise
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benefitted from the Agreement because Teton County stopped Burns Concrete from producing
concrete since at least 2012 and has never allowed the Temporary Facility to again operate, and
(b) Teton County's own appraiser opined in Trial Exhibit 13_ that the value of the Property with
its changed zoning is now only $476,000, whereas it was purchased when zoned C-3 for
$823,119 (or approaching double its current rezoned value), as is established by item numbers 13 in Trial Exhibit 8. Or in a nutshell, Teton County introduced no evidence of any conceivable
benefit to Burns that it might have "tendered back to Teton County."

H.

Re: Plaintiffs' Claimed Damages.
15.

Disputed, 63. Teton County asserts that numerous costs or expenses included in

Trial Exhibit 8 were incurred prior to the August 31, 2007 date of the Agreement. However, (a)
other than with respect to the credit at line item 4672, none of the over 1,200 additional
offsetting credits included in Trial Exhibit 8 for those line items listed are considered, and (b) the
listed expenses at line items 4687-4692, 5080-5115, 5133-5134, and 6598-6599 all relate to taxes
and fees that were paid after August 31, 2007 for real and personal property dedicated for use at
the Driggs facility when the taxes and fees were incurred.
16.

Disputed , 64.

Teton County also asserts that numerous costs or expenses

included in Trial Exhibit 8 were incurred prior to the May 10, 2013 date of Trial Exhibit 5.
However, other than with respect to the credits at line items 4644-4649, 4651-4656, 4658-4661,
4664, 4666, 4668, 4671-4672, and 4674, none of the thousands of additional offsetting credits
included in Trial Exhibit 8 for those line items listed are considered.
17.

Disputed, 65. Teton County asserts that credits for certain retained assets should

be included in Trial Exhibit 8 and implies that they were not. But not only does Mr. Bums'
uncontroverted testimony at Tr. 455:5-456:11 establish that Trial Exhibit 8 includes credits for
each identified line item, but line items 5141-6567 to Trial Exhibit 8 reflect these credits.
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18.

Disputed ,r 66. Teton County asserts that certain of the legal expenses included at

line items 4695-4764 of Trial Exhibit 8 should be excluded for various reasons.

However,

counsel for both Burns and Teton County rested their respective cases without any of the
documentation supporting line items 4695-4764 being introduced into evidence. Tr. 530:10-16
& 531 :7-14.

I.

Re: Profitability.
19.

Disputed

,r 96.

Teton County asserts "[t]here was no situation presented at trial

which would have allowed Plaintiffs to make a profit on the Temporary Facility through 2016."
However, Schedule 2.1 of the expert report of Teton County's expert Richard Hoffman (Trial
Exhibit 31 at hand-marked page 5) projects the following operating profits for the Temporary
Facility and positive cash flow after 2016.
Expected Net Incremental Profits:
2010

$42,280

2011

$25,689

2012

$33,717

2013

$52,449

2014

$52,449

2015

$78,138

2016

$88,307

2017

$115,602

Total

$488,632

Available Cash After Repayment of Debt in 2016:
2017

$115,602
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Moreover, Mr. Hoffman projected that no loss or negative cash flow would occur after the debt
he attributed to the Driggs facility was fully repaid in 2016.
20.

Disputed ~ 97. Teton County asserts that Burns wasn't harmed by the County

"because the inability to construct the Permanent Facility" prevented Bums from losing more
money. But as this Court ruled at pages 10-12 in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Motion to Reconsider and Motion in Limine, filed February 12, 2018, all of Teton County's
breaches of the Agreement pertain to its conduct in preventing Burns from operating the
Temporary Facility, and even Teton County's own expert witness opined that the Temporary
Facility would generate net incremental profits in every year it operated and repay all of the debt
he attributed to the facility by 2016.
II. DISPUTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A.

Re: Forfeited Claims.
21.

Disputed ~ 101. Teton County asserts that Bums has abandoned its claim for

declaratory relief (Count I of Burns' Complaint, filed May 21, 2013), in which Bums seeks entry
of declaratory judgment against Teton County establishing (a) that Teton County is estopped and
enjoined from rezoning the Property for so long as Burns is not in material breach of the
Agreement, and (b) that the 18-month period specified in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement to
construct the Permanent Facility has been and will remain tolled until Teton County has taken all
such action within its control that is necessary for it to permit the construction of the Permanent
Facility. Complaint 130. Absent this Court's rescission of the Agreement, however, Bums'
right to the requested declaratory judgment is established by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 120-21, 384 P.3d 364, 367-68 (2016)
(holding that Teton County's conduct in preventing Burns from constructing the Permanent
Facility falls within the force majeure clause to the Agreement).
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B.

Re: Election of Remedies.
22.

Disputed , 102. Teton County asserts that Bums has "elected the remedy of

rescission of the contract coupled with reliance damages." But Bums has made no such election,
as the information contained in Trial Exhibit 8 equally supports an award of reliance damages
whether such damages are for the rescission of the Agreement or for its breach. Moreover,
Bums requests this Court to determine the amount of reliance damages to which Bums is entitled
under the law for each rescission of the Agreement and its breach, so that Bums may make an
informed decision of which measure of reliance damages to adopt by the judgment that is
entered.

C.

Assignment of Contract.
23.

Disputed ,, 104-105.

Teton County asserts that Bums Holdings and Bums

Concrete did not effectuate a legal assignment of the Property, or of an interest in the Agreement,
or of their respective claims against Teton County because each party "retain[ed] an undivided
interest in the whole." Teton County thus ignores Idaho's law of common interests established
by Idaho Code § 55-104 ("Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right is
an interest in common ..."). That the statute applies to common interests in intangible personal
property has long been the law in Idaho. Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 447 304 P.2d 650, 654-55
(1960); In re Chase's Estate, 82 Idaho 1, 7-8, 348 P.2d 473, 476-77 (1960). Nor does the
recording of an instrument of transfer effect its validity between parties having actual knowledge
of the transfer. Farm Bureau Fin. Co. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 747, 605 P.2d 509, 511 (1980)
(when a party has actual knowledge of a prior interest, "it makes no difference whether the prior
interest was properly acknowledged and recorded.")
24.

Disputed, 106. Teton County asserts that because the Property was secured by a

deed of trust conveying title to First American Title and securing the Bank of Idaho's loan to
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Burns Concrete, "Burns Concrete did not have the legal authority to transfer ownership." But as
explained in McKay v. Walker, 160 Idaho 148, 153, 369 P.3d 926, 931 (2016): "a trustee is not
granted the right to possess the property and 'even though title passes for the purpose of the trust,
a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage with power of sale."' (Citation omitted.)
See also Idaho Code § 45-507 (establishing that for purposes of mechanic's liens, an "owner or

reputed owner does not include a trustee of a deed of trust"). Further, Trial Exhibit E (the deed
of trust) contains no restriction on the transfer of the Property by Burns Concrete.

D.

Re: Rescission.
25.

Disputed

1, 108-109.

Teton County asserts that Bums cannot rescind the

Agreement because Burns received the benefit of a zone change from C-3 to M-1 and has not
returned that benefit and restored Teton County to the status quo as it existed prior to the
Agreement. The applicable requirement in Idaho is that "[a] party seeking to rescind a contract
ordinarily must return any consideration or the benefit received by the rescinding party before
the rescission is valid." O'Connor v. Harger Const. Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 911, 188 P.3d 846, 911
(2008). For the reasons explained in paragraph 14 above, however, there is no evidence of any
conceivable benefit to Burns that it might have returned to Teton County.

E.

Re: Reliance Damages.
26.

Disputed ,: 112.

Teton County contends that Bums cannot recover expenses

incurred prior to the August 31, 2007 date of the Agreement, "because those expenses were not
made in reliance on the contract." Although Burns acknowledges there is significant authority
denying the recovery of pre-contractual expenses as reliance damages, Burns submits it should
be awarded its pre-contract expenses incurred in reliance upon the Agreement being
consummated based on the facts of this case. For as explained by the United States Court of
Federal Claims:
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Notwithstanding such authorities, courts have permitted
recovery of pre-contract expenses when the defendant knew of
such expenses. See, e.g., Coast/and Corp. v. Third Nat'/ Mortgage
Co., 611 F.2d 969, 979 (4 th Cir. 1979). Under Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 349 (1979), reliance interest includes
"expenditures made in preparation for performance." See also
Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(permitting recovery of "moneys which appellees expended in
preparation to do business" under a promised franchise); Sec. Stove
& Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo.App. 175, 51 S.W.2d
572, 577 (1932) (granting pre-contractual expenses as reliance
recovery on the ground that "[t]he whole damage ... was suffered
in contemplation of defendant performing its contract, which it
failed to do, and would not have been sustained except for the
reliance by plaintiff upon defendant to perform it").
Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 135, 161 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (emphasis added),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 407 FJd 1352, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See also DAN B. DOBBS,

LAWOFREMEDIES§ 12.3(1)(2ded.1993):
Recoupment through performance: pre-contract expenses
and fixed overhead Given an enforceable set of promises, perhaps
the most important reason for allowing recovery for some kinds of
reliance expense is that they represent a kind of partial expectancy;
they would have been recouped by the gain the plaintiff would
have made if the defendant had performed. If this is correct, it
would be perfectly sound to award the plaintiff any reasonably
proven "partial expectancy." On this basis one might justify an
award of pre-contract expenditures, even though they could not
possibly be said to have been made in reliance on a non-existent
promise. If such expenditures were directed toward a hoped-for
contract. the contract was in fact made and breached. and the
expenditures would have been recouped had it been performed. it
is difficult to see any objection to recovery. Whether it is called
"reliance expense or partial expectancy does not seem to matter
very much when enforceable, bargained-for promises were
exchanged.
Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

27.

Disputed

~

112. Although Teton County's listing of pre-contract items includes

credits at line items 2-3 of Trial Exhibit 8, it omits the additional offsetting credits for the precontract costs and expenses that are included at line items 46, 4644-4649, 4664, 4671, 51445264, 5341-5590, 5613-5862, 5886-6085, 6092-6109, 6158-6401, and 6430-6546. Additionally,
the listed expenses at line items 4687-4692, 5029, 5080-5115, 5133-5134, and 6598-6599 all
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relate to taxes, fees, or utilities that were paid after August 31, 2007 for real and personal
property dedicated for use at the Driggs facility when the taxes and fees were incurred.
Accordingly, if Burns' $1,905,344.78 damage claim supported by Trial Exhibit 8 were to be
modified to eliminate pre-contract costs and expenses, all of the offsetting credits identified
above, including those at line items 2-3, should be added back to Burns' damage claim and none
of the post-contract taxes and fees identified above should be deducted from Burns' damage
claim.
28.

Disputed , 113. Teton County contends that reliance damages are limited to

those expenditures caused by the breach. However, the measure of reliance damages under
Idaho law is set forth in Beco Construction Company, Inc. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130
Idaho 4, 936 P.3d 202 (Ct. App. 1997), as follows:
Beco sought recovery of the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in anticipation of performance of the contract with
Harper. A party aggrieved by a breach of contract may be entitled
to reimbursement for losses caused by its reliance on the contract,
even if the aggrieved party elects to rescind the contract. Brown v.
Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 915, 198, 722 P.2d
1062, 1065 (Ct. App. 1986). Reliance damages include expenses
reasonably related to the purposes of the contract which would not
have been incurred but for the contract's existence. Id. at 198-200,
722 P.2d at 1065-1067. Beco's evidence showed that it incurred
expenses in crushing and testing gravel in preparation for
performance of the asphalt contract. After a thorough review of
the record, we conclude that there was substantial competent
evidence to support the jury's verdict that Harper was obligated to
pay Beco for the crushing and testing of gravel.
Beco, 130 Idaho at 9, 936 P.2d at 207 (emphasis added).

F.

Prejudgment Interest.
29.

Disputed , 115. Teton County seeks a determination that prejudgment interest

should not be awarded. However, this Court ruled during trial at Teton County's request that the
Court would not consider the question of prejudgment interest until after judgment is entered and
any applicable post-judgment submissions are made by the parties. Tr. 351 :21-353:6.
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III. SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
30.

In the absence of the Agreement's rescission, and based on the Supreme Court's

opinion in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d 364 (2016), judgment
shall be entered against Teton County (a) establishing that it is estopped and enjoined from
rezoning the Property for so long as Burns is not in material breach of the Agreement, (b)
establishing that the 18-monh period specified in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement to construct
the Permanent Facility has been and will remain tolled until Teton County has taken all such
action within its control that is necessary for it to permit the construction of the Permanent
Facility, and (c) ordering Teton County to rescind and withdraw its revocation of Burns'
authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
31.

Quantum meruit (implied-in-fact contracts) is a measure of equitable recovery.

Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228, 232, 280 P.3d 731, 735 (2012). "An implied-in-fact contract

exists where 'there is no express agreement[,] but the conduct of the parties implies an agreement
from which an obligation in contract exists."' Id at 233 (brackets in original) (citation omitted).
"'[A]n implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract are
manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance of the
other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance."' Id. (citation
omitted). "[T]he general rule [is] as follows: 'where the conduct of the parties allows the dual
inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting party promised
payment, then the court may find a contract implied in fact.'" Id. (citation omitted).
32.

A contract-in-fact existed between Burns Concrete and Teton County based on

the following evidence established at trial: (a) the Agreement (Trial Exhibit 3) was prepared by
the Driggs city attorney, with Driggs and Teton County working together in its preparation, Tr.
236:24-237:4 & 237:23-238:5; (b) a single draft of the Agreement was prepared, which included
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all of the provisions required by Teton County, Tr. 237:5-32 & 238:6-9; (c) because the legal
descriptions attached as Exhibit "A" to the Agreement use the precise metes-and-bounds
descriptions as those used in the two deeds by which Burns Concrete acquired the Property (Trial
Exhibits 1 and 2) and expressly incorporate the recording numbers of those two deeds, the
preparer of the Agreement knew that title to the Property was held in the name of Burns
Concrete, Tr. 235:17-236:18 & 238:10-23; (d) Teton County recorded the agreement against the
Driggs site, thereby binding the Property and the parties, together with their successors and
assigns, as provided in paragraph 12.b of the Agreement, Tr. 240:3-22; (e) based on the terms in
the Agreement specifying Burns Concrete's operations and Kirk Burns' meeting with Teton
County's and Drigg's planning and zoning directors, Kurt Hibbert and Doug Self, Mr. Burns
reasonably believed when he signed the Agreement that it was binding on both Burns Concrete
and Burns Holdings, Tr. 241: 1-24; (f) paragraph 2. b(v) of the Agreement provides that "the
Developer shall erect and operate a temporary concrete batch plant on site" as depicted in the
exhibits to the Agreement; and (g) Teton County admits in paragraph 1 of its verified answer
(Trial Exhibit 6) that the Agreement was recorded "at the request of Burns Concrete."
DATED this 30th day of August 2018.
PARSONS BEHLE

TIMER

By.,,L.:.l!<___ _ __,__ _..__ _ _ _ _ _ __
Robert B. B s
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of August 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing REBUTTAL OF DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Billie Jean Siddoway
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Facsimile (208) 354-2994

0
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
~ Overnight Delivery
0 Email: bsiddo•=.,,n,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-165

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FILED IN CHAMBERS
at Idaho Falls

Bonneville Coui .
Juree O,,-\-¥{OS

Honorable
Date QC!·
Time //: t/o
Deputy Clerk
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In August 2007, Burns Holdings, LLC and Teton County executed a Development
Agreement pertaining to the use of certain real property owned by Burns Concrete, LLC, in
Teton County. Having already decided on summary judgment that Teton County breached the
Development Agreement, trial was held on the issue of damages.
Plaintiffs are awarded $1,049,250.90 in reliance damages. Plaintiffs are not entitled to
prejudgment interest.
II. PROCEDURAL IDSTORY

Burns Holdings, LLC and Burns Concrete, Inc. are Idaho entities. Kirk Burns is the CEO
and president of Burns Concrete and the sole member of Burns Holdings.
In December 2006, Burns Concrete purchased property in Teton County to build and
operate a ready-mix concrete manufacturing facility. On February 26, 2007, the County
approved a zone change of the property from C-3 (commercial) to M-1 (light industrial),
conditional on Burns Holdings entering a development agreement with the County.
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Burns Concrete's property was located within the Driggs city impact area, where Teton
County and Driggs had agreed, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-6526, that the Driggs zoning laws
would apply. Driggs zoning ordinances provided that any building or structures could not
exceed forty-five feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit (CUP).
Burns Holdings submitted a CUP application to the Teton County Board of
Commissioners, seeking permission to increase the property's height restrictions to 75 feet.
On August 31, 2007, Teton County and Burns Holdings executed "Developer's
Agreement for Burns Holdings, LLC" (Agreement).
The Agreement provides, in part:
2.
Conditions on Development: The sole use allowed and restrictions
pursuant to this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows:
a.
The property shall be used exclusively for the operation of a readymix concrete manufacturing facility.
b.
At the current time the property has been re-zoned to Ml, Light
Industrial as described in paragraph 1. Above. Part of such approval and
recommendation was based upon execution of this development agreement to
identify responsibilities and obligations pertaining to certain matters relating to
the improvement and operation of the property. This development and operation
shall be subject to the following terms and conditions, in addition to the other
terms hereof:
(i)
Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete
Manufacturing facility (a "Facility") on the property.
(ii)
All operations on the property shall comply with all
applicable and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances and laws relating to dust,
noise, water quality and air quality.
(iii)
Attached as Exhibit "B" - Site plan, and Exhibit "C" Building Elevations, and by this reference incorporated herein are plans for

construction of Developer's intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility").
(iv)
Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer
shall order and commence construction of the Permanent Facility. The
installation of the Permanent Facility shall be completed within eighteen (18)
months of execution of this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting
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from weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other
act of force majeure or action beyond Developer's control.
(v)
In order to facilitate and support the construction of the
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite commercial operations,
the Developer shall erect and operate a temporary concrete batch plant on site as
shown in Exhibit "B" - Site Plan and Exhibit "D".
(vi)
In the event that the Permanent Facility is not completed
within the time allowed herein, the County shall have the right to revoke the
authority to operate the Temporary Facility. The grant of authority of the
Temporary Facility is to allow Developer to operate Developer's business until
the Permanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate the Temporary
Facility shall terminate upon completion of the Permanent Facility even if sooner
than the described eighteen (18) month time period.

5.
Zoning Reversion Consent: The execution of this Agreement shall be
deemed written consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed by this
Agreement. No reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter
pursuant to Idaho Code §67-651 lA. Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this
Agreement and in Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached
Exhibit "A" is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends or is abandoned,
the Board of county Commissioners may, upon receiving a recommendation from
the City's governing board, order that the property will revert to the zoning
designation (and land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing
immediately prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to the
C3, Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation.

8.
Default and Remedies: In the event of a default or breach of this
Agreement or of any of its terms or conditions, the party alleging default shall
give the breaching party not less than thirty (30) days Notice of Default, in
writing, unless an emergency exists threatening the health and safety of the
public. If such an emergency exists, written notice shall be given in a reasonable
time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach. The time of the
giving of the notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of
Default. The Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default and,
where appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said default may
be satisfactorily cured. During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be
considered in default for the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the
institution of legal proceedings. If the default is cured, then no default shall exist
and the charging party shall take no further action.
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10.
Compliance with Laws: Developer agrees to comply with all federal, state,
county and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject
property. Developer's failure to comply with the above laws or the terms of this
Agreement will subject Developer to an enforcement action by the County in a
court of competent jurisdiction.
12.

Miscellaneous Provisions:

b.
The parties agree that this Agreement shall run with the land and
bind the property in perpetuity, and shall inure to the benefit of and be
enforceable by the parties, and any of their respective legal representatives, heirs,
successors, and assigns.
Ex. 3 at 2-6 (emphasis in original).
Exhibit C, attached and incorporated in the Agreement, contained elevation schematics
that showed a 75-foot tall permanent facility.
Paragraph 2.d. of the Agreement required Burns Holdings to make improvements,
including: highway and street improvements, decorative concrete block walls along property
boundaries, and landscaping.
In November 2007, Teton County denied Burns Holdings' CUP application. Burns
Holdings sought judicial review of the decision. The district court upheld the County's denial.
Burns Holdings appealed.
In January 2010, during the pendency of the appeal, Plaintiffs ceased operating the
temporary facility.
In January 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court reached its decision on the appeal, upholding
the district court on the basis that a zoning variance, rather than a conditional use permit, is
required to waive a zoning ordinance's height requirement. Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty.
Bd. of Comm 'rs, 152 Idaho 440,272 P.3d 412 (2012) (Burns/).
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Following the Supreme Court's decision in Burns L Burns Holdings applied for a zoning
variance, which Teton County denied on September 13, 2012. In order to obtain a zoning
variance, a party must prove an ''undue hardship because of characteristics of the site." LC. §
67-6516. Plaintiffs have acknowledged that the site is without problematic characteristics, which
would enable it to secure a variance under Section 67-6516.
In October 2012, Teton County sent written notice revoking Burns Holdings' authority to
operate the temporary facility.
In November 2012, Teton County sent Plaintiffs a letter demanding they remove the
Temporary Facility.
By the Quitclaim Deed, executed on May 6, 2013, Burns Concrete conveyed an undivided
50% interest in the real property to Bums Holdings.
On May 10, 2013, Plaintiffs executed an Assignment and Assumption Agreement
whereby both entities assigned to the other an undivided interest in all rights, benefits and duties
under the Agreement.
On May 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the current action, alleging causes of action for
declaratory judgment, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Teton County counterclaimed,
alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment for the removal of the Temporary
Facility.
Teton County then filed a motion for summary judgment, which this Court granted on the
basis that the denial of a zoning variance was foreseeable, making the Agreement's force
majeure clause(, 2.b.(iv)) inapplicable. This Court held that because the force majeure clause
was inapplicable, it did not excuse Burns Holdings from constructing the Permanent Facility and
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the County's revocation of Burns Holdings' right to operate the Temporary Facility was
permissible under the Agreement.
After this Court denied Burns' motion for reconsideration, Burns appealed. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that this Court erred in determining the force majeure clause did not apply.
It explained:
The clause states that it applies to "delays resulting from weather, strikes,
shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act offorce majeure or
action beyond Developer's control." (Emphasis added.) The wording "or
any other act of force majeure" could certainly be read as referring to some other
act that was of the type previously mentioned. However, the clause then states,
"or action beyond Developer's control." That shows that the "action beyond
Developer's control" was something other than the type of acts that were
previously mentioned in the clause as being an act of force majeure. The County's
conduct certainly constitutes an action beyond the Developer's control.

Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton Cty., 161 Idaho 117, 120--21, 384 P.3d 364, 367-68 (2016), reh'g
denied (Dec. 6, 2016) (Burns II).
After remand and on motion for summary judgment prior to trial, this Court held that
Teton County breached the Agreement by:
•

not providing Plaintiffs with a Notice of Default or opportunity to cure; and

•

ordering Plaintiffs to cease operations of the Temporary Facility and demanding its
removal.

This Court also held on summary judgment that:
•

plaintiffs may recover reliance damages based on Teton County's breach of contract;
and

•

plaintiffs could not rescind the contract as a matter of law.

Trial was held on March 7-9 and May 11, 2018, on the issue of damages.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 6

Page 211

III. ISSUES
A.

May Burns Concrete, as well as Burns Holdings, recover damages under the
Development Agreement?

B.

What reliance damages, if any, are Plaintiffs entitled to?

C.

What damages based on the loss of property use, if any, are Plaintiffs entitled to?

D.

Are Plaintiffs entitled to prejudgment interest?
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
In early 2006, Kirk Bums met with Kurt Hibbert, Teton County's planning and zoning

director, and Doug Self, Driggs' planning and zoning director, in consultation about where to
construct a concrete batch plant. Hibbert and Self pointed Kirk Bums to the property (two
separate parcels), which Bums Concrete ultimately purchased in December 2006. Bums
Concrete purchased the property, rather than Bums Holdings, because it was easier for Bums
Concrete to obtain the financing.
Following Teton County's approval of the zone change and during negotiations over the
Agreement's terms, Bums Construction began making certain improvements to Highway 33 and
the site and began to assemble the temporary facility on the site. From the date of the zone
change on February 27, 2007, Teton County did or should have foreseen the large expenditures
plaintiffs made in constructing a temporary batch plant and making the road and site
improvements.
Exhibit A to the Agreement contains the legal descriptions of the two parcels purchased
by Bums Concrete. Exhibit A also references the Teton County recording numbers of the two
warranty deeds. Those warranty deeds indicate Bums Concrete owned the properties. While the
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Agreement was executed in the name of Burns Holdings, Teton County was or should have been
aware that Burns Concrete owned the property.
Plaintiffs cannot construct the permanent facility, as shown in the Agreement, without an
amendment to the ordinances of Teton County. The construction of a 45-foot tall permanent
facility would not be economically feasible due to exorbitant maintenance and operation costs.
Burns Concrete made an incremental profit every year it operated the temporary facility.
Burns Concrete's decision to cease operations in 2010 was based, at least in part, on the
existence of an unfavorable environment in Teton County, created by the actions of the Teton
County Board of Commissioners.
If Burns Concrete had been able to continue operating the temporary facility it would
have made incremental profits every year from 2010 on. Burns Concrete's revenues would have
permitted it to recover its costs over time, pay off all of its debt and produced a net income by
2017.
As illustrated in Exhibit 8, Burns Concrete's financial records show net expenditures of
$1,905,344.78 from December 2006 through the date of trial. Allen Barger, Burns Concrete's
controller, created Exhibit 8. In order to create Exhibit 8, Barger sifted through thousands of
invoices, payments and other financial documents. Often, only a portion of any given invoice or
payment was attributable to the Driggs facility, as opposed to other Burns Concrete sites.
Barger's efforts to compile Exhibit 8 required him to work with both Kirk Burns and Burns
Concrete's attorney and took one year to complete.
This Court accepts the majority of those expenses shown on Exhibit 8 as legitimately
incurred in reliance on the Agreement. However, this Court finds that several categories of
expenditures were not sufficiently proven or were not incurred in reliance on the Agreement.
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The evidence in the record does not indicate how expenditures described as "travel"
were incurred. Plaintiffs did not persuade the Court that travel expenses were reasonable or were
incurred in reliance on the Agreement.
The record does not establish how each of the line entries for "Legal Expenses" was
incurred. Plaintiffs did not persuade the Court that the claimed legal expenses were incurred in
reliance on the Agreement.
Plaintiffs' lost and were unable to recover the records verifying the cost of consumables
labeled as ''truck alloc" on Exhibit 8. This Court finds those charges to be speculative and does
not include them in damages.
Costs incurred to prepare presentations to Teton County for a CUP or zone variance were
made for the purpose of complying with land use statutes and ordinances and are not attributable
to reliance on the Agreement.
Burns Concrete's estimate of costs related to demobilization, as included in Exhibit 8, are
reasonable.
Burns Concrete incurred $1,461,393.53 in expenditures made in reasonable reliance on
the Agreement.

1

Burns Concrete received compensation in the amount of $625,420.77 made from sales
out of the temporary facility.
In addition to the $1,461,393.53 in expenditures mentioned above, Burns Concrete
incurred another $213,053.82 in costs of sales.

V. STATEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

For the sake of clarity, this Court notes that in calculating this amount it reviewed each line
item in Exhibit 8. Where the Court eliminated certain claimed expenditures for reasons
discussed above, it also eliminated any corresponding credit (where applicable).
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A. Teton County is liable to both Plaintiffs for its breach of the Agreement.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that covenants running with the land "may be
enforced by one other than a party to them where the original parties intended that the
restrictions should benefit the land of the person claiming the right of enforcement." Sun Valley

Ctr.for Arts & Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 411,413,690 P.2d 346,348
(1984).
Land use covenants may run with the land, and the primary characteristic of a
covenant running with the land is that both liability upon it and enforceability of it
pass with the transfer of the estate. Thus, a covenant that runs with the land may
be enforced against the party who bears the burden of the covenant by the party
who receives the benefit of the burden, the buyer, or the current owner of the
land. In fact, all grantors, back to and including the original grantor-covenantor,
become liable upon the breach thereof to the assignee or grantee in possession or
entitled to the possession at the time.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Etc.§ 119.
Paragraph 12.b. of the Agreement indicates that it "shall run with the land and bind the
property in perpetuity, and shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the parties, and any
of their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns." (Emphasis added).
Burns Concrete owned the property designated in Exhibit A to the Agreement. The Agreement
clearly indicates that its terms applied to both Burns Holdings, as signatory to the Agreement,
and to Burns Concrete, as owner of the property.
Furthermore, since 2013, both Burns Holdings and Burns Concrete have an equal interest
in the real property. Both Plaintiffs have assigned to each other an undivided interest their
respective claims in this action.
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Teton County is liable to both Bums Holdings and Bums Concrete for breach of the
Agreement. 2
B. This Court has already held, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs are not entitled to
rescission of the Agreement.

Plaintiffs argue that the Agreement should be rescinded. This Court has already
determined that rescission is not available as a matter oflaw. February 12, 2018, Memorandum
Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Motion in Limine, p. 17. This determination
was based on the fact that Plaintiffs received the benefit of a zone change to light industrial and
that the value of that benefit had not been tendered back to Teton County. 3
The issue of rescission was not before this Court at trial and will not be reopened now.
C. Plaintiffs are awarded $1,049,250.90 in reliance damages.

Plaintiffs do not attempt to establish expectation damages for Teton County's breach of
contract, but ask for reliance damages.
Evidence of damages "is sufficient if it proves the damages with reasonable
certainty." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162,
1167 (2009). "[R]easonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance
nor mathematical exactitude." Id. However, ''the factfinder may not determine
damages by mere speculation and guesswork, and there must be a reasonable
foundation established by the evidence from which the factfinder can calculate the
amount of damages." Pope v. Intermountain Gas, Co., 103 Idaho 217, 234, 646
P.2d 988, 1005 (1982). "Damage awards based upon speculation and conjecture
will not be allowed." Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington
2

Plaintiffs also argue their status as a joint venture makes Teton County liable to both of them.
This Court need not address that argument in light of its conclusion that the Agreement runs with
the land and applies equally to both Plaintiffs.
3
Although Plaintiffs have urged this Court to find that they did not benefit from the zone change,
such a finding would be inconsistent with other findings made by this Court. Plaintiffs made
incremental profits from 2007 through 2010. Had they continued in operation, they would have
paid off all debt and recognize a net profit by 2017. Additionally, Teton County residents were
impacted by Plaintiffs operations. Such impact would have included noise and an increase in
heavy machinery traffic. Plaintiffs clearly benefitted from the zone change and the ability to
operate the temporary facility. The value of that benefit has not been returned to Teton County.
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Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249, 257, 985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999) (citing Rindlisbaker v.
Wilson, 95 Idaho 752,519 P.2d 421 (1974)).
Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 355,361,386 P.3d 496,502 (2016), reh'g
denied (Jan. 9, 2017).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained what measure of damages is available for
breach of contract:
[I]n general, when a contract has been breached, the aggrieved party may seek
compensation for infringement upon any of three separate interests embodied in
the contract.
Judicial remedies ... serve to protect one or more of the following interests
of [one who has been promised performance under a contract]:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not been made, or
(c) his ''restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1979) ....
Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 198-200, 722 P.2d 1062,
1065--67 (Ct. App. 1986).
"Reliance damages include expenses reasonably related to the purposes of the contract
which would not have been incurred but for the contract's existence." Beco Const. Co. v. Harper
Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 9,936 P.2d 202,207 (Ct. App. 1997).
Restatement (Third) Restitution§ 38 provides:
(1) As an alternative to damages based on the expectation interest (Restatement
Second, Contracts § 347), a plaintiff who is entitled to a remedy for material
breach or repudiation may recover damages measured by the cost or value of the
plaintiff's performance.
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(2) Performance-based damages are measured by
(a) uncompensated expenditures made in reasonable reliance on the
contract, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in
performance, less any loss the defendant can prove with reasonable certainty
the plaintiff would have suffered had the contract been performed
(Restatement Second, Contracts § 349); or
(b) the market value of the plaintiff's uncompensated contractual
performance, not exceeding the price of such performance as determined by
reference to the parties' agreement.
(3) A plaintiff whose damages are measured by the rules of subsection (2) may
also recover for any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused
by the breach.
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ 38 (2011). Comment b, Illustration
2 to § 38 elucidates:
The United States induces Investors to acquire and recapitalize a failing savings
and loan association, in exchange for a promise of favorable tax and accounting
treatment for the next 30 years. After the agreement has been performed on both
sides for 10 years, Congress enacts a statute making further performance illegal.
In subsequent litigation, this legislation is held to constitute a repudiation and
material breach of contract on the part of the United States. Because the ultimate
value of the promised regulatory treatment is unknowable, Investors cannot
recover expectation damages. Because the benefits conferred on either side cannot
be restored, the contract is not subject to rescission(§§ 37, 54). Because the value
to the United States of Investors' performance in acquiring and recapitalizing the
savings and loan is likewise unknowable, the case does not lend itself to
measurement of damages by the rule of§ 38(2)(b). On the other hand, Investors
can show that they spent $100 million in performing their contractual obligations,
while the United States can show that Investors received compensation valued at
$30 million, in the form of regulatory relief as stipulated by the contract, before
performance was interrupted. Investors may recover $70 million in damages by
the rule of§ 38(2)(a).
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ 38, cmt. b, ill. 2 (2011).
Section 349 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts similarly provides:
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347 [pertaining to
expectation interest], the injured party has a right to damages based on his
reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or
in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable
certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 (1981) (emphasis added).
Teton County argues that Plaintiffs cannot claim expenditures made prior to the
Agreement's execution on August 31, 201 7, because such expenses were not made in reliance on
the Agreement.
Plaintiffs respond that under the facts of this case, expenses were incurred in reliance on
the contract prior to the contract's execution and should be included in the damages calculation.
Plaintiffs cite Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 135, 161 (2002), in support of
its position that pre-contract expenses should be permitted.
In Westfed, the United States Court of Federal Claims noted that many jurisdictions do
not permit a plaintiff to recover pre-contractual expenditures. It then explained:
Notwithstanding such authorities, courts have permitted recovery of pre-contract
expenses when the defendant knew of such expenses. See, e.g., Coast/and Corp.
v. Third Nat'/ Mortgage Co., 611 F.2d 969, 979 (4th Cir.1979).
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 (1979), reliance interest includes
"expenditures made in preparation for performance." See also Goodman v.
Dicker, 169 F.2d 684,685 (D.C.Cir.1948) (permitting recovery of"moneys which
appellees expended in preparation to do business" under a promised
franchise); Sec. Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo.App. 175, 51
S.W.2d 572, 577 (1932) (granting pre-contractual expenses as reliance recovery
on the ground that "[t]he whole damage ... was suffered in contemplation of
defendant performing its contract, which it failed to do, and would not have been
sustained except for the reliance by plaintiff upon defendant to perform it") .
. . .[T]he Federal Circuit has focused less on when the contract was executed and
more on whether the damage was foreseeable:
In order to .. . [recover] ... reliance damages ... plaintiffs loss must have
been foreseeable to the party in breach at the time of contract formation ....
"Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it
follows from the breach (a) in the ordinary course of events, or (b) as a
result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that
the party in breach had reason to know." In order to be entitled to reliance
damages, a plaintiff must prove that both the magnitude and type of
damages were foreseeable .... [To be foreseeable] ''the injury that occurs
must be one of such a kind and amount as a prudent man would have
realized to be a probable result of his breach."
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Landmark Land Co. v. United States, 256 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .
. . . [C]ourts have recognized and applied the Restatement concept of recovering
reliance interest that includes preparation to perform in the Winstar context. See,
e.g., Glendale, 239 F.3d at 1383 ("A party may recover expenses of preparation of
part performance, as well as other foreseeable expenses incurred in reliance upon
the contract. ... [T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his reliance
interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in
performance") (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Glass v.
United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 316, 326 (2000) (permitting recovery of accounting and
legal fees expended in preparation for merger), vacated in part on other
grounds, 258 F.3d 1349 (Fed.Cir.2001).
Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 135, 162 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also taken the approach that reliance damages may include
expenses incurred before the parties reach an agreement. In French v. Nabob SilverLead Co., 82 Idaho 120,350 P.2d 206 (1960), the plaintiff negotiated a lease extension with
defendants. As part of negotiations, defendants notified plaintiff that it would be unable to
supply compressed air to him as it had in the past. Throughout contract negotiations, plaintiff
consulted with defendants regarding his efforts to construct an airline and how the timing of that
completion might affect the lease. Plaintiff constructed the airline before the lease agreement
was executed. After defendants breached the contract, plaintiff sought damages based on his
costs in constructing the airline. The trial court denied plaintiff damages. On appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court reversed, explaining: "The airline was built in anticipation of a new lease in
accordance with the suggestion of respondent's officers. Expenses incurred by a party in
anticipation of or preparation for performance of a contract may be recovered as damages in an
action for a breach thereof." French v. Nabob Silver-Lead Co., 82 Idaho 120,128,350 P.2d 206,
210 (1960).
In this case, Teton County approved a zone change of the property from commercial to
light industrial on February 26, 2007. That zone change was conditioned on Bums Holdings
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entering a development agreement. Subsequent to that date, the parties began to negotiate the
terms of the Agreement. A majority of Plaintiffs' claimed expenditures, which occurred
subsequent to February 26, 2007 and prior to August 31, 2007, were incurred in making
improvements to Highway 33 (as required under the Agreement), grading the site, and relocating
and assembling the "Johnson Ross" plant for use as the temporary facility. Teton County
foresaw both the magnitude and type of these expenditures. This Court is not convinced,
however, that Teton County did or could have foreseen Plaintiffs' expenditures, which arose
prior to the zone change made on February 26, 2007. Plaintiffs' expenditures, incurred in
preparation for Plaintiffs' performance under the Agreement, shall be permitted from February
26, 2007, onward.
Plaintiffs should be awarded $1,049,250.90 in reliance damages, calculated as follows:
$1,461,393.53 (expenditures made in reasonable reliance on the Agreement) - $625,196.45
(compensation received by Plaintiffs through sales)+ $213,053.82 (cost of sales). Teton County
did not establish Plaintiffs would have suffered losses entitling them to an additional offset.
D. Plaintiffs are not awarded damages based on loss of property use.

Plaintiffs request damages based on loss of use of the property. They cite the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 348( 1), which provides: "If a breach delays the use of
property and the loss in value to the injured party is not proved with reasonable certainty, he may
recover damages based on the rental value of the property or on interest on the value of the
property." Similarly, Idaho Code§ 6-1601(3) allows for the recovery of"objectively verifiable
monetary loss, including ... loss of use of property."
Teton County argues that this Court should not consider damages under§ 348(1) because
Plaintiffs did not raise this issue prior to or during trial.
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Assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiffs' delay in asserting loss of use damages
has not prejudiced Teton County, Plaintiffs are nonetheless precluded from loss of use damages
based on the lack of supporting evidence.
No evidence was produced at trial regarding the property's rental value.
Plaintiffs were not prevented from operating the temporary facility until at least 2010.
Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence at trial regarding the property's value in the years 20102013, 2015 or 2016. Between 2009 and 2014, the property's appraised value dropped from
$1,200,000 to $300,000. Given the huge decrease in value between 2009 and 2014, this Court
cannot reach any conclusions regarding property value in 2010, 2011, 2012, or 2013. Similarly,
the Court cannot determine what the property value was in 2015 or 2016. Without evidence of
the property's value during those years, any estimation of interest on the value of the property is
speculative.
E. Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.

"An award of prejudgment interest by a trial court is reviewed for abuse of discretion."
Silver Creek Seed, LLC v. Sunrain Varieties, LLC, 161 Idaho 270,275,385 P.3d 448,453
(2016).
Idaho statutory law, Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award
of prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law likewise
calls for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust enrichment. Jones v.
Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Ct.App.1987). Under either
the
statute
or
the
equitable
remedy
of unjust
enrichment,
however, prejudgment interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated
or readily ascertainable by mathematical process. Id; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho
702, 706, 727 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct.App.1986). This limitation is based upon
"equitable considerations," Farm Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920,
478 P.2d 298,300 (1970), which presumably include the notion that a person who
could not determine the amount owed should not be charged interest on the sum
that is ultimately found to be due. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 654 (1988).
However, "where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of
ascertainment by mere mathematical processes" interest is allowed from a time
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prior to judgment, "for in that event the interest in fully compensating the
injured party predominates over other equitable considerations." Farm Dev.
Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 900, 452 P.2d 993, 1004
(1969)). See also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 814,
919 P.2d 334, 343 (1996); Davis v. Prof/ Bus. Serv., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 817,
712 P.2d 511,518 (1985); Child, 111 Idaho at 706--07, 727 P.2d at 897-98.
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages
''unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without
incurring interest expense
by
disputing
and
litigating any
claim,
and prejudgment interest would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc. v.
Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751, 682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct.App.1984). See
also Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 235, 506 P.2d 455, 462 (1972). Rather,
damages are unascertainable where some factor necessary to calculate the
amount ofdamages must be determined by a trier offact. Conversely:
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed,
makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance
upon opinion or discretion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a
fixed sum, claims for money had and received, claims for money paid out,
and claims for goods or services to be paid for at an agreed rate.
Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d 555,
561 n. 2 (Ct.App.1993), a.ffd, 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994). There need be
no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justify the award
of prejudgment interest. Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at
300; Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323, 326
(Ct.App.1992).

Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276-77, 178 P.3d 639, 641-42 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added).

When parties dispute what costs were incurred and what the value of those costs are,
damages are not liquidated or readily ascertainable until the trier of fact determines, which of the
claimed amounts is reasonable. Bouten Const. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 763,
992 P.2d 751, 758 (1999). In Beco Const. Co. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 11-12,
936 P.2d 202, 209-10 (Ct. App. 1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals denied prejudgment interest
because "[t]he amount of gravel that [plaintiff] crushed ... was not a known or agreed upon
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amount prior to trial; hence, the mathematical product of the amount of gravel multiplied by the
cost of crushing the gravel was not ascertainable prior to the deliberations of the jury").
The fact that the damages became mathematically ascertainable after the jury
decided, in light of conflicting evidence, which numbers were relevant does not
render the damages mathematically ascertainable within the meaning of Idaho
Code § 28-22-104(1 ). If it were otherwise, damages would be "mathematically
ascertainable" in every case in which the trier of fact ultimately determines the
relevant numbers and then calculates the award based on those numbers. This
result would be contrary to Idaho law.

Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2003).
In order to determine the amount of its claimed damages, Barger had to go through
thousands of invoices and payments with the help of Kirk Burns and an attorney. Barger also
had to determine what portion of these expenses was attributable to the Teton County facility.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs had to persuade this Court that the expenditures submitted in evidence
were occurred in reliance on the Agreement. This Court found some of the expenditures were
made in reliance on the Agreement and others were not. Teton County could not have
ascertained the amount of damages prior to trial and this Court's determination of damages.
Consequently, prejudgment interest on damages is not available in this case.

VI. ORDER
Plaintiffs are jointly awarded $1,049,250.90 in reliance damages based on Teton
County's breach of the Agreement.
Plaintiffs are not awarded prejudgment interest.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

3

day of

c::'.'.\-:k
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this__!}_ day of October, 2018, I did send a true and correct
copy of the aforementioned Order upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered.
Robert Burns
Parsons Behle and Latimer
800 West Main St. Ste. 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Bille Siddoway
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 North Main, Ste. 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422
Mary Lou Hansen
Clerk of the District Court
Teton County, Idaho

DeputyQ-!A/
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Electronically Filed
10/25/2018 4:53 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Mary Lou Hansen, Clerk of the Court
By: Susan Hill, Deputy Clerk

Robert B. Burns, ISB #3744
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
rburns@parsonsbehle.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation,
and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.

Case No. CV-2013-165
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
AMENDED AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, Inc. (“Burns Concrete”) and Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly
with Burns Concrete, “Plaintiffs”) submit this supporting memorandum for Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Amended and Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which is being filed
concurrently herewith.

This memorandum hereby incorporates by reference the evidence,

citations to the record, findings, and conclusions stated in the following documents on file in this
matter:


Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed August 24, 2018
(“Plaintiffs’ PF&C”);
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Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed August 24, 2018
(“Defendant’s PF&C”);



Rebuttal of Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Supplemental Proposed Conclusions of Law, filed August 31, 2018 (“Plaintiffs’
Supplemental Proposed Conclusions”); and



This Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed October 4, 2018 (“Findings
& Conclusions”).
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
As provided in I.R.C.P. 52(b): “On a party’s motion filed no later than 14 days after the

entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings, or make additional findings, and may
amend the judgment accordingly.” This motion is timely as no judgment has yet been entered in
this case.
The purpose of findings of fact and conclusions of law and the result of a trail court’s
failure to make all required findings is explained in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho
217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982):
When the court sits at the trier of fact, it is charged with the
duty of preparing findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of the decision which it reaches. The purpose behind
requiring the court to “find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon” is to afford the appellate court a
clear understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision, so that
it might be determined whether the trial court applied the proper
law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment in the
case. The absence of findings and conclusions may be disregarded
by the appellate court only where the record is clear, and yields an
obvious answer to the relevant question. Absent such
circumstances, the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law concerning the material issues arising from
the pleadings, upon which proof is offered, will necessitate a
reversal of the judgment and a remand for additional findings and
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conclusions, unless such findings and conclusions would not affect
the judgment entered . . . .”
Id. at 225, 646 P.2d at 996 (internal and concluding citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Additionally, “[i]ssues presented to the trial court for resolution must be resolved. Owen v.
Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31, 35, 624 P.2d 413, 417 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also
id. at 36, 624 P.2d at 418 (“if it appears that an issue was before the lower court but that court
failed to make the mandatory findings thereon as required by Rule 52(a), the case normally will
be remanded with directions that the appropriate findings be made.”).
On appeal the Supreme Court “examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact
are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Evidence is regarded as substantial if a
reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point
of fact has been proven.” Kemmer v. Newman, 161 Idaho 463, 466, 387 P.3d 131, 134 (2016)
(citations omitted). And where there is no evidence in the record to support a finding, the
finding is reversed. Id. at 468, 387 P.3d at 136; Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho 839, 847, 405 P.3d
1180, 1188 (2017).
II. AMENDED AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
This Court correctly found that “Burns Concrete made an incremental profit every year it
operated the temporary facility.” Findings & Conclusions 8. However, this finding should be
clarified and augmented by an additional finding that incremental profits are determined before
consideration of the cost of debt service and other sunk costs. Plaintiffs’ PF&C ¶¶ 98, 99(g) &
100. See also concurring trial testimony of Teton County’s expert Rick Hoffman at Trial
Transcript 552:4-9 & 582:8-17. The Court’s foregoing finding should also be clarified and
augmented by an additional finding that, after debt service and other sunk costs are considered,
the temporary facility lost money. Plaintiffs’ PF&C ¶¶ 37 & 72; Defendant’s PF&C ¶¶ 75-76,
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87 & 96. There is no controverting testimony or documentary evidence in the record with
1

respect to either of these requested additional findings.

Although “[t]his Court accept[ed] the majority of those expenses shown on Exhibit 8 as
legitimately incurred in reliance on the Agreement,” Findings & Conclusions 8, the Court made
no findings with respect to the accuracy of the information presented in Trial Exhibit 8 and its
multiple columns. See Plaintiffs’ PF&C ¶¶ 39-50. This Court’s findings with respect to the
accuracy of the referenced information is essential to determining both Plaintiffs’ right to recover
prejudgment interest and/or interest for the loss of use of Plaintiffs’ property, should the
Supreme Court reverse this Court’s conclusions regarding these two questions of law. See Owen
v. Boydstun, supra. Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request this Court to make the additional
findings just referenced.
Finally, this Court identified none of the line items reflecting charges and corresponding
credits that the Court eliminated based on its review of Trial Exhibit 8.
Conclusions 9.

See Findings &

The absence of such findings renders the appellate court incapable of

determining “whether the trial court applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its
ultimate judgment in the case.” Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., supra. Plaintiffs therefore
respectfully request this Court to also make additional findings with respect to which specific
line items were eliminated and the factual basis for their elimination.
1 This Court also correctly found that “Burns Concrete received compensation in the

amount of $625,420.77 made from sales out of the temporary facility. . . [and] incurred another
$213,053,82 in cost of sales.” Findings & Conclusions 9. However, as reflected in Trial
Exhibit 7, from which both the quoted sales and costs of sales were derived, Burns Concrete also
incurred costs in operating the temporary facility for equipment and plant, uncollected
receivables, labor costs, and fuel costs. And as the testimony cited in the above paragraph
establishes, after debt service and other sunk costs are considered, the undisputed testimony at
trial was that the temporary facility lost money. Indeed, Trial Exhibit 7 itself reflects a net loss.
Thus, there is no testimony or documentary evidence in the record to support this Court’s finding
that Burns Concrete made money operating the temporary facility.
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III. AMENDED AND ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS LAW
This Court concluded that rescission of the Developer’s Agreement at issue (the
“Agreement”) “is not available as a matter of law. . . . based on the fact that Plaintiffs received
the benefit of a zone change to light industrial and that the value of that benefit had not been
tendered back to Teton County.” Findings & Conclusions 11. The stated bases for the Court’s
conclusion are (i) “Plaintiffs made incremental profits from 2007 through 2010” and (ii) “Teton
County residents were impacted by Plaintiffs operations.”

Id. at 11 n.3.

However,

notwithstanding the uncontested fact that Burns Concrete made incremental profits in each year
the temporary facility operated, the undisputed evidence at trial established that Burns Concrete
suffered a net loss from its operations after debt service and other sunk costs are considered. In
addition, of course, this Court found that Plaintiffs incurred $1,049,250.90 in reliance damages.
Id. at 16. Moreover, not only is there no evidence in the record that the local residents were
impacted by Burns Concrete’s operations, but any such impact that might have occurred would
not constitute a benefit to Plaintiffs. Thus, there is no substantial and competent evidence in the
record supporting a finding that Plaintiffs have in any manner benefitted from the Agreement.
Therefore, based on the points and authorities set forth in paragraphs 108-17 of Plaintiffs’
PF&C, Plaintiffs request this Court to reconsider its conclusion that rescission of the Agreement
is not available as a matter of law and establish Plaintiffs’ right to rescind, should they elect to do
so.

2

This Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ $1,461,393.53 in reliance damages should be
reduced by the difference between the $625,196.45 in the sales at the temporary facility and the
2 I.R.C.P. 11.2(b) provides, in relevant part: “A motion to reconsider any order of the

trial court entered before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after
the entry of a final judgment.” As also noted above, no final judgment has yet been entered in
this case.
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$213,053.82 in the cost of sales. As discussed in note 1 supra, however, Burns Concrete also
incurred costs in operating the temporary facility for equipment and plant, uncollected
receivables, labor costs, fuel costs, and debt service, with the undisputed evidence at trial
establishing that the temporary facility lost money, not made it. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request
this Court to reconsider its conclusion that Plaintiffs’ reliance damages of $1,461,393.53 should
be further reduced.
This Court concluded that “prejudgment interest on damages is not available in this case”
because “Teton county could not have ascertained the amount of damages prior to trial and this
Court’s determination of damages.” Findings & Conclusions 19. However, neither the amount
nor date of payment of any of those line items of costs reflected in Trial Exhibit 8 for which the
Court awarded reliance damages was disputed by Teton County. And as the authority quoted by
this Court establishes, “‘where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment
by mere mathematical processes’ interest is allowed from a time prior to judgment, ‘for in that
event the interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over other equitable
considerations.’” Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276-77, 178 P.3d 639, 641-42 (Ct. App. 2007)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
As further explained by the Court of Appeals in Ross, “[t]he mere fact that a claim is
disputed or litigated does not render damages ‘unascertainable,’” and that “claims for money
paid out” are an example of a liquidated claim “if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed,
makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or
3

discretion.” Id. at 277, 178 P.3d at 642 (emphasis added).

3 Our Supreme Court adopted and applied the foregoing requirement in Huber v.

Lightforce USA, Incorporated, 159 Idaho 833, 367 P.3d 228 (2016):
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The Court of Appeals in Ross also decided the question of whether prejudgment interest
is obtainable on those particular components of a claim that are liquidated or ascertainable, “or
whether the entire award is made unascertainable when any portion of it is unliquidated.” Id. at
278, 178 P.3d at 643. The court in Ross explained its ruling as follows in deciding this question:
In a number of prior opinions, we have examined discrete parts of
the total damages award to determine if prejudgment interest was
appropriate on those portions. For example, in Child [v. Blaser],
111 Idaho 702, 727 P.2d 893, the plaintiff was awarded damages
for the lost value of lots after the defendant breached an agreement
to complete the subdivision.
The court also ordered
reimbursement for taxes and water assessments that the plaintiff
had paid. We determined that the value of the lots was not easily
ascertainable because it required the trial court to sift through
conflicting expert testimony and differing theories of recovery, but
that prejudgment interest was owed on the amounts expended for
taxes and water assessments because the dates and amounts of
those expenditures were not disputed. Similarly, we approved
prejudgment interest on discrete portions of a larger damages
award, in Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.
App. 1989) and Bergkamp v. Carrico, 108 Idaho 476, 700 P.2d 98
(Ct. App. 1985). We have been cited to no authority, and have
found none, disallowing prejudgment interest on a liquidated
component of a larger damages award, and we perceive no reason
for a rule that would deprive a claimant of prejudgment interest on
a plainly liquidated claim merely because he or she also pressed an
entirely separate, unliquidated claim in the same litigation.
In the present case, the amounts of Rick’s three checks
applied toward the purchase of the property and his payments for
improvements on the property were readily ascertainable.
Compare Davis [v. Prof’l Bus. Serv., Inc.], 109 Idaho at 817, 712
P.2d at 518 (award of prejudgment interest affirmed where, “[I]n
calculating plaintiff's damages . . . all the district court had to do
was add up the amount of the checks.”). See also Dillon [v.
Montgomery], 138 Idaho at 618, 67 P.3d at 97 (contract set forth
procedure for ascertaining damages, and all the parties needed to
do was add up the figures); McGill v. Lester, 108 Idaho 561, 700
P.2d 964 (Ct. App. 1985) (reimbursement for funds paid in an
“[D]amages are unascertainable where some factor necessary to calculate the
amount of damages must be determined by a trier of fact.” Ross v. Ross, 145
Idaho 274, 277, 178 P.3d 639, 642 (Ct.App. 2007). Contrastingly, “[a] claim is
liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to
compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion.”
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Huber, 159 Idaho at 845 n.6, 367 P.3d at 240 (emphasis added).
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attempt to purchase property were ascertainable by mathematical
computation). These claims did not become unascertainable
merely because Rick also claimed, in the same complaint,
unliquidated claims of compensation for his labor.
Ross, 145 Idaho at 278, 178 P.3d at 643 (emphasis added).
Additionally, our Supreme Court confirmed its earlier holdings that prejudgment interest
on the component costs incurred by a plaintiff is awardable when rescission is granted in Benz v.
D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167 (2012):
In Sorensen v. Larue, 47 Idaho 772, 278 P. 1016 (1929), we
held that “[w]hen rescission is granted the vendee, he is entitled
not only to a return of so much of the purchase money as he has
paid, but to interest thereon from time of payment.” Id. at 778, 278
P. at 1018. We also held that the purchaser may recover “the
amount of his necessary outlays, taxes, etc., incurred under the
contract, with interest.” Id. at 778-79, 278 P. at 1018. In Brooks v.
Jensen, 75 Idaho 201, 270 P.2d 425 (1954), we held that upon
rescission of a real estate contract, the purchasers were entitled to
recover “the payments on the contract and mortgage, taxes paid,
and water assessments . . . and the value of the improvements they
made, less the reasonable rental value of the land.” Id. at 218, 270
P.2d at 437 (citations omitted).
Benz, 152 Idaho at 229, 268 P.3d at 1181 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, whether or not the Agreement is rescinded, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
prejudgment interest on those components of their damages claim set forth on an item-by-item
basis in Trial Exhibit 8 that are liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical
processes. Plaintiffs therefore request this Court to reconsider its conclusion that prejudgment
interest is not available and to establish Plaintiffs’ right to prejudgment interest for those line
items of costs reflected in Trial Exhibit 8 for which the Court awarded reliance damages.
Finally, as requested in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Proposed Conclusions,
and based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho
117, 384 P.3d 364 (2016), this Court is requested to adopt an additional conclusion of law that,
in the absence of the Agreement’s rescission, Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment (a) establishing
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that Teton County is estopped and enjoined from rezoning the subject real property for so long as
Plaintiffs are not in material breach of the Agreement, (b) establishing that the 18-month period
specified in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement to construct the permanent facility has been and
will remain tolled until Teton County has taken all such action within its control that is necessary
for it to permit the construction of the permanent facility, and (c) ordering Teton County to
rescind and withdraw its revocation of Plaintiffs’ authority to operate the temporary facility.
DATED this 25th day of October 2018.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

By

/s/ Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Burns
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PAINTIFFS’ MOTION - 9
21813.001\4822-4020-3129v1

Page 234

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of October 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Billie Jean Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Telephone: (208) 354-2990
Facsimile: (208) 354-2994
Email: bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us
lblake@co.teton.id.us

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant

/s/ Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Burns
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)

Case No. CV-2013-165
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In August 2007, Burns Holdings, LLC and Teton County executed a Development
Agreement pertaining to the use of certain real property owned by Burns Concrete, LLC, in
Teton County. Under the terms of the Agreement, Burns Holdings was required to immediately
commence construction of a permanent facility for concrete production. The Agreement granted
Burns Holdings 18 months to complete construction "subject to delays resulting from weather,
strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act of force majeure or action
beyond Developer's control." Plaintiffs were unable to obtain the zoning variance necessary to
construct the permanent facility, but quickly constructed and began operating a temporary
facility. After the 18-month period for construction of the permanent facility had passed, Teton
County demanded Plaintiffs remove the temporary facility and sought to revert the property to its
previous zoning.
Plaintiffs then filed this case. This Court entered summary judgment in favor of Teton
County, holding that the force majeure clause, quoted above, did not excuse Plaintiffs' failure to
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construct the permanent facility within 18 months. Plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court reversed this Court, finding the force majeure clause applied to toll the 18-month
period, and remanded the case to this Court. On remand, this Court entered summary judgment

in favor of Plaintiffs, finding that Teton County breached the Development Agreement by
ordering Plaintiffs to cease operating the temporary facility and demanding its removal and by
not providing Plaintiffs with Notice of Default or opportunity to cure.
Trial was held on the issue of damages on March 7-9 and May 11, 2018. This Court
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (FOFCOL), awarding Plaintiffs $1,049,250.90
in reliance damages, but denying prejudgment interest.
Plaintiffs now move this Court to amend its FOFCOL.
Plaintiffs' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A. Motion to Amend FOFCOL
The Court reviews a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion
to amend_ findings or to grant a new trial for abuse of discretion. Be/st/er v.
Sheler, 151 Idaho 819, 823, 264 P.3d 926, 930 (2011); Lanham v. Idaho Power
Co., 130 Idaho 486, 497-98, 943 P.2d 912, 923-24 (1997).
The test for whether a trial court has abused its discretien is three-fold: (1)
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.

Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd, 127 Idaho 565, 573, 903 P.2d 730, 738
(1995).
Nw. Farm Credit Servs., FLCA v. Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC, 156 Idaho 758, 764-65, 331 P.3d
500, 506-07 (2014).
When the court sits as the trier of fact, it is charged with the duty of preparing
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the decision which it reaches.
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I.R.C.P. 52(a). Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 560 P.2d 861 (1977);
Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 572 P.2d 861 (1977). The purpose behind
requiring the court to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon" is to afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis
of the trial court's decision, so that it might be determined whether the trial court
applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment in
the case. Perry Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 497, 531 P.2d 584, 585
(1975). The absence of findings and conclusions may ·be disregarded by the
appellate court only where the record is clear, and yields an obvious answer to the
relevant question. Perry Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, supra; see, e.g., Clements v.
Clements, 91 Idaho 732, 430 P.2d 98 (1967); Call v. Marler, 89 Idaho 120, 403
P.2d 588 (1965); Merrill v. Merrill, 83 Idaho 306, 362 P.2d 887 (1961). Absent
such circumstances, the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law concerning the material issues arising from the pleadings,
upon which proof is offered, will necessitate a reversal of the judgment and a
remand for additional findings and conclusions, unless such findings and
conclusions would not affect the judgment entered ....

Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,225,646 P.2d 988,996 (1982). "1.R.C.P. 52(a)
clearly establishes that a court sitting without a jury has the responsibility of making findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the issues before it. Issues presented to the trial court for
resolution must be resolved." Owen v. Boydstun, 102 ldaho 31, 35,624 P.2d 413,417 (1981).
"On appeal pursuant to an allegation of error, if it appears that an issue was before the lower
court but that court failed to make the mandatory findings thereon as required by Rule 52(a), the
case normally will be remanded with directions that the appropriate findings be made." Id. at 36,
624 P.2d at 418.
Rule 52(b), LR. C.P. provides: '•On a party's motion filed no later than 14 days after the
entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings, or make additional findings, and may
amend the judgment accordingly." "This Court has previously held that a court may not consider
new evidence when asked to amend findings of facts or conclusions of law under LR.C.P.
52(b)." Sweet v. Foreman, 159 Idaho 761,367 P.3d 156, 161 (2016).
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B. Motion to Reconsider
Rule l 1.2(b)( 1) states:
A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment
may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final
judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after the entry of final
judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the order.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained:
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l(a)(2)(B). On a
motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence
or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH Mortg.
Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P .3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823,
800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, a motion for reconsideration need not be
supported by any new evidence or authority. When deciding the motion for
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the
court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. In other
words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so
is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original
order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the
motion for reconsideration.

Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
C. Prejudgment Interest
"An award of prejudgment interest by a trial court is reviewed for abuse of discretion."
Silver Creek Seed, LLC v. Sunrain Varieties, LLC, 161 Idaho 270,275,385 P.3d 448,453
(2016).

III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs ask this Court to amend its FOFCOL to make the following additional findings:
•

Incremental profits are determined before considering debt service and sunk costs;

•

After considering incremental profits, debt service, and sunk costs, the temporary
facility lost money; and
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•

Which specific line items in Exhibit 8 were eliminated from this Court's damages
calculation and why.

Teton County, in turn, asks this Court to amend its FOFCOL to add the following
findings:
•

The amount of annual incremental profits and net profits/losses between 2007 and
2017; and

•

The nature of the causal link between Teton County's breach and Plaintiffs' reliance
damages.

Plaintiffs also ask this Court to amend its legal conclusions to add or amend the following
conclusions:
•

Plaintiffs' damages should not be reduced by the difference between sales proceeds
and costs of sales because Burns Concrete incurred additional, unspecified costs of
operation which exceeded sales; and

•

Damages were mathematically ascertainable, sufficient to permit prejudgment
interest.

Plaintiffs also ask this Court to reconsider its February 12, 2018, Memorandum Decision
and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Motion in Limine in which this Court held that
rescission of the Agreement was not available. Plaintiffs ask that if rescission is not ordered, that
this Court:
•

Enjoin Teton County from rezoning the property while Plaintiffs are not in material
breach of the Agreement;
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•

Order the 18-month period allowing operation of the temporary facility remain tolled
until Teton County has undertaken all possible action to permit construction of the
permanent facility; and

•

Order Teton County to rescind its revocation of Plaintiffs' authority to operate the
temporary facility.

A. Motion to Amend FOFCOL
1. Definitions of incremental profits and net profit/loss
Plaintiffs ask this Court to add a finding that incremental profits are determined before
considering debt service and sunk costs. Teton County does not object to this definition, but
proposes defining incremental profits as the difference between revenue and the cost of goods
so]d and operating expenses. Teton County also asks that this Court to define net profit/loss as
incremental profit/loss less interest on debt, repayment of debt principal, capital expenditures and
taxes.
The definitions put forth by the parties are consistent with the evidence produced at trial.
Consequently, this Court agrees to supplement its FOFCOL with the following findings:

•

Incremental profit is calculated as the difference between revenue and the cost of
goods sold and operating expenses; costs associated with debt service and sunk costs
are not considered when determining incremental profits.

•

Net profit/loss is calculated as the difference between incremental profit/loss less
interest on debt, repayment of debt principal, capital expenditures and taxes.

2. Net loss
Plaintiffs ask this Court to add a finding that the temporary facility lost money after
considering incremental profits, debt service, and sunk costs.
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The evidence supports this finding. The FOFCOL should be amended to add the
following finding of fact:
•

During its operation, the temporary facility suffered a net loss when considering
incremental profits, debt service, and sunk costs.

3. Exhibit 8 line items
Plaintiffs contend that this Court failed to make findings "with respect to the accuracy of
the information presented in Trial Exhibit 8 and its multiple columns." Mem. in Support of Ps'
M. at 4. Plaintiffs urge that this Court's determination of accuracy will be essential on remand if
the Supreme Court reverses and remands this Court on the issues of prejudgment interest and

--

interest for loss of use.of property. Plaintiffs add that because this Court (i~! ~~rify which

-

-

.

- .,.._______

Exhibit 8 line items it eliminated in calculating damages, the appellate court will not be able to
determine whether this Court appropriately applied the law to the facts.
In its FOFCOL, this Court described the contents of Exhibit 8 and how it was compiled.
The Court stated: "This Court accepts the majority of those expenses shown on Exhibit 8 as
legitimately incurred in reliance on the Agreement. However, this Court finds that several
categories of expenditures were not sufficiently proven or were not incurred in reliance on the
Agreement." FOFCOL at 8. This Court then went on to list which categories of expenditures
were not sufficiently proven or incurred in reliance on the Agreement. The FOFCOL clearly
establishes that with the exception of the excluded categories, this Court found the expenditures
listed in Exhibit 8 to be accurate and legitimately incurred. The Court's findings sufficiently
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provide a clear understanding of the basis of its decision. This Court need not specifically
identify each line item by number nor make findings specific to each column. 1

4. Annual profits and losses for 2007 through 2017
Teton County notes that this Court previously held that any reliance damages suffered by
Plaintiffs would be offset by "any loss [Teton County] can prove with reasonable certainty
[Plaintiffs] would have suffered had the contract been performed.,, Feb. 12, 2018, Memorandum
Decision and Order (quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ 38
(2011)). Teton County argues that this Court did not offset Plaintiffs' reliance damages by such
a loss and asks this Court to amend its FOFCOL to add the following specific findings regarding
incremental profit and net profit/loss for the years 2007 -2017. Teton County argues such
findings will allow the appellate court to better understand this Court's decision and to consider
alternative conclusions.
This Court finds it unnecessary to make the specific findings requested by Teton County.
TheFOFCOL stated:
•

"Burns Concrete made an incremental profit every year it operated the temporary
facility."

•

"If Bums Concrete had been able to continue operating the temporary facility it
would have made incremental profits every year from 2010 on. Bums Concrete's
revenues would have permitted it to recover its costs over time, pay off all of its debt
and produced a net income2 by 2017."

FOFCOL at 8. This Court also concluded:
Toe last four columns of Exhibit 8, pertaining to the calculation of prejudgment interest, were
not admitted into evidence.
2 This Court notes that use of the word income in the quoted finding of fact was a clerical error.
The finding should have stated that Burns Concrete would have produced a net profit by 2017.
1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AMENDED AND ADDITIONAL
FlNDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 8

Page 244

•

"Teton County did not establish Plaintiffs would have suffered losses entitling them
to an additional offset."

FOFCOL at 16. Additionally, as discussed above, this Court is amending its findings to make
the following additional finding:
•

During its operation, the temporary facility suffered a net loss when considering
incremental profits, debt service, and sunk costs.

Although this Court found that Plaintiffs suffered a net loss during the temporary
facility's operation, that determination alone does not justify an offset in the amount of reliance
damages. While Plaintiffs suffered a loss during the temporary facility's operation, it was
projected, even by Teton County's expert, to make a net profit by 2017. This Court should not
and does not confine its consideration of loss to the less than three years of operation. See
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ 38, ill. 7 (explaining that plaintiff
has no claim to reliance damages when defendant establishes with reasonable certainty that
plaintiff would have operated at a loss "at all times" and in excess of his uncompensated preperformance expenditures);
As Kirk Burns testified, a new business of this magnitude and nature would have
expected losses for the first few years. This Court finds that to be the case even if Teton County
had not breached the Agreement. If the Agreement had been fully performed, Plaintiffs would
have paid off its expenses (including those encompassed by the reliance damages) and debt and
produced a net profit by 2017. Teton County did not establish that Plaintiffs would have
suffered a net loss even if it had been allowed to continue in operation. Teton County failed to
prove losses sufficient to offset Plaintiffs' reliance damages.
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5. Causation
Teton County notes that this Court's calculation of damages included expenses related to
initiating the operation of the temporary facility. It argues that this Court did not, however, find
that Teton County's breach caused the temporary facility's operation. It also notes that this
Court found that "Bums Concrete's decision to cease operations in 2010 was based, at least in
part, on the existence of an unfavorable environment in Teton County, created by the actions of
the Teton County Board of Commissioners." FOFCOL at 8. Teton County emphasizes that the
Commissioners' actions only played a part in Burns Concrete's decision to cease operations two
years prior to Teton County's breach of the Agreement. Teton County points out that its actions
constituting breach of the Agreement had not yet occurred by 2010 and consequently, this
Court's calculation of damages should be reduced to account for the other possible causes behind
the cessation in operations. Teton County asks this Court to explain the causal link between
Teton County's breach and the proposed damages award.
Given the chronology involved, this Court did not and could not find that initiation of the
temporary facility's operation was caused by Teton County's breach. Rather it was caused by
Plaintiffs' reliance on the Agreement. The applicable standard applied to reliance damages is:
A party aggrieved by a breach of contract may be entitled to reimbursement for
losses caused by its reliance on the contract, even if the aggrieved party elects to
rescind the contract. Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195,
198, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Ct.App.1986}. Reliance damages include expenses
reasonably related to the purposes of the contract which would not have been
incurred but for the contract's existence. Id. at 198-200, 722 P.2d at 1065-1067.

Be<:o Const. Co. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 9, 936 P.2d 202, 207 (Ct. App. 1997).
The fact that Teton County had not yet breached the contract when Burns Concrete
incurred many ofits expenses in reliance on the Agreement is immaterial to the determination of
reliance damages. Teton County had created a sufficiently hostile environment as to cause, at
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least in part, Plaintiffs' decision to cease operations in Driggs. Subsequently, Plaintiffs
continued to seek a variance to construct the permanent facility. After Plaintiffs were denied the
variance, Teton County sent Plaintiffs letters revoking Plaintiffs' ability to operate the temporary
facility and demanding the temporary facility's removal. Teton County's actions breached the
Agreement. Both the County's actions prior to cessation of operations in 2010 and in breach of
the Agreement prevented Plaintiffs from operating under the terms of the Agreement. Because
Teton County breached the Agreement, Plaintiffs were entitled to recover "Performance-based
damages ... measured by uncompensated expenditures made in reasonable reliance on the
contract, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance .... "
See FOFCOL at 13 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§

38(2)(a) (2011)). This Court found that the reliance damages awarded Plaintiffs were "made in
reasonable reliance on the Agreement." FOFCOL at 8. To aid in clarification on the issue of
causation, this Court now adds that the following finding:
•

Burns Concrete incurred $1,461,393.53 in losses caused by its reliance on the
Agreement. Those reliance damages were reasonably related to the Agreement's
purpose. Burns Concrete would not have incurred the expenses if not for the
Agreement's existence.

6. Accounting for sales proceeds, costs of sales, and additional, unspecified costs of
operation

Plaintiffs ask this Court to reconsider its conclusion that the award of reliance damages
should be reduced by the difference between the amount of sales revenue and the cost of sales.
Plaintiffs argue that they incurred other costs in operating the temporary facility and suffered a
net loss each year that the facility operated. They contend that because they suffered a net loss
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during the facility's operation, sales revenues should not diminish their amount of reliance
damages.
Teton County responds that Plaintiffs refused to provide specifics pertaining to the
additional expenses it now wishes to receive credit for. Teton County argues that without any
such specifics, this Court cannot use those additional indeterminate expenses to adjust the
amount of reliance damages.
This Court acknowledges and accepts Plaintiffs' argument that its costs and expenses
outpaced its sales revenues. Nonetheless, no evidence was submitted at trial that would allow
this court to account for such generalized additional expenses. Neither is there any way for this
Court to ensure such additional, unidentified expenses were not already included in Exhibit 8 and
awarded as reliance damages or related to equipment retained or sold by Plaintiffs and not
requested as damages. The evidence regarding these additional, unspecified expenses is too
vague to include in calculating reliance damages.

7. Prejudgment Interest
Plaintiffs argue that Teton County did not dispute any of the amounts or dates of payment
of any of the claimed expenses awarded by this Court as damages. Plaintiffs add that those costs
were capable of being ascertained by mere mathematical process and, therefore, this Court
should award prejudgment interest on those expenses allowed.
Teton County responds that it could not have ascertained the amount of damages prior to
trial. It adds that the case law does not support the idea that the ability to ascertain the amount of
damages by line item, as opposed to by claim, is sufficient to establish a right to prejudgment
interest.
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The determination whether to award prejudgment interest is a matter of discretion. Silver

Creek Seed, supra.
Idaho statutory law, Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award
of prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law likewise
calls for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust enrichment. Jones v.
Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Ct.App.1987). Under either
the statute or the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, however, prejudgment
interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or readily
ascertainable by mathematical process. Id; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706,
727 P.2d 893, 897 (Ct.App.1986). This limitation is based upon "equitable
considerations," Farm Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920, 478 P.2d
298, 300 (1970), which presumably include the notion that a person who could
not determine the amount owed should not be charged interest on the sum that is
ultimately found to be due. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 654 (1988). However,
"where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere
mathematical processes" interest is allowed from a time prior to judgment, "for in
that event the interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over
other equitable considerations." Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at
300 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle
Co., 92 Idaho 889, 900, 452 P.2d 993, 1004 (1969)). See also Doolittle v.
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. 1Vo. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 814, 919 P.2d 334, 343
(1996); Davis v. Prof/ Bus. Serv., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 817, 712 P.2d 511, 518
(1985); Child, 111 Idaho at 706--07, 727 P.2d at 897-98.
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without
incurring interest expense by
disputing
and
litigating
any
claim,
and prejudgment interest would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc. v.
Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751, 682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct.App.1984). See
also Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 235, 506 P.2d 455, 462 (1972). Rather,
damages are unascertainable where some factor necessary to calculate the
amount of damages must be determined by a trier offact. Conversely:
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed,
makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance
upon opinion or discretion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a
fixed sum, claims for money had and received, claims for money paid out.
and claims for goods or services to be paid for at an agreed rate.

Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d 555,
561 n. 2 (Ct.App.1993), affd, 125 Jdaho 409,871 P.2d 826 (1994). There need be
no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justify the award
of prejudgment interest. Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at
300; Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720, 723, 838 P.2d 323, 326
(Ct.App.1992).
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Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276-77, 178 P.3d 639, 641--42 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added).
Ross describes several examples of liquidated claims that may be computed with
exactness: "claims upon promises to pay a fued sum, claims for money had and received, claims
for money paid out, and claims for goods or services to be paid for at an agreed rate." Ross,

supra, (quoting Seubert, supra) (emphasis added). These examples indicate a claim that would
be easily known to or discoverable by the defendant.
This is not a case involving more straightforward "paid out" expenses, as in Ross, supra.
In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals found the bulk of plaintiffs payments to be readily
ascertainable. 3 The plaintiff in Ross made payments to defendant's direct benefit. Those
payments consisted of three checks paid towards the purchase of defendant's real property, a
payment towards construction of a home on the property. and a payment towards the home's
heating and cooling system. Unlike the facts in this case, where Teton County was not made
aware of the amount of claimed expenses until Plaintiffs prepared Exhibit 8, the defendant in

Ross was presumably always aware of plaintiffs payments towards the purchase and
construction of defendant's real property and home. The amount of the payments was never at
issue.
In Huber, quoted by Plaintiffs, prejudgment interest was awarded on plaintiff's unpaid
salary. The amoW1t of plaintiff's unpaid salary was not in question. Huber v. lightforce USA;" - ·

lnc.• 159 Idaho 833, n.6, 367 P.3d 228,240 (2016) ("parties agreed that Huber's salary was
$180,000 and, therefore, the amount owed was certain and exact.").
Teton County had no way of determining the amount owed until Burns Concrete's
controller, its attorney, and Kirk Bums spent a year examining thousands of pages ofinvoices,

3

Prejudgment interest was ultimately not awarded in Ross because of a non-liquidated offset.
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checks and other financial records to determine and apportion which expenses were attributable
4

to the Driggs facility. See Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276-77, 178 P.3d 639, 641-42 (Ct.
App. 2007) ("a person who could not determine the amount owed should not be
charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to be due''). Those thousands of pages of
supporting documents were compiled into more than seventy 1-2 inch binders, which were not
admitted into evidence. During trial, the parties and this Court frequently retrieved various
binders to examine the supporting documents.
Plaintiffs argue that as this Court went through each of the more than 7,000 line items in
Exhibit 8, the Court's acceptance of any individual line item made that item a "believed" "claim"
which was then "possible to compute ... with exactness." Ross, supra. The problem with
Plaintiffs' contention is that this Court had to rely on its discretion to determine which line items
to accept and which to reject. As discussed in the FOFCOL, and in this memorandum decision,
this Court found the evidence insufficient to support many of the items claimed by Plaintiffs.
Although Plaintiffs argue Teton County did not object to the amount or date of payment
of any of the expenses awarded as reliance damages, Teton County objected to any award of
reliance damages and disputed that any of Plaintiffs' claimed damages were caused by Teton
County's breach of the Agreement. Teton County's failure to object to any specific line item
does not, by itself, render that line item mathematically ascertainable. Rather, this Court had to
weigh the evidence on damages to determine whether the amounts were reasonable. See Bouten

Cons/. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,763,992 P.2d 751, 758 (1999) ("The amount

4

For example, line item# 2334 in Exhibit 8 attributes $0.06 of a check totaling $2,847.93 to the
Driggs project for payment of state unemployment tax. Exhibit 8 contains hundreds, if not
thousands, of similar line items, apportioned from larger amounts. Teton County had no means
of deciphering these claimed expenses prior to production of Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 8's
supporting documents.
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of damages became liquidated when the district court determined which of the amounts had been
proven to be reasonabJe. "). That determination included whether costs incurred prior to the
Agreement's execution were incurred in reliance. Even for those damages claimed after the
Agreement's executio~ it was necessary for this Court to evaluate the claimed expenses and
determine whether they could properly be attributed to reliance damages. While this Court
determined that a majority of Exhibit 8's line items were reasonably incurred in reliance on the
Agreement, that determination was not made until after trial.
Considering the inequity of Teton County's inability to ascertain the amount of claimed
damages prior to Plaintiffs' preparation of Exhibit 8 and its supporting binders, along with the
fact that this Court had to use its discretion to determine which damages were reasonably
incurred in reliance on the Agreement, plaintiffs' claimed expenses did not become liquidated or
mathematically ascertainable until after trial. Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of
prejudgment interest.
B. Motion for Reconsideration
1. Rescission

Plaintiffs ask this Court to reconsider its finding that they benefitted from the zone
change and to reconsider its conclusion that rescission of the Agreement is not available as a
result of that benefit. Plaintiffs emphasize that they suffered a net loss as a result of their
operations and cannot, therefore, be said to have benefitted from the Agreement.
''Rescission is an equitable remedy within the discretion of the trial court." Bolognese v_
Forte, 153 Idaho 857,864,292 P.3d 248,255 (2012). As noted by this Court in its February 12,

2018, Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Motion in Limine, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that "The party desiring to rescind a contract must, prior to
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rescinding, tender back to the other party any consideration or benefit received under the contract
by the rescinding party." Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 181, 45
P.3d 829, 837 (2002); accord Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818,821,683 P.2d
854, 857 (1984) ("Also important herein is the rule oflaw that the party desiring to rescind a
contract must, prior to rescinding, tender back to the other party any consideration or benefit
received under the contract by the rescinding party.").
Although Plaintiffs argue that it did not receive a benefit under the Agreement because it
suffered a net loss from its operations, they have not offered any authority in support of their
assertion that benefit is synonymous with profit. In February 2007, Teton County approved a
zone change of the property from C-3 (commercial) to M-1 (light industrial), conditional on
Burns Holdings entering a development agreement with the County. That zone change and the
Agreement enabled Plaintiffs to develop and operate a ready-mix concrete manufacturing
facility. Plaintiffs operated the temporary facility for more than two years between the end of
2007 and the beginning of 2010. Although Plaintiffs suffered a net loss during the facility's
operation, this Court found in its FOFCOL that:

If Burns Concrete had been able to continue operating the temporary facility it
would have made incremental profits every year from 2010 oh.. Burns Concrete's
revenues would have permitted it to recover its costs over time, pay off all of its
5
debt and produce a net income by 2017.
FOFCOL at 8. At trial, Kirk Burns testified:
Any business that greenfields or starts brand new is going to have losses for
probably the first five, six years, potentially. It always is that way. You have to
cover your costs before you're making true profit.
Tr. p. 275, 11. 22-25. Under Plaintiffs' theory, a party making annual incremental profits
sufficient to pay down significant start up costs and debts would not be benefitting from the

5

See footnote 2.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AMENDED AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 17

Page 253

operations until qfter all initial start up costs are paid off and a net profit is realized. Plaintiffs'
interpretation is untenable. Plamtiffs benefited from the zone change to light industrial, which
permitted the operation of the temporary facility for more than two years. Plaintiffs made
incremental profits each year it operated.
Plaintiffs have not made any attempt to render back to Teton County any consideration or
benefit it received under the Agreement. Neither have Plaintiffs attempted to place a value
(other than to say there is none) on that benefit. This Court is uncertain that the value of Teton
County's benefit under the Agreement can be determined or that the parties could be returned to
their pre-contract status quo.
As quoted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 777-79,
747 P.2d 1302, 1306-08 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 4.3 at 256 (1973)), and by this Court in its February 12, 2018, Memorandum
Decision and Order:
[I]t does not follow that rescission is given for every serious mistake. The parties
may have changed position, or restoration may be extremely difficult to compute
with any assurance of accuracy, or rescission and restitution may be a radical and
destructive remedy where an award of damages may repair the mistake with a
minimum of dislocation. Thus the remedy is neither given nor withheld
automatically, but is awarded as a matter of judgment.
More than eleven years have passed since the parties executed the Agreement. Plaintiffs
operated the temporary facility as a light industrial use for more than two years of that period,
receiving an undetermined benefit. The award of reliance damages should sufficiently
compensate Plaintiffs without the necessity of rescission.
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on the issue of rescission should be denied.

2. Order in lieu of rescission
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Plaintiffs ask this Court to enter an order: (1) estopping Teton County from rezoning the
subject property; (2) declaring the 18-month period for operation of the temporary facility to be
tolled until Teton County permits construction of the permanent facility; and (3) ordering Teton
County to rescind and withdraw its revocation of Plaintiffs' authority to operate the temporary
facility.
Teton County argues that trial in this case was limited to the issue of damages and that
the parties did not present evidence or argument pertaining to Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory or
injunctive relief. Teton County adds that the parties agreed at the pre-trial conference that
damages was the only issue to be tried and that Plaintiffs' trial brief did not address declaratory
or injunctive relief. The County argues that Plaintiffs have waived these equitable claims.
Plaintiffs reply that the Supreme Court's decision in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton Cty.,
161 Idaho 117, 120-21, 384 P.3d 364, 367-68 (2016), reh'g denied (Dec. 6, 2016) (Burns II) sets
forth the legal grounds for their request. They add that Kirk Burns's uncontroverted trial
testimony supports the equitable relief they request. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Teton County
consented to trial of the issues, either expressly or implicitly.
Plaintiffs' Trial Brief stated that it addressed "each issue of law to be litigated at trial."
Plaintiffs' Trial Br. at 1. Plaintiffs' brief did not, however, raise any of the equitable issues on
which Plaintiffs now seek judgment. Neither were the issues discussed at pretrial conference.
As noted by this Court in its FOFCOL, trial was held on the issue of damages.
The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Burns II was limited to the determination that the
Agreement's force majeure clause applied to Plaintiffs' inability to obtain zoning approval for
construction of the permanent facility. Because the force majeure clause applied, the 18-month

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AMENDED AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 19

Page 255

limit on the temporary facility's operations was tolled. 6 Plaintiffs' request is recognized to the
extent it claims the 18-month time limit was tolled. But Plaintiffs ask this Court to go further
and order that the 18-month period is tolled "until Teton County has taken all such action within
its control that is necessary for it to permit the construction of the permanent facility." Mem. in
Support of Ps' M. at 9. The parties have not briefed, argued or otherwise tried this issue or the
other equitable issues.
Plaintiffs also cite Bias v. State, 164 Idaho 198,427 P.3d 830 (Ct. App. 2018), review
denied (Oct. 10, 2018), for the proposition that a court may decide an unplead issue if tried with
the parties' implied consent. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, a motion to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence under
I.R.C.P. 15(b) should be granted. Lynch v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238, 241, 561 P.2d
380, 383 (1977). The requirement that the unpled issues be tried by at least the
implied consent of the parties assures that the parties have notice of the issues
before the court and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and
argument.

Id 427 P.3d at 833.
Plaintiffs cite to numerous portions of Kirk Burns's trial testimony, arguing that his
testimony established facts supporting the claimed relief. They argue the issues were tried with
Teton County's implied consent. This Court disagrees. The cited testimony more directly
related to the issue of reliance damages. If the testimony was meant to apply to the equitable
issues now argued, this Court did not perceive it as such. While the testimony may have
supported the issues, it was in no way presented or argued in such a way as to place Teton

6

See February 12, 2018, Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and
Motion in Limine at 12 ("By denying Bums Holdings the right to operate the Temporary
Facility, the County violated, nullified and significantly impaired one of the Agreement's
benefits-namely that Burns Holdings could continue to operate the Temporary Facility beyond
18 months if a delay outside Burns Holdings' control occurred.").
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County on notice that the equitable issues were being tried. Teton County did not have an
opportunity to address those issues with either evidence or argument
Plaintiffs did not mention these equitable issues in their Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Instead, they raised the issues in their Rebuttal of Defendant's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Proposed Conclusions of Law.
Plaintiffs' request to make additional conclusions of law based on Plaintiffs' untried
equitable claims should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
This Court makes the following additional findings of fact stemming from the court trial
in this case:
•

Incremental profit is calculated as the difference between revenue and the cost of
goods sold and operating expenses; costs associated with debt service and sunk costs
are not considered when determining incremental profits.

•

Net profit/loss is calculated as the difference between incremental profit/loss less
interest on debt, repayment of debt principal, capital expenditures and taxes.

•

During its operation, the temporary facility suffered a net loss when considering
incremental profits, debt service, and sunk costs.

•

Burns Concrete incurred $1,461,393.53 in losses caused by its reliance on the
Agreement. Those reliance damages were reasonably related to the Agreement's
purpose. Burns Concrete would not have incurred the expe~ if not for the
Agreement's existence.

With the exception of the above-noted amending findings, Plaintiffs' motion to amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law is denied.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AMENDED AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 21

Page 257

Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on the issue of rescission is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _L_Yday of

.-

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this ~a~ day of
AA ~
2019, I did send a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties list below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon, or by electronic delivery.

=!am ,

Robert B. Burns
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER

800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Billie J. Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

230 North Main, Suite 125
Driggs, ID 83442

Clerk of the District Court
Teton County, Idaho
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Electronically Filed
2/21/2019 11:14 AM
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Kim Keeley, Clerk of the Court
By: Gabriela Hermosillo, Deputy Clerk

Filed: 02/28/2019 15:48:42
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Kim Keeley, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hansen, Phyllis

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation,
and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2013-165
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC are jointly awarded damages
against Defendant Teton County in the sum of One Million Forty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty and 90/100’s Dollars ($1,049,250.90); and
2. The running of the 18-month period provided in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Developer’s
Agreement for Burns Holdings, LLC, recorded September 5, 2007 by the Teton County Recorder
as Instrument No. 191250, pertaining to the construction of the Permanent Facility defined and

JUDGMENT - 1
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described in such agreement is tolled in accordance with the Supreme Court of Idaho’s opinion
in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d 364 (2016).
DATED __________________.

399.53,?'-z

Signed: 2/22/2019 12:59 PM

DANE H. WATKINS, JR.
District Judge

k¢ .l‘

é

.c'

g“!

TETON

COUNTY

g;

a

IDAHO
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CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on _________________,
28 February 2019 I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Billie Jean Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Telephone: (208) 354-2990
Facsimile: (208) 354-2994
Email: bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us
lblake@co.teton.id.us

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Robert B. Burns
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
Email: rburns@parsonsbehle.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings,
LLC

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

mm
Clerk of the Court
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Electronically Filed
2/28/2019 5:52 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Kim Keeley, Clerk of the Court
By: Gabriela Hermosillo, Deputy Clerk

Billie J. Siddoway, ISB # 6628
bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us
Lindsey A. Blake, ISB # 7920
lblake@co.teton.id.us
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
230 North Main, Suite 125
Driggs, ID 83442
Telephone: 208-354-2990
Service Email: prosdocs@co.teton.id.us

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Teton County
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TETON COUNTY
BURNS CONCRETE, INC. and
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,

Case No. CV-2013-165

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.
TETON COUNTY,
Defendant/Appellant.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, BURNS CONCRETE, INC.
AND BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, ROBERT B. BURNS,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant, Teton County, appeals against the abovenamed respondents, Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC, to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the final judgment entered in the above-entitled action on
February 28, 2019, the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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2. Appellant Teton County has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,
and the judgment described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1).
3. The issues which the appellant intends to assert in the appeal are:


Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on
respondents’ breach of contract claim;



Whether the district court erred in concluding that Burns Concrete
could recover contract damages;



Whether the district court erred in calculating damages;



Whether the district court erred in issuing declaratory judgment;



Whether the district court abused its discretion by granting, in part,
respondents’ motion to quash appellant’s subpoena to Bank of Idaho.

Appellant reserves the right to modify this statement of issues and assert
additional issues on appeal as allowed by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
4. An order has been entered sealing a portion of the record. The documents
in the record that have been sealed are trial exhibits H through L.
5. Appellant does not request the preparation of any transcript in addition to
those which have already been prepared.
6. Appellant does not request the inclusion of any documents in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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7. The undersigned certifies that:.
(a) A notice of this appeal has been served upon the reporter of the
trial, Amy Bland, by email to abland@co.bonneville.id.us.
(b) Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee
because it has not requested any additional transcripts.
(c) Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation
of the record because it is a subdivision of the state exempt from such fee under
Idaho Code § 67-2301.
(d) Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because it
is a subdivision of the state exempt from such fee under Idaho Code § 67-2301.
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of February, 2019.
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
/s/ Billie J. Siddoway
By: Billie J. Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Co-counsel for Teton County

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that date set forth below, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was caused to be filed electronically via File and Serve with
automated service to respondents via their counsel:
Robert B. Burns
rburns@parsonsbehle.com
Parsons Behle & Latimer
800 West Main St Ste 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208-562-4901
In addition, a copy was sent by electronic mail to Reporter Amy Bland at
abland@co.bonneville.id.us.
Date: February 28, 2019.
/s/ Billie Siddoway

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Electronically Filed
4/9/2019 4:43 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Kim Keeley, Clerk of the Court
By: Susan Hill, Deputy Clerk

Robert B. Bums, ISB #3744
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
rbums@parsonsbehle.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Cross-Appellants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation,
and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2013-165

NOTICE OF CROSSAPPEAL

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

TO THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT, TETON COUNTY, AND ITS
ATTORNEYS:
Billie J. Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Office of the Teton County
Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83442
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named cross-appellants, Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings,

LLC, appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1
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Judgment entered in the above entitled action on February 28, 2019, the Honorable Dane H.
Watkins, Jr., presiding. A copy of the Judgment being appealed is attached to this notice.
2.

The cross-appellants have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and

the Judgment described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1),
I.A.R.
3.

The cross-appellants’ preliminary statement of the issues they intend to assert on

cross-appeal is as follows:
(a)

Did the district court err in reducing the cross-appellants’ reliance

damages by $412,142.63 for incremental profits purportedly realized from operating their
temporary concrete facility?
(b)

Did the district court err in reducing the cross-appellants’ reliance

damages by $443,951.25 in net costs that were incurred for the temporary concrete facility
without identifying the specific costs and credits that were disallowed?
(c)

Did the district court err in disallowing prejudgment interest on the cross-

appellants’ reliance damages?
4.

No reporter’s transcript is requested by the cross-appellants in addition to the

complete trial transcript prepared under the Reporter’s Certificate of Amy L. Bland, dated July
30, 2019, for the March 7-9, 2018 and May 11, 2018 trial dates.
5.

The cross-appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk’s

record, together with any additional documents automatically included under Rule 28(b)(1),
I.A.R.:
(a)

Verified Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract

and Rescission, (iii) Unjust Enrichment, filed May 21, 2013;

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2
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(b)

Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013;

(c)

Final Judgment, filed July 13, 2015;

(d)

Remittitur, filed December 12, 2016;

(e)

Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment, filed May 2, 2017;
(f)

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Motion

in Limine, filed February 12, 2018;
(g)

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed

August 24, 2018;
(h)

Rebuttal of Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and Supplemental Proposed Conclusions of Law, filed August 31, 2018;
(i)

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Amended and

Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed October 25, 2018;

6.

(j)

Judgment, filed February 28, 2019, and

(k)

This Notice of Cross-Appeal.

The cross-appellants designate the following documents offered or admitted as

exhibits at trial to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition to those requested in the
original notice of appeal:
(a)

Exhibit 1 – Warranty Deed;

(b)

Exhibit 2 – Warranty Deed;

(c)

Exhibit 3 – Developer’s Agreement for Burns Holdings, LLC;

(d)

Exhibit 4 – Quitclaim Deed;

(e)

Exhibit 5 – Assignment and Assumption Agreement;
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(f)

Exhibit 7 - Bums Concrete, Inc. operating summary;

(g)

Exhibit 8 - Damages Schedule Thru 3/17/18 - All Items; and

(h)

Exhibit 31 - Lonepeak Expert Report, dated March 30, 2018 (hand

numbered excerpts followed by complete report).
7.

I certify:
(a)

That service of this Notice of Cross-Appeal has been made upon the

reporter, with no request for additional transcript to that previously prepared and paid for being
made;
(b)

That the actual reporter's fees of $3,900.00 for the complete trial transcript

have been paid;
(c)

That the estimated fees of $100.00 for including additional documents in

the clerk's record have been paid;
(d)

That the appellate filing fees in the amount of $144.00 have been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 9th day of April 2019.
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER

By

Isl Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Bums
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Cross-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of April 2019, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL to be served by the method indicated below
and addressed to the following:
Billie J. Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Office of the Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83442
Telephone: (208) 354-2990
Facsimile: (208) 354-2994
Email: bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us
lblake@co. teton. id. us

0

[ZI

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

!ZI

U.S. Mail

D
D
D

Attorney for DefendantlCounterclaimant
Amy L. Bland
Official Court Reporter
605 North Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 529-1350
Email: abland@co.bonneville.id.us

[ZI Facsimile

D
D
D

Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

Isl Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Bums
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Filed:02/28/2019 15:48:42
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Kim Keeley, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Hansen, Phyllis

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho corporation,
and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2013-165
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Plaintiffs Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings, LLC are jointly awarded damages
against Defendant Teton County in the sum of One Million Forty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty and 90/l00's Dollars ($1,049,250.90); and
2. The running of the 18-month period provided in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Developer's
Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC, recorded September 5, 2007 by the Teton County Recorder
as Instrument No. 191250, pertaining to the construction of the Permanent Facility defined and
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described in such agreement is tolled in accordance with the Supreme Court of Idaho's opinion
in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d 364 (2016).
Signed: 2/22/2019 12:59 PM

DATED

.............·•..
....•·
.
0

.··.

TETON
COUNTY
IDAHO

...

DANE H.,WATKINS, JR.
District Judge

.

.....·

·········
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CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 28 February 2019 , I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Billie Jean Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Telephone: (208) 354-2990
Facsimile: (208) 354-2994
Email: bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us
1b lake@co.teton.id. us

0

D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

D

iCourt E-File Delivery

0

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

L✓ Email

Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Robert B. Bums
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
Email: rbums@parsonsbehle.com

D
D

[2

D

Attorneys for P laintiffs/Counterdefendants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings,
LLC
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Electronically Filed
4/22/2019 9:02 AM
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Kim Keeley, Clerk of the Court
By: Susan Hill, Deputy Clerk

Billie J. Siddoway, ISB # 6628
bsiddoway@co.teton.id. us
Lindsey A. Blake, ISB # 7920
lblake@co.teton.id. us
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

230 North Main, Suite 125
Driggs, ID 83442
Telephone: 208-354-2990
Service Email: prosdocs@co.teton.id.us
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Teton County
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TETON COUNTY
BURNS CONCRETE, INC. and
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,

Case No. CV-2013-165

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 1

V.

TETON COUNTY,
Defendant/Appellant.
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, BURNS CONCRETE, INC.
AND BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, ROBERT B. BURNS,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE- ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellant, Teton County, appeals against the above-

named respondents, Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC, to the Idaho

1

Appellant amends paragraph 5 of this Notice to request preparation of the trial transcript.
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Supreme Court from the final judgment entered in the above-entitled action on
February 28, 2019, the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. presiding.
2. Appellant Teton County has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,
and the judgment described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(l).
3. The issues which the appellant intends to assert in the appeal are:
•

Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on
respondents' breach of contract claim;

•

Whether the district court erred in concluding that Burns Concrete
could recover contract damages;

•

Whether the district court erred in calculating damages;

•

Whether the district court erred in issuing declaratory judgment;

•

Whether the district court abused its discretion by granting, in part,
respondents' motion to quash appellant's subpoena to Bank of Idaho.

Appellant reserves the right to modify this statement of issues and assert
additional issues on appeal as allowed by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
4. An order has been entered sealing a portion of the record. The documents
in the record that have been sealed are trial exhibits H through L.
5. Appellant requests the preparation of the transcript for the trial held on
March 7, 8 and 9, 2018 and May 11, 2018.
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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6. Appellant does not request the inclusion of any documents in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28.
7. The undersigned certifies that:.
(a) A notice of this appeal has been served upon the reporter of the
trial, Amy Bland, by email to abland@co.bonneville.id.us.
(b) Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee
because it has not requested any additional transcripts.
(c) Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation
of the record because it is a subdivision of the state exempt from such fee under
Idaho Code § 67-2301.
(d) Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because it
is a subdivision of the state exempt from such fee under Idaho Code§ 67-2301.
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of April, 2019.
OFFICE OF THE TETON COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

/ s/ Billie J. Siddoway
By: Billie J. Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Co-counsel for Teton County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that date set forth below, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was caused to be filed electronically via File and Serve with
automated service to respondents via their counsel:
Robert B. Burns
rburns@parsonsbehle.com
Parsons Behle & Latimer
800 West Main St Ste 1300
Boise, ID 83 702
Fax: 208-562-4901
In addition, a copy was sent by electronic mail to Reporter Amy Bland at
abland@co.bonneville.id. us.
Date: April 22, 2019.

I sf Billie Siddoway
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Exhibit Log
Case Style:

Case: (;V..2013-165

Burns Concrete, Burns Holdings, LLC

Sort Order: Exhibit#

vs.
Teton County

Exhibit ID
Exhibit #

On Behalf Of
Source

Status
Date

Proj.
Return I

Type
Description

Exhibit Flag

Custody
Date

Custody Detail

'

CV-2013165-11
CV-2013165-11

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
03/08/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 PX 2 Warrant Deed

03/08/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

CV-2013165-13
CV-2013165-13

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
03/08/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 PX 4
Quit Claim
deed

03/08/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

CV-2013165-15
CV-2013165-15

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
03/08/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 PX 6 Answer and
Counterclaim

03/08/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

Total Count:

25

Page
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4
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Exhibit Log
Case Style:

Case: CV-2013-165

Burns Concrete, Burns Holdings, LLC
vs.
Teton County

Type
Description

Exhibit ID
Exhibit#

On Behalf Of
Source

Status
Date

Proj.
Return/

CV-2013165-18
CV-2013165-18

Other
Siddoway, Billie
Jean

Exhibit Admitted
03/08/2018

Default - Conversion
D:
01/01/1900 DX P County
Commission Minutes

03/08/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

CV-2013165-2
CV-2013165-2

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
03/08/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 PX 8 damages schedule

03/07/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

CV-2013165-21
CV-2013165-21

Other
Siddoway, Billie
Jean

Exhibit
De11ied/Not
Admitted
03/08/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 DX K

03/08/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

CV-2013165-29
CV-2013165-29

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
05/14/2018

Default - Conversion
D:
Net Loss
01/01/1900 PX 7
statement? Dated Jan
01,2007 - December 31
12010

05/14/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

Total Count:

25

Exhibit Flag

Sort Order: Exhibit#

Custody
Date

Custody Detail
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4
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Exhibit Log
Case Style:

Case: CV-2013-165

Burns Concrete, Burns Holdings, LLC

Sort Order: Exhibit#

vs.
Teton County

Type
Description

Exhibit ID
Exhibit#

On Behalf Of
Source

Status
Date

Proj.
Return/

CV-2013165-32
CV-2013165-32

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
05/14/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 PX 10 Damages
schedule thru 3/17 /18
only disputed items

CV-2013165-36
CV-2013165-36

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
05/14/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 PX 29
Permit Report
1/01/2007 - 3/1/2018

05/14/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

CV-2013165-38
CV-2013165-38

Other
Burns, Robert
Brett

Exhibit Admitted
05/14/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 PX 31 Expert Witness
report

05/14/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

Total Count: 25

Exhibit Flag

Custody
Date

Custody Detail

Teton County District Court: Default Conversion
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Exhibit Log
Case Style:

Case: CV-2013-165

Burns Concrete, Burns Holdings, LLC

Sort Order: Exhibit#

vs.
Teton County

Exhibit ID
Exhibit#

On Behalf Of
Source

Status
Date

Proj.
Return/

CV-2013165-41
CV-2013165-41

Other
Siddoway, Billie
Jean

Exhibit Admitted
05/16/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 DXF Financial
Statements Years ended
December 31, 2007 and
2006

05/16/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

CV-2013165-43
CV-2013165-43

Other
Siddoway, Billie
Jean

Exhibit Admitted
05/16/2018

D:
Default - Conversion
01/01/1900 DX H
Financial
Statements Years ended
December31,2011 and
2010

05/16/2018 Teton County District Court: Default Conversion

Total Count:

25

Type
Description

Exhibit Flag

Custody
Date

Custody Detail

Page

4

of

4

Printed on 04/29/2019 at 4:00 PM

Page 282

Amy L. Bland, CSR, RPR
Official Court Reporter
Seventh Judicial District
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 529-1350 Ext 1329
E-mail: abland@co.bonneville.id.us

**************************************************************
NOTICE OF LODGING

**************************************************************
DATE:

April 17, 2019

TO:

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court/ Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO: 46827-2019
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO:
CAPTION OF CASE:

CV-2013-165

Burns Concrete, Inc., et al. v. Teton County

You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate
transcript in the above-entitled and numbered case has been
lodged with the District Court Clerk of the County of Teton in
the Seventh Judicial District.
Said transcript consists of
the following proceedings, totaling 780 pages plus cover
sheet:
1.

Trial

(March 7, 8, 9 2018 and May 11, 2018)

Respectfully,
AMYL. BLAND
Idaho CSR #SRL-1053
cc:

District Court Clerk
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Filed: 05/06/2019 13:25:21
Seventh Judicial District, Teton County
Kim Keeley, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hansen, Phyllis
IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

Burns Concrete, Burns Holdings, LLC

CV—2013-165
Case No. CV-2013-165

vs.

Teton County

Phyllis A.

l,
I,

Hansen, Deputy Clerk of the

State of Idaho,

Record

in

Clerk’s Certificate of Service

in

and

for the

District

Court of the Seventh Judicial

County of Teton, do hereby

the above entitled cause

was

certify that the

electronically compiled at

my

further certify that

|

have caused

direction,

(if

Investigation,

and

is

a

true,

full

parties.

be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript

(if

D Exhibits offered or admitted; D No Exhibits submitted;
E
Confidential Documents; or D Confidential
or D Other Conﬁdential
Conﬁdential Exhibits

requested), along with copies of

D Pre-sentence

to

of the

above and foregoing

and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the

|

District,

all

applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties

in this

case as

follows:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

|

certify that

on May 03, 2019,

Robert Brett Burns
Billie

Jean Siddoway

Dated: 05/03/2019

|

served a copy of the attached

to:

rburns@parsonsbehle.com

[X]

By E-mail

bsiddoway@co.teton.id.us

[X]

By E-mail

05/06/2019

Kim Keeley
Clerk of the Court

By:

?ﬁyfl'is
Tﬁyffis

Hansen

Deputy Clerk

Clerk’s Certificate of Service

— Revised 07/01/2018
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